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Summary 
This thesis explores the role of expert-led policy processes in addressing water quality. It does 
so by drawing on the ‘peri-urban’ as a setting which exemplifies contemporary social and 
environmental challenges associated with river and groundwater pollution, as well as the health 
and livelihood implications for the poorest citizens in peri-urban areas. The peri-urban area of 
Ghaziabad, on the outskirts of New Delhi, provides a good reference point for understanding 
those challenges, while India’s environmental regulatory agency (the Central Pollution Control 
Board) demonstrates how policy experts influence such a setting by enacting their institutional 
role and mandate. 
 
The thesis examines the ways in which problems associated with deteriorating water quality in 
peri-urban areas are often neglected in expert-led policy processes, and the consequent 
implications for peri-urban poor communities. It argues that expert-driven policy approaches to 
addressing water quality are formulated almost exclusively on scientific grounds, while 
underlying ‘non-scientific’ decisions and choices, emerging from actors operating at levels from 
policy framing to policy implementation, are not awarded the same importance, thus ignoring 
issues that pertain to the social, environmental and political implications of the problems.   
 
By drawing on qualitative research, the thesis focuses on two case studies. One examines the 
Central Pollution Control Board’s framing of policy initiatives while the other follows the 
implementation of such policies in peri-urban Ghaziabad. The thesis demonstrates how the scale 
of monitoring water quality is heavily biased towards national rather than local level priorities. 
This leads to an understatement of important water quality problems that affect peri-urban areas 
in favour of large-scale analyses of pollution in river basins. This has the effect of understating 
important water quality problems that affect peri-urban areas in poorer localities such as villages 
within the Ghaziabad district. The centrality of technical discourses in the articulation of and 
response to water quality problems makes it difficult for non-technical perspectives (derived 
directly from those people who are exposed to pollution) to feed into formal decision-making. 
This research also identified the key influence of a number of actors (municipal engineers, 
public health officials and district magistrates) in shaping and implementing policy outcomes on 
the ground in local contexts (i.e. peri-urban areas), even though their roles are often not 
recognised formally. 
 
The thesis is original in its attempt to merge insights from policy studies and science technology 
studies (STS) and apply them to the domain of water quality, a field that has not traditionally 
been subjected to critical social science inquiry. It also unpacks ethnographically the Board’s 
dual role as both a policy advisor and regulator, and further illustrates how the enactment of 
these roles can lead to contradictory outcomes on the ground, particularly for the poorest peri-
urban citizens. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
In recent years a number of scholars have turned their attention to water, and to 
understanding the inherently politicised nature of its distribution, commodification, 
regulation and use (cf. Bakker, 2003, Swyngedouw, 2004, Baviskar, 2007). A growing 
body of literature on water also recognises that although ‘water’ is traditionally viewed 
in techno-managerial terms there are also other important meanings and ‘constructions’ 
of water emanating from the local community level and civil society, whose roles in 
policy processes are often not fully recognised (cf. Mehta, 2005, Mosse, 2005). So far, 
however, the emphasis in the literature has been on issues relating to access to water 
whilst water quality has not received as much focused attention and is often situated at 
the margins of the growing water debate.  
More focused research on water quality appears to be timely as well as relevant to 
existing water debates. The research and international policy community have already 
begun to identify a broad range of contemporary challenges posed by poor water 
quality. For instance, a recent report on wastewater management that was jointly 
researched and written by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
United Nations Habitat (UN-Habitat) has put forward the view that because of 
continuing population growth, urbanisation and intensification of food production, ‘the 
world is facing a global water quality crisis’ (Corcoran et al., 2010). As a consequence, 
the adverse environmental implications associated with the disposal of large quantities 
of untreated sewage and other effluents in rivers and groundwater have increased, as 
well as the number of people whose health is at risk from the contamination of the 
drinking water supply by human, industrial and agricultural waste (Murty, 1995).  
With more than half of the world’s population currently residing in growing megacities 
(such as in China, India and Brazil) with populations exceeding 8 million (Davis, 2004), 
many of these challenges are known to affect urban and peri-urban areas in developing 
countries. Particularly in growing peri-urban environments characterised by increasing 
marginalisation and environmental degradation (Marshall et al., 2009), water quality 
poses a very real and complex challenge for livelihoods and the environment. Water 
pollution caused by the largely unregulated disposal of industrial effluents and domestic 
wastewater places enormous pressures on local water resources (Satterthwaite, 2007).  
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Impaired quality of local water sources in turn has a much more severe impact on 
poorer communities that lack access to alternatives (such as piped water) and have to 
resort to using contaminated water to meet their basic water needs. According to the 
WHO, at least 4% of the global disease burden could be prevented by reducing people’s 
exposure to unsafe water (WHO, 2009: 12). For these reasons, international fora such as 
the recent 2010 Stockholm World Water Week are attempting to develop greater 
awareness of the multifaceted nature of water quality, involving both a ‘human’ and 
‘environmental’ dimension (SIWI, 2010).  
However, solutions to complex water quality problems are commonly perceived to lie 
almost entirely in major investments within a narrow range of engineering solutions, 
such as large scale wastewater and water treatment technologies (WSP, 2011). As a 
consequence of this, formal policy interventions have had only a small impact on the 
improvement of water quality in local contexts where the impact is often felt more 
severely by the poorest populations. Specifically, in developing economies like India 
(which is the focus of the greater part of this thesis), scientific and engineering 
knowledge is invariably and deeply involved with the framing and implementation of 
policies to deal with water quality, but also other policy areas such as natural resource 
management, environmental conservation and urban planning (Prakash, 1999). The 
strong ties that are formed between policy making and expert knowledge are often 
treated more critically by scholars because such knowledge can fail to take sufficient 
account of the interests of the poor in decision making processes (Fairhead and Scoones, 
2005, Movik and Mehta, 2009). Following from that, it is this thesis’ aim to explore the 
relationship between expert knowledge and water quality management on the basis of 
selected case studies in India. The approach adopted is intended to develop deeper 
insight into how expert knowledge is used to respond to emerging challenges regarding 
deteriorating water quality. 
The first case study of the thesis aims to contribute to such discussions by analysing the 
role of expert advisors (i.e. scientists and engineers) working within India’s 
environmental regulation agency called the Central Pollution Control Board (for short, 
the Board). This is of particular interest due to the Board’s dual role as both policy 
advisor and regulator, influencing both the framing of policy decisions and their 
execution and enactment in the public and political realms. The advisory role of the 
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Board mobilises scientific expertise and ‘know-how’ in order to propose policy 
responses to environmental problems, while its regulatory role has a direct bearing on 
the actual decision-making process, functioning as a validated, respected and prestigious 
scientific arm of the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). Drawing 
upon the work of scientists at the Board, the study hopes to deliver a more grounded 
understanding of scientific practice in India’s environmental regulatory institutions, and 
a better understanding of how scientists influence ‘official’ perceptions of water quality 
at the policy level. Some of the central themes with which this thesis will be concerned 
include how scientists define water quality, the policy priorities and interventions which 
tend to be inferred from the Board water quality assessments, and the unarticulated 
assumptions that shape relationships between experts and different stakeholder groups 
(including NGOs, poorer citizens affected by poor water quality, policy makers and 
government officials). 
The second case study contrasts the work of scientists at the Board with the way in 
which water quality problems manifest in especially challenging environments of the 
Global South, epitomised by peri-urban areas. Ghaziabad district, situated in the 
periphery of Delhi, is one such area. It is characterised by a complex array of water 
quality problems arising from the contamination of the groundwater, the environmental 
degradation of the local river Hindon and the fragmented provision of water supply and 
wastewater management services. The use of Ghaziabad as a case study is supported by 
a range of empirical observations of the local realities of impaired water quality. It 
enables valuable inferences to be drawn from the differences between the framing of 
policies at the national level (i.e. through the involvement of the Board) and the 
translation of these policies in peri-urban areas by multiple actor groups such as district 
officials, the regional pollution enforcement agency, and the water and health 
departments.  
Drawing insights from these two case studies, this study hopes to provide more general 
theoretical explanations of the use of expert knowledge to address impaired water 
quality. It is argued that although expert knowledge takes a major role in decision 
making processes relating to water quality management, it can underplay (or at times 
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completely overlook) critical issues in terms of pollution sources1 that are currently 
having the most (and potentially increasing) impact on the environment and the lives of 
poorer social groups. In addition, it is demonstrated that heavy reliance on technical 
notions of water quality can obscure the underlying inequalities and power relations that 
influence how the impact of deteriorating water quality is distributed across the 
population.  
In the sections that follow, the thesis briefly set the context, first by explaining how 
urbanisation and peri-urbanisation is taking place in India, and specifically in the 
context of New Delhi. Next it illustrates that urban change and peri-urbanisation pose a 
unique set of challenges for addressing water quality, and that a better understanding of 
these challenges requires a more careful analysis of the politics of knowledge and the 
underlying power relations which guide policy interventions. It then briefly explains the 
limitations posed by formal expert knowledge, closing with the research questions that 
guide this thesis and a brief outline of subsequent chapters.   
1.1. Drivers of urban change in India 
The social and environmental transformation of Delhi’s periphery is closely tied to 
wider changes taking place in India, such as those related to urbanisation, population 
growth and economic neo-liberalisation. In this context, Delhi is considered one of the 
fastest growing metropolises in South Asia. According to the Delhi Master Plan for 
2021, the urban core of Delhi, also known as the National Capital Territory (NCT), is 
highly urbanised with more than 90% of its population living in urban areas (i.e. far 
greater than the national average of 27.81%)(MoUD, 2007: 7). In addition, a 
continuation of the current demographic growth rate of nearly 4% per year (Kundu, 
2008: 45) suggests Delhi is one of the fastest growing cities in the country, with the 
projected urban population reaching 17.6 million people by the year 2015 (Ansari and 
Einsiedel, 1998: 3). Other Indian cities are also experiencing very high rates of 
urbanisation. By 2025, an estimated 70 Indian cities are expected to have a population 
exceeding one million. Three mega-urban regions: Mumbai–Pune (50 million), the 
                                                
1 One particularly widespread source of pollution comes from small scale factories, which are 
increasingly found to operate illegally in peri-urban areas.  
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national capital region of Delhi (more than 30 million) and Kolkata (20 million) will be 
among the largest urban concentrations in the world (Dyson and Visaria, 2004).  
The growing number of large Indian cities further reflects the region’s growing 
importance within the world economy, along with China and Africa. During the period 
2000 - 2005, India contributed nearly one fifth of the growth in Asian domestic demand, 
and it is expected to be the second largest demand driver in Asia, after China (Purfield 
and Shiff, 2006). Indian corporates are also emerging as key players in their own right. 
For instance, Reliance enterprises own one of the world’s largest oil-refining 
complexes, and Tata Steel is amongst the world leaders in steel manufacturing; both 
enterprises have expanded abroad in the United States as well as in several countries in 
Europe and Africa (ibid). Urban India overtook rural India in its share of GDP in the 
late 1990s, and urban per capita incomes are now more than three times those in rural 
areas (CSO, 2006).  
This unprecedented growth of cities in India has not remained unaffected by changes 
affecting the urban landscape worldwide. The evolution of capitalism, the decline of 
Fordist production as a dominant mode of accumulation and the increasing globalisation 
of markets as a result of technological change have combined to transform large cities 
into economically strategic places (Sassen, 1994). As a consequence of this 
restructuring there has been an intensification of connections between the world’s 
largest cities, or ‘global cities’2 (Sassen, 2000: 80), in terms of flows of raw materials, 
goods, information and capital (much of it managed by transnational corporations) 
(ibid). As Davis argues, such changes taking place in cities today should be viewed as a 
consequence of the ‘brutal tectonics’ of neoliberal globalisation (Davis, 2004: 23).  
Emerging megacities situated in developing societies, including Delhi, are perceived to 
have an important role in enhancing neo-liberalism. Indeed, since the 1990s multilateral 
aid agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, through their 
Structural Adjustment Programmes, have increasingly focused their attention on cities 
in developing economies, which are perceived as ‘engines of growth’, and therefore 
                                                
2 Saskia Sassen coined the term ‘global city’ to describe how the massive trends towards the spatial 
dispersal of economic activities at the metropolitan, national, and global levels that we associate with 
globalisation, are mediated by a relatively small proportion of the world’s cities such as London, Tokyo 
and New York. Whilst the majority of world cities are situated in developed economies, trade 
liberalisation and urban population growth in cities of the Global South suggests that an increasing 
number of global cities are also emerging rapidly within developing economies (Sassen, 2000).   
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directing substantial funds into urban ‘infrastructure’ and other service delivery 
mechanisms in order to facilitate this role (Kennedy and Zérah, 2008:110).   
For Neil Smith, neo-liberalism has provided an operative framework for the 
gentrification of the city (Smith, 1982). It has encouraged the state to re-organise urban 
space, displacing older, lower-value and historical land uses to make way for newer 
capital-intensive developments that can attract capital and fix it in physical 
infrastructure and land (ibid). As part of this process, an industrial economy is being 
transformed into a service based economy, while activities that are deemed undesirable 
are displaced into the peripheries, or relocated to marginal and unprofitable parts of the 
urban centres. A significant increase in the cost of living is another factor associated 
with gentrification, contributing to the displacement of the poorer urban residents that 
are unable to afford increased rents or house prices.  
In India, this mode of urban development has been pursued through the implementation 
of policies such as the Floor Space Index (FSI), which permits vertical growth in parts 
of the city with high land values (Kundu, 2002). This has been a huge incentive for 
major real estate developers to invest in Indian cities and to construct a plethora of high 
rise buildings, including multi-storied structures such as shopping malls, office blocks 
for business groups, and high-income residential houses. Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) are another government-led project established to attract capital into cities. They 
were created to increase the availability of land for private Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) companies, both domestic and foreign, to set up 
exclusive business enclaves on the peripheries of big cities (Ramachandraiah and 
Srinivasan, 2011). As a result, plans for the construction of ICT ‘parks’ such as Pritech 
Park (Mumbai), Shastri Park (Delhi) and ‘cities’, such as HiTec City (Hyderabad) and 
Electronic City (Bangalore), are being considered in several cities in India, while 
several SEZ projects are already complete (ibid).   
Alongside these developments, there has been a shift in the role of the Indian state from 
provider to facilitator and the welfare state is starting to be dismantled (Patnaik, 2007). 
Large infrastructure projects have been undertaken in key sectors such as electricity, 
water, sanitation and transport, through public/private partnerships, the outsourcing and 
contracting out of several functions of urban local governments (ibid)(Ramachandraiah 
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and Srinivasan, 2011). In the context of the urban transport sector, for instance, there 
has been massive financial investment in widening roads, constructing numerous 
flyovers, and, in Delhi, in the construction of the Delhi Metro Rail mass transit system 
(i.e. the first underground transport system in India)(Roy, 2004). For the burgeoning 
neo-liberal Indian state, allocation of lands and financial incentives to the private sector, 
as well as the construction of large infrastructural projects, are thus considered to be 
part and parcel of a policy to promote economic growth in an era of globalisation 
(Ramachandraiah and Srinivasan, 2011).  
However, such large investments in urban infrastructure have also been widely 
criticised for their distinct lack of attention to the urban poor working in Indian cities 
and living in slums and low-income settlements. In an analysis of the Delhi transport 
reforms, for instance, Siematycki argues that despite the positive ‘world class’ image of 
the city that the Delhi metro project aspires to create, it has in reality undermined the 
right of the urban poor to a genuinely ‘public’ transport service (2006:285) . This is due 
to a focus on increasing transport connectivity between affluent neighbourhoods, and by 
displacing slums for road and rail construction. Banerjee-Guha arrives at similar 
conclusions in an examination of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Plan 
and other government policies on a range of urban reforms taking place in Mumbai. She 
argues that although ‘the proposed plans aim to realise the immense opportunities 
offered by Mumbai’s role as an international business and financial centre, they fail to 
address the 60 percent of the population who live in slums and an even higher 
percentage who form the teeming multitude of unorganised workforce’ (2002:125). 
Such criticisms highlight the increasing inequalities between social classes in urban 
India which are often neglected by city planners and urban developers, yet are inherent 
to the process of global city development (Shatkin, 2007).  
The ‘invention’ of a new Indian middle class has been fundamental to the emergence of 
a wider national political culture of a liberalising India, which has opened its borders to 
a range of consumer goods that were unimaginable before the economic reforms of the 
1990s (Fernandes, 2004:2044). As a result, in the management of urban space, much of 
the emphasis of the state has been on the wealthier middle class segments and the 
aspirations of the rich to inhabit sanitised urban spaces (Baviskar, 2003). This middle 
class bias in the planning of Indian cities has become enmeshed in complex socio-
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spatial contradictions. Poorer sections of the population are integral to the urban 
economy. They provide essential services, including street cleaning, working in 
factories and on construction sites, or providing domestic help in the homes of the rich 
and the middle classes. Despite this, they are deemed undesirable and commonly forced 
to live in unauthorised settlements and slum areas. In the city of Delhi, for example, 
nearly 52% of the population lives in such settlements, and the situation is not very 
different in several other Indian cities (Narsiah and Ahmed, 2012). As Fernandes 
argues, these contradictions have emerged first through a ‘politics of distinction’ of the 
middle classes, and followed by a ‘politics of forgetting’ of the poor and working 
classes in the process of liberalisation (Fernandes, 2004).    
The state, with its monopoly, and the means of violence and the power to define 
legality, plays a crucial role in legitimising and further promoting these processes 
(Harvey, 2004). For instance, in Delhi, between 1990 and 2003, 51,461 houses were 
demolished under ‘slum clearance’ schemes that were endorsed by the Delhi city 
authorities (Hazards Centre, 2003). And thereafter, in the period between 2004 and 
2007, at least 45,000 homes were demolished. Fewer than 25 percent of the households 
evicted in that period were allocated any alternative settlement sites (ibid). These 
massive displacements of populations from the urban core are inextricably linked to the 
larger political, economic and aesthetic transformations taking place in Indian cities.  
For instance, the removal from the bank of the Yamuna River of a string of settlements 
(colloquially known as ‘Pushta’)3 is one of the numerous cases of slum clearances that 
have been justified on the grounds of urban renewal and development. In January 2003, 
the Indian Ministry of Tourism announced a plan to redevelop a 100-acre of strip of 
publicly owned land on the banks of the Yamuna River into a riverside promenade. 
Between February and April 2004, and after several 24-hour long operations involving 
armed police officers and bulldozer crews, the homes of nearly 35,000 families in 
Pushta were razed to the ground (Bhan, 2009). The eviction of the Pushta settlement 
residents received very little coverage in the media, while the involvement of the Delhi 
High Courts played a crucial role in legitimising the eviction operations, often by ruling 
in favour of appeals filed by middle class residents’ welfare associations and trade 
                                                
3 The majority of residents were daily wage workers, rickshaw pullers, domestic workers and recyclers 
who had migrated to Delhi for work, or had been brought by contractors to build infrastructure for the 
Asian Games in 1982(Bhan, 2009).  
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associations. Bhan further notes that these recent eviction strategies further mark an 
ideological shift in the judiciary since the adoption in the early 1990s of liberalisation 
policies that have resulted in reduced enforcement of the rights of marginalised groups 
(ibid). 
More recently, slum clearances in Delhi have become enmeshed with a ‘bourgeois 
environmentalist’ discourse (Baviskar, 2002: 41) mobilised by middle-class interest 
groups in courts to remove from the city the ‘aesthetically unpleasant’ sight of slums, 
and of factories that provide incomes for a large number of poor urban workers. 
Similarly, in Mumbai, Zerah describes how environmentalists sought to have the poor 
cleared from Sanjay Gandhi National Park on the grounds of promoting the 
beautification and environmental preservation of the park premises. The poor were 
blamed in court for destroying the environment of Sanjay Gandhi National Park, while 
the rich and middle classes were never considered to be part of the problem (Zérah, 
2007:122). This was irrespective of encroachment on the park’s reserves for middle 
class uses such as industry, restaurants and large residential bungalows.   
As the next section will demonstrate, the fact that certain social groups and activities are 
deemed undesirable within the urban core has a direct bearing on the type of roles and 
activities that are often characteristic of the peri-urban. In the context of this research, it 
is further understood to be an important driver of the various manifestations of 
environmental degradation, such as deteriorating water quality, which are becoming 
increasingly more acute in peri-urban areas as compared to the inner metropolitan 
region. 
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1.2. The peri-urban challenge: social and environmental 
transformations in Delhi’s periphery 
There is at this present juncture a growing body of research that attempts to 
conceptualise peri-urban areas. The term ‘peri-urban’ is often used to describe the rural 
fringe areas that surround cities and bear the consequences of urban expansion (Iaquinta 
and Drescher, 2000). However, in the peri-urban literature it is difficult to find one 
single definition of the term, as different definitions can apply depending on the 
circumstances. In some of the earlier work on peri-urbanisation, it is the proximity of 
the peri-urban to the city and the mixed rural-urban populations and land uses that seem 
to define the peri-urban, or as Ramachandran argues, ‘the point where agricultural land 
uses appear near the city and villages have distinct urban land uses’ (Ramachandran, 
1989:297). More recently however, a number of scholars have moved away from a 
‘place based’ definition, arguing that proximity to towns is not the single most defining 
characteristic; rather it is the linkages and flows of goods and services between rural and 
urban centres, as well as the institutional contexts that underpin them (Douglas, 2006).  
As a result, definitions of the peri-urban increasingly tend to return to a ‘process’ based 
description, as opposed to one that denotes a place with well-defined geographic 
boundaries (Narain & Nischal., 2007).    
In the proximity of the mushrooming South Asian cities, the peri-urban is increasingly 
seen as the product of deeper structural transformations in society. What is particularly 
relevant to an examination of the peri-urban in Indian cities is the acknowledgement 
that the complexity and heterogeneity that mark peri-urban spaces have been underlined 
increasingly by globalising imperatives, and growth which is brought about largely by 
outside forces (Thong, 1995, Arabindoo, 2006). The liberalisation of the Indian 
economy followed by a need to envision the city as a world-class centre for global 
capital, discussed in the previous section, is one such transformation. It has had a 
massive impact on the urban periphery by adding greater complexity to the relationship 
between the city and its periphery, and creating new forms of segregation, polarisation 
and socio-spatial fragmentation between the previously established village settlements 
and the more recent settlements of both the urban rich and middle classes (Arabindoo, 
2006: 24). That is why Arabindoo further argues, the peri-urban presents ‘a much richer 
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mix of varied elements that appear to oscillate between their desires and compulsions of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity’ (ibid: 25).  
The peri-urban agglomerations and townships of Ghaziabad (i.e. the subject of Chapter 
5), Gurgaon, NOIDA and Faridabad, on the outskirts of New Delhi, have been 
influenced in a number of ways by the mode of urban development shaping the capital. 
The Delhi Master Plan for 2021, which outlines the government’s vision for the city, 
mentions that, ‘Delhi…is a growing and expanding magnet of attraction for people from 
all across the country and also a hub for the region surrounding it’ (MoUD, 2007: 5) 
indicating the aspiration of city planners to associate the periphery with the capital.  
Similarly, the Ghaziabad Master Plan 2021, for instance, complements the vision of the 
regional plan of Delhi, stating that ‘any city located in the proximity of a large 
metropolis such as Delhi cannot be oblivious to developments taking place in the larger 
city’ (Ghaziabad Development Authority, 2006: 3).  
This aspiration to foster ‘interdependencies’ between the city and its periphery has also 
encouraged various antagonisms. In Gurgaon, out of 700 acres of what was previously 
cultivated farmland, about 500 acres have been acquired by agencies of the state, and 
100 acres have been voluntarily sold to private builders and property dealers (Narain, 
2009). In line with the principles of liberalisation, the purpose of these land acquisitions 
was to construct middle class residential colonies, shopping malls and corporate houses. 
Similar developments are about to happen in other parts of Delhi’s periphery, such as 
NOIDA and Ghaziabad. With the cost of buying property in Delhi increasing rapidly, 
many middle class households are moving to the periphery and commuting to Delhi for 
work as a more economically viable option than buying property in the capital (Kundu, 
2002). This is supported by easier travel between the city and the periphery as a result 
of the construction of rapid transport corridors such as motorways and railroads (but 
only for those peri-urban localities where new commercial and residential developments 
are taking place) (ibid). 
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Real estate companies and state agencies, taking a cue from these developments, 
perform the role of surrogate landlords, using revenues to buy more land in the 
peripheries which can then be sold on to the private sector and potential home buyers 
(Arabindoo, 2005). In the short term, some villagers with large land holdings benefit as 
they are paid large sums of money in return for their land. However, Narain’s 
observations in the context of Gurgaon suggest that in the long term the conversion of 
land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes has spawned a consumerist culture 
and led to the loss of livelihoods for many of the landless and migrants who either live 
as tenants in the villages and commute to the city to work as low paid labourers, or work 
for the farms of the village landlords (Narain, 2009).  
A vision of urban development that focuses on the remaking of Delhi into a global city 
has also meant that the social and environmental costs associated with urbanisation have 
become very unequally distributed between the urban core and its periphery. A series of 
developments to ‘beautify’ the city, culminated in Delhi becoming a host for the 2010 
Commonwealth Games (Ghertner, 2008) while the peri-urban areas surrounding Delhi 
were transformed into the ‘wastelands’ of development taking place elsewhere. The 
large-scale removal of unauthorised colonies, such as the clearance of the ‘encroaching’ 
Pushta settlements from the Yamuna River (discussed in the previous section), was 
closely linked to the pursuit of city beautification policies. Many of the poor that were 
displaced from Delhi have resettled into a number of urban villages in the periphery. In 
addition, since 1996, numerous PIL-based court orders in Delhi have further forced the 
closure and relocation of hundreds of factories from residential neighbourhoods of 
Delhi (Navlakha, 2000). Once again the peri-urban has become the main receiver of 
those units, many of which - despite being grossly polluting - are allowed to operate 
with little or no adherence to environmental regulations.  
It is further noted in the literature that while environmental degradation is not 
necessarily new to the peri-urban (or indeed to the urban core), it has accelerated since 
the 1990s when the pursuit of a neoliberal vision of urban development was initiated 
(Arabindoo, 2005). Development and planning documents have played an important 
role in disguising environmental pollution problems affecting the peripheries. On the 
one hand they showcase only those areas and activities that are viewed as ‘profitable’ or 
are implicated with Delhi’s redefined role as world-class city, namely the development 
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of exclusive residential colonies, commercial centres and industrial complexes. On the 
other hand, they overlook the specificity of the peri-urban both in terms of its mixed 
rural and urban ecological features and the diverse social structures that underpin them 
(Sharan, 2011, Allen, 2003). These problems are further compounded by the tendency 
of the peri-urban to exist in a regulatory and planning vacuum, influenced by a city 
planning culture of ‘tolerating’ environmental pollution in the periphery while striving 
to maintain the inner urban core pollution-free (Allen, 2003: 136).   
The neglect of the peri-urban is partly a reflection of the power relations at play and the 
growing tendency of urban planners, policy actors and city based environmental 
campaigners to prioritise middle class and elite interests. Curbing pollution in the city 
(e.g. by conserving particular environmental resources such as the Yamuna floodplain) 
is often presented as being in the ‘public interest’ (Veron, 2006). But as Veron notes, 
‘because the actions of environmental groups and governmental agencies are often 
segmented, departmentalised and limited to one or two resources, they have the 
unintended consequence of both including and excluding particular environments in and 
from the public realm’ (Veron, 2006: 2097). Thus, environmental plans are drawn up on 
the basis of promoting a middle class aesthetic of what constitutes a ‘clean’ 
environment and have redefined an overtly sanitised vision of Delhi, whilst neglecting 
the environmental consequences of this vision for the towns and regions that surround 
it.   
A direct consequence of these processes is that environmental degradation in peri-urban 
areas is often acute and marked by multiple and often overlapping ecological, social and 
health effects. It entails, for instance, pollution impacts on both land and water arising 
from the transfer of polluting industries to the periphery, and the associated toxic 
chemicals and hazardous wastes that are associated with these industries. In Ghaziabad, 
which is one of the case studies for this thesis (discussed in Chapter 5), industrial 
pollution is seen to pose a serious risk for human health because of the water 
contamination associated with the unregulated disposal of industrial wastes into the 
groundwater and river bodies. Other ecological effects are related to the shrinking of 
common land and the loss of productive farmland due to real estate developments 
(Dupont, 2005, Narain, 2009). This is the case in peri-urban Gurgaon, for instance, 
which has experienced large changes in the use of land (i.e. conversion from farming to 
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residential and commercial uses). Furthermore, the lack of water and sanitation facilities 
also represents an environmental problem, since domestic sewage adds to the pollution 
burden of already constrained water resources (Marshall et al., 2009).  
In this new geography of pollution and environmental degradation, the costs of 
pollution tend to be borne by economically and socially marginalised groups. In peri-
urban areas these costs are likely to be further magnified because of the multiple and 
escalating environmental pressures in these areas, including those previously observed 
to have an impact on the poor within traditional city boundaries. Examples include 
inadequate access to basic health, water and sanitation services (Birley & Lock., 1998, 
Allen et al., 2006), and also the environmental costs associated with the fact that the 
peri-urban is a fuzzy regulatory zone increasingly subjected to more pollution from 
hazardous industrial activities and the illegal dumping of toxic wastes (Singh, 1998, 
Parkinson and Tayler, 2003). Marginal populations are at an increased risk of direct 
exposure to diverse pollutant sources (i.e. domestic as well as industrial waste pools) 
and indirect exposure via an intricate chain of pollutant pathways (i.e. exposure to 
heavy metals and air pollutants via dietary intake) (Singh et al., 2010).  
In a peri-urban context, unequal power relations and the vested interests of local 
planners and politicians (who seek to profit from the sharp increase in the value of land 
in Delhi’s peripheries) tend to underpin the fact that little attention is paid to the 
environmental priorities of poorer peri-urban groups. That is why Moffat and Finnis 
identify land ownership as a key driver of how power is negotiated in peri-urban spaces 
(Moffat and Finnis, 2005). As the city grows and the influence of the capital over the 
periphery is increased, poorer groups such as squatters and village residents see their 
entitlement to land being rapidly diminished. Tenure insecurity in turn means that 
poorer social groups have limited power when attempting to negotiate with municipal 
governments and environmental planning bodies regarding their own lack of services 
and exposure to pollution (this is again explored in detail in Chapter 5, which discusses 
the Ghaziabad case study). 
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The fact that the environmental interests of the poor tend to be ignored in a peri-urban 
setting raises further questions around how citizenship is constituted in peri-urban areas, 
particularly as there are heavily biased official positions regarding which citizens are 
considered legal or illegal, or indeed which citizens are deemed more deserving in terms 
of access to a clean environment (Ramanathan, 2006). The exposure of the poor to 
deteriorating water quality is fraught with its own particularities, and these are explored 
throughout the thesis. However, water quality is also a challenge that cannot be seen in 
isolation from these wider peri-urban environmental transformations.  
Having described some of the underlying causes of environmental degradation in peri-
urban areas, and highlighting that these are linked to changes taking place not just in the 
peri-urban sphere but also in the city, I will take up the issue of deteriorating water 
quality as the focal point of this study.   
1.3. Different dimensions of water quality  
The deterioration of water quality as currently experienced in many cities of the 
developing world is ultimately tied to rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and 
accelerated population growth. These wider transformations have placed added pressure 
on already inadequate and often poorly designed water, sanitation and wastewater 
infrastructure, which has in turn exacerbated water pollution in cities worldwide. Delhi 
alone, for instance, has 40 per cent of the total sewage treatment infrastructure of the 
country, yet only 45 per cent of the sewage generated is treated, while the rest is 
discharged directly into the river and local water bodies (CPCB, 2004). In many 
developing countries industrial waste is also a significant contributor to water pollution, 
with more than 70 percent of industrial waste dumped untreated into waters, where it 
pollutes the usable water supply and poses a threat to freshwater and coastal ecosystems 
(Corcoran et al., 2010). Poor quality water is increasingly viewed as one of the greatest 
health challenges, with at least 1.8 million deaths per year linked to water related 
diseases (WHO, 2010).  
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Observation of the above trends, however, is often based on aggregate assessments of 
deteriorating water quality. A less explored dimension of the water quality crisis which 
is pursued in this thesis is one that examines not only the challenges faced as a 
consequence - or merely an ‘externality’ - of urbanisation and development, but equally 
a challenge which requires a more careful conceptualisation of power and politics. This 
is a line of enquiry that has been applied, for instance, to the study of water as a 
resource of both consumption and production. Mehta approaches her analysis of water 
from a critical socio-political perspective and arrives at the conclusion that supplying 
water and sanitation services to urban and peri-urban areas often has less to do with 
actual water availability than with struggles over access to and control over a finite 
resource (Mehta et al., 2007). Swyngedouw’s analysis of water from the perspective of 
Marxist political ecology further reinforces this point, highlighting that because urban 
transformations under the current political and economic structures of capitalism (such 
as those exhibited in Indian cities) are often uneven and unjust, access to natural 
resources such as water can be highly unequal, with the urban poor being largely 
excluded from even a basic level of water provision (Swyngedouw, 2004). For others 
such as Bakker, specific policy trends in the water sector can reinforce inequalities. In 
particular, in the urban context the trend towards the commodification and privatisation 
of water resources, although advocated as a solution to the former inefficient water and 
sanitation infrastructure, has largely failed to extend water supply to poor urban 
households. Moreover, it has even been counterproductive when extended to low 
income regions that have already established alternative community economies of water 
(Bakker, 2003).  
Although the socio-political analysis of water has now become an established research 
field, water quality has largely been devoid of this type of analysis. In particular there 
has been limited attention to inequalities in the distribution of water pollution and how 
these are likely to vary according to location, class and economic status. Perhaps, as 
Kelly Alley notes, it is the culturally neutral, mundane image of waste flows that has 
failed to engage the interest of social scientists (2002: 24). However, the social 
disparities in exposure to waste and water pollution observed in a peri-urban setting 
suggest that water quality management should be taken more seriously and researched 
in a more rigorous manner.
  
 
17 
One point that is clearly emerging from ongoing research is that the peri-urban poor are 
more likely to be exposed to poor water quality than more affluent citizens who reside 
in the same region, but in colonies that are far better served by established sanitation 
facilities and access to safe drinking water, and better recognised formally by the state 
(Randhawa and Marshall, 2010, Sharan et al., 2010). For peri-urban authorities it is 
often not a priority to bring environmental services and sanitation technologies to the 
poor, so their physical exposure to contaminated water is increased and they are induced 
to reside in marginal or ecologically vulnerable areas (Birley & Lock., 1998, Davilla et 
al., 1999). As a result the health impacts of exposure to and consumption of poor 
quality water across these populations can often be dramatic: it is often associated with 
common diarrhoeal diseases (such as cholera and typhoid) (Sharma et al., 2003) as well 
as longer-term impacts from heavy metals with carcinogenic potential, which have been 
found in groundwater extracted for drinking purposes (Singh, 2006). The distributional 
inequalities in exposure to water pollution are further linked to the changing character 
of the peri-urban and the transfer of environmental pollution to the periphery.  
Embedding water quality in a socio-political framework also necessitates an 
appreciation of the wider political economy of water access and use, as opposed to 
deteriorating water quality being seen solely as a problem of environmental pollution. In 
a peri-urban setting water pollution can travel in ways that are largely uncontrollable. It 
can pose a threat to the wide array of arrangements operating on the basis of solidarity, 
reciprocity or need, where water is accessed through non-conventional and officially 
unrecognised means (Davilla et al., 1999, Allen et al., 2006).  
For instance, water for drinking and other domestic uses such as food preparation, 
hygiene and sanitation are usually met by the peri-urban poor through informal, 
unofficial means of water allocation (Allen et al., 2006). A broad range of individual 
and collective solutions are deployed, which may include informal tapping into the 
mains lines supplying water, using submersible pumps to extract water from the 
groundwater (this is quite common in the field sites examined as part of this study) or 
accessing water from water tank trucks and bottles (Randhawa and Marshall, 2010). 
Increasing numbers of informal vendors and small-scale private entrepreneurs have 
been able to profit from the obvious lack of state water provision by selling bottled 
water at high prices to poorer peri-urban populations (Solo, 1999).  However, because 
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these water allocation strategies are often operating in the absence of a clear regulatory 
framework and under ambiguous water safety standards, ‘water quality’ cannot always 
be guaranteed (Allouche, 2011).   
The thesis explores how the water quality associated with these largely informal water 
allocation practices might be compromised in peri-urban areas, and to what extent 
responsibilities for ensuring water safety are shared between citizens and the State. It 
does not deal directly with the role of informal water providers in peri-urban areas (as 
this is a large topic of intellectual inquiry in itself). It does, however, explore some of 
the key ‘water quality’ dimensions associated with informal water allocation practices. 
It further explores how the implementation of sector-based approaches (linked to water 
supply, wastewater treatment, and the amelioration of river pollution) accounts for those 
water quality problems that sometimes operate on the intersection of different policy 
agendas (Sharan, 2011).  
Related to this, the study explores the environmental discourses and knowledge that 
tend to justify specific policies related to the control of water pollution, and examines 
whose interests and priorities are reflected in the lobbying for and implementation of 
such policies. For instance, in Delhi the alliance between middle-class interests and 
river quality concerns has led to a particular framing of the problem of deteriorating 
water quality. That is why a seemingly endless number of court cases has been filed 
against the government by activists such as M.C. Mehta and the NGO Paani Morcha, to 
push for the effective protection of the Yamuna River (Dutta and Peace Institute 
Charitable Trust, 2009). By contrast, the link between poor sanitation and water-borne 
disease, which is crucial for India's urban poor but not for its urban middle classes, has 
not been made a campaign issue (Chaplin, 2011). This in turn has been an important 
driver for the Delhi Jal Board (DJB, the city water authority) to focus investments 
purely on the extension of the sewerage network while neglecting the social dimension 
of the water quality crisis as it presents in the proximity of poorer urban households 
(Prasad, 2002). Similarly, in a peri-urban context, policy priorities for water quality 
management are likely to be influenced by the power relations which operate between 
different social groups and the type of knowledge which guides the actions of peri-
urban water and environmental authorities (a point explored in Chapter 5 of this study).   
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1.4. Policy interventions, expert knowledge and official practice  
The examination of the role of scientific knowledge and scientists in influencing 
decision making around water quality management is an important part of positioning 
water quality within a socio-political framework of study. Traditionally, water quality 
has been framed largely in technical terms, and as a result there is a tendency to 
replicate in peri-urban areas the heavily engineered solutions that were previously 
adopted in Western contexts to resolve their own water quality crises4 (Keeling, 2005). 
These include a heavy emphasis on hydraulic engineering, the design of pollution limits 
(criteria and standards) and the construction of centralised water treatment plants, as 
well as optimisation and monitoring of treated water at existing technological plants 
(Datta et al., 2001).   
The limitations of relying solely on technological solutions are now beginning to 
resonate strongly within the research community. Large scale technological systems 
commonly require large capital investments, involve high maintenance costs, and 
depend on economies of scale to make them economically feasible (Frijns and Jansen, 
1996). As a consequence, such systems can fail to reach the poorest and most 
marginalised populations, whilst typically serving middle class colonies that are able to 
afford running and maintenance costs (Parkinson and Tayler, 2003). In tackling 
challenges linked more closely to environmental sustainability, the implementation of 
large scale technological solutions has already come up against noticeable barriers. 
River restoration programmes in India, drawn up on the basis of increasing numbers of 
centralised wastewater treatment plants, have to date failed to deliver any significant 
improvements to the water quality of important river systems despite large financial 
investments in the sector (CSE, 2007). Furthermore, the capital intensity of these 
technologies and the costs of transportation and eventual treatment of waste before 
disposal are such that the improvements simply have not reached all users - or even all 
urban areas - affected by poor water quality (Kumar, 2003). But despite the 
shortcomings of the engineering approach, confidence in large-scale technological 
measures still prevails and is further associated with a deep reluctance to accommodate 
                                                
4 This point has been well substantiated by environmental historians who have focused on the links 
between colonial development, science and technology. The key shortcomings of transferring Western 
technological models to address water quality are explored in more detail in the literature review in 
Chapter 2. 
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the social mechanics of projects, such as mobilising communities and involving water 
users and people affected by the processes of implementation (Tova Maria Solo, 1993).   
Part of the reason why it has been difficult for less capital-intensive solutions to gain 
momentum in policy processes is that scientists and engineers tend to occupy strategic 
positions of influence within government. Commentators have also argued that despite 
the emergence of a ‘critical’ voice in India, comprising social movements, civil society 
and environmental NGOs (Nandy et al., 2001), environmental decision making in India 
has not been very progressive because of a predominant emphasis on expert 
perspectives (Menon and Kohli, 2008). For instance, the MoEF, like many other parts of 
government, has largely been hostile to the idea of NGO participation, and has not 
usually welcomed lobbying from, or dialogue with civil society (Vyas and Ratna 
Reddy, 1998). This position is also reflected in the MoEF policy guidelines, which 
adopt a definition of expertise which is rather limited to those with professional training 
in the ‘engineering, technology and architectural’ disciplines (MoEF, 2007: 1). This 
leaves little scope and few entry points for dialogue across other fields such as the 
ecological and environmental disciplines, the social sciences, or from representatives of 
local communities and civil society organisations (Open Letter, 2004).  
Another issue, perhaps in some ways more pressing, is that the implementation of 
policies linked to water quality management in India has become heavily politicised and 
is often far more complex than just a matter of expertise. The nodal agencies that 
monitor and regulate water quality, the Board and State Boards5, appear well organised 
on paper. However, in practice, they often have little power to take action against 
polluters. This is partly a result of the fact that in the context of India’s neo-
liberalisation, enhancement of the international competitiveness of its industrial sector is 
perceived by many of India’s top policy makers as a higher priority than investing in 
pollution abatement (Stuligross, 1999). A pro-industry outlook has in turn meant low 
levels of monitoring compliance of polluters by the Boards, as well as little practical 
influence over the policy agenda of other Ministries (ibid). Scientists therefore have to 
                                                
5 The Board and State Boards are the main organisations that have a formal mandate for water quality 
management. The main difference between the two institutions is that according to the federal system of 
governance in India the Board operates at the national level while State Boards operate at the ‘state’ level. 
The functioning and relationship between these two sets of institutions is explored in more detail in the 
analysis of the main case studies.  
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take care to develop their own boundaries between what issues are truly within the 
domain of their ‘scientific’ activities and which lie in the political realm in a way that 
protects their own legitimacy. Chapter 4, which investigates the role of the Boards in 
more detail, suggests that creating such boundaries is often far from straightforward.  
Furthermore, looking at the science of water quality from a critical social science 
perspective can be useful to highlight what problems are resolved effectively by science 
vis a vis those that are uncertain or context specific. Research on the environment and 
health is also pointing towards the inherent difficulties in deriving conclusive evidence 
of the human health effects associated with long term exposure to environmental 
hazards (Dunn et al., 2008). This is particularly true in the case of impaired water 
quality since impacts on human health may arise from complex indirect mechanisms. 
Precisely how these mechanisms function is far less well understood than the human 
health impacts of direct exposure to poor water quality. For instance, heavy metals 
found in wastewater used for farm irrigation can remain in the soil and water for longer 
time periods. Using wastewater for irrigation can pose a risk not only to the farmers of 
food crops but also to consumers, through contaminated food crops purchased in local 
food markets (Marshall et al., 2005). Wastewater irrigation is a practice that has become 
increasingly widespread in recent years even though the immediate and long term risks 
of such pollutants on human health are still not widely known (Shahalam et al., 1998).   
It is interesting to note that the problems with the use of expert knowledge have been 
pointed out by its critics in other fields such as the use of Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) (Menon and Kohli, 2008) and the function of water regulatory 
authorities (Coelho, 2004, Dubash, 2008). The dominance of technical knowledge in the 
formulation of water quality priorities via environmental regulatory institutions such as 
the Board and State Boards has been somewhat taken for granted in these debates. As a 
result we still know very little about how formal policy priorities and the mandates of 
environmental regulatory institutions in India are set, or with what implications for the 
peri-urban. It also remains uncertain how much influence more ‘bottom-up’ research 
approaches (e.g. focusing more on the social dimensions of water quality) can have on 
expert-driven practices and associated interventions, considering that policies linked to 
water quality are shaped by powerful interest groups and hegemonic frameworks of 
knowledge production.   
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1.5. Motivation for the study: an alternative research approach  
How water quality problems in peri-urban areas are manifested is the result of both 
conflicts of interests in resource allocation and the knowledge used to inform decision 
making. This fact has motivated this research to analyse in depth (i) the role of expert 
advisory systems, and (ii) how these interact with or come into conflict with other 
knowledge systems, and furthermore to link this analysis with insights from the political 
economy of water quality as it is presented in in the peri-urban fringe of Delhi. The 
study therefore poses the questions: Why are problems associated with deteriorating 
water quality in peri-urban areas frequently neglected in expert-led policy processes? 
And furthermore, does this neglect carry specific implications for the poorest and most 
marginalised populations? Up to now, research on peri-urban water quality has not 
succeeded in directly answering these questions. Peri-urban scholars have made some 
progress in recognising the tensions between local level realities and official practice. 
However the aim of this study has been to go beyond a place-based approach (Marshall 
et al., 2009) focused on localised water quality problems in specific peri-urban areas, 
and to include the influence of expert advisors as well as the relationship of peri-urban 
water quality problems to mainstream policy thinking and practice.  
The study builds upon the different theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2.  
Insights from Science and Technology Studies have been useful for exploring 
empirically how technical knowledge mobilised by scientists working for the Board can 
legitimise certain knowledge claims around water quality in policy (Jasanoff, 1990). It 
has also been helpful for exploring further how ‘texts’ are used to put forward particular 
styles of argument for identifying, selecting and evaluating different courses of 
collective action (Hilgartner, 2000). The approach used here has been to reflect upon 
these expert driven framings of the problems, and their relevance to complex ecosystem 
dynamics witnessed in peri-urban areas and the water quality concerns of poorer user 
groups (Leach and Scoones, 2006) .
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By building a better understanding of the use of expert knowledge, the study hopes to 
develop a deeper engagement with policy processes (Keeley and Scoones, 1999: 3), 
recognising that apart from science there are other less well recognised types of 
knowledge operating at the peri-urban scale. A policy process approach therefore shifts 
the attention from ‘policy analysis to policy process analysis’ (ibid: 3) and attempts to 
clarify connections between the processes of policy agenda setting and its 
implementation. It further perceives policy as involving contestations of knowledge 
between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ spaces of decision making, involving scientists, local actor 
groups, water users and those exposed to problems of water quality (Barrett, 2004). The 
problem of unequal power relations between different stakeholders is explored, and the 
role of official discourses in promoting a particular framing of the problems (and their 
solutions) is addressed and continually reflected upon. With these considerations in 
mind, the next section summarises the key research questions that guide the thesis.
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1.6.    Research Questions 
By studying the politics of the policy process and using a conceptual framework linking 
peri-urban dynamics to issues of knowledge, power and agency, the overarching 
research questions this dissertation seeks to address may be stated as follows:   
Why are the problems associated with deteriorating water quality in peri-urban 
areas often neglected in expert-led policy processes? And as a consequence, what 
are the implications for peri-urban poor communities?  
A set of more specific sub-questions is used to approach the overall research 
questions: 
1. What are the roles of science and engineering practitioners (pollution control 
scientists, water engineers, hydrologists within the formal bureaucracy) and their 
expert knowledge in influencing policy interventions to address water quality 
problems? 
-­‐ What are the main policy priorities (and inferred interventions) of scientists and 
engineers for addressing deteriorating water quality?  
-­‐ How do the disciplinary frameworks and discourses through which scientists 
operate indirectly shape the management of water quality in peri-urban areas? 
-­‐ How well are the water quality concerns of peri-urban poor communities 
represented in policy agenda-setting procedures? 
 
2. How are formal policies translated and implemented by official actors and 
formal institutions operating in peri-urban areas? 
-­‐ What synergies and contestations in framing policy priorities emerge 
between national and peri-urban policy actors? 
-­‐ What is the role of the everyday discourses and professional practices of 
officials working in peri-urban areas in shaping policy implementation? 
-­‐ What are the implications of current practice for the peri-urban poor?
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1.7. Outline of chapters  
Having outlined the context and the research questions which guide the thesis, the 
succeeding chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 2 explores the body of literature upon which this research has been based. The 
research draws on different theoretical approaches and this is very much reflected in the 
literature reviewed for this study. A distinguishing feature of the approach used in this 
study is that insights are drawn from both policy studies and Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) in order to explain water quality policy processes.  
Chapter 3 explains the methodology used for collection of empirical evidence. It 
elaborates on the conceptual framework, the choice of case studies and the fieldwork 
that was carried out in Delhi.  
Chapter 4 is an empirical chapter where the case of the CPCB allows the study to move 
within the science-policy interface and describe the work of scientists operating within a 
regulatory organisation. The emphasis is largely on the discursive processes of 
knowledge production.  
Chapter 5 is an attempt to look at the policy process from below. In the peri-urban 
district of Ghaziabad, poorer citizens are challenged on a daily basis by water quality 
problems. Specifically, the chapter describes not only the official view of the problems, 
but also the various ways in which water quality is entwined with poorer urban citizens’ 
living conditions.  
Chapter 6 serves two purposes. Firstly, it considers the empirical evidence gathered as 
part of the case studies. It also attempts to look ahead, and builds on the empirical 
evidence to suggest some features of an alternative approach to water quality 
management that is more adaptable to the complex water quality challenges presented in 
peri-urban areas.  
Chapter 7 concludes by answering the research questions, by outlining the thesis’ 
contributions to knowledge, and by discussing the limitations of the analysis and how 
critical knowledge gaps could be filled by future research in this field. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Departures of the Study 
This chapter reviews a number of theoretical ideas and approaches that were considered 
in developing this thesis. Insights are drawn from diverse theoretical perspectives 
including actor orientated approaches to studying policy processes, and the role of 
discourse in shaping expert knowledge on water quality, as well as the science studies 
literature that provides specific insights on the role of scientific advisors working in 
regulatory and technical institutions. The motivation for reflecting on this diverse 
literature has been the fostering of a ‘transdisciplinary’ research involvement with water 
quality problems with a view to identifying coherences and to create bridges between 
the different viewpoints (Wickson et al., 2006:1053).   
2.1. From policy analysis to policy ‘process’ analysis 
The first strand of literature that was considered is that concerning the study of policy, 
in terms of both how agendas are set, and also how they are implemented on the ground.  
Traditionally, those interested in understanding the nature of policy have largely treated 
it as a linear phenomenon. Decisions are taken by those with responsibility for a given 
policy area (this often occurring at higher levels of the administration). These decisions 
take the form of statements or formal proposals on an issue, which in turn are executed 
by the bureaucracy (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, Hill, 
1993). From this perspective, it can be seen that expert knowledge (largely based on 
science) fairly easily acquires a privileged role in decision making, while frontline 
agents at the bottom of the policy chain are looked upon as passively receiving and 
carrying out policies usually dispensed from above (Aberbach, 1981). It is argued that 
the complexity of contemporary policy decisions requires the highly specialised and 
technical knowledge of trained scientists (Habermas, 1971, Wildavsky, 1979). With the 
source of knowledge to inform policy decisions being largely linked to the role of 
experts, it is often assumed that bureaucrats, administrators and politicians are 
responsible for implementation and agenda setting on the basis of complete knowledge 
of the problems and their solutions (Habermas, 1971, Fischer and Forester, 1993, 
Keeley and Scoones, 1999). 
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Proponents of this concept of policy perceive a rationalistic model of human behaviour 
based on a limited number of axioms, such as the maximisation of preferences or utility 
(Long, 1992:22). Much of the emphasis of this approach is on improving 
implementation procedures on the basis of more effective public management 
approaches, communication, incentives, sanctions and rewards in order to improve the 
execution of policies (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, Keeley and Scoones, 1999: 6).   
This linear view of policy is rooted in rational-choice theory and neo-classical economic 
models of human behaviour and response, embedded in modernist concepts of the 
interactions between people and society.  
The rational choice policy model may be well placed for analysing easily monitored and 
controlled policy issues set within a well implemented administrative framework 
(Keeley and Scoones, 1999: 5). However, it is not helpful for understanding problems 
that are multi-dimensional and which involve the interaction of human and natural 
systems (Leach et al., 2010). Water quality problems in peri-urban areas are often 
characterised by this type of complexity. On the one hand, they consist of multiple and 
sometimes overlapping policy areas linked to a broad set of issues, such as the 
management of domestic and industrial wastewater, ensuring the quality of drinking 
water or restricting river and groundwater pollution. On the other hand, water quality is 
also subject to opposing definitions and interpretations linked to diverse groups of 
actors both at the level of agenda setting and at the local level of implementation. Some 
of the actor networks that will be examined in the thesis later on include, for example, 
national-level expert policy advisors (scientists working within regulatory bodies) and 
also local-level official organisations, industrial associations, water users and those who 
are exposed to deteriorating water quality on a regular basis.   
For a better understanding of the complex interrelations between different actor groups 
and across different scales, a different theorisation of policy is needed. More 
importantly, the interest lies in examining policy, not only in terms of the course of 
action that is proposed, but also in understanding why ‘inaction’ can often be a 
dominant policy approach. It is often the case that, although peri-urban areas offer 
several opportunities for promoting sustainability (e.g. linked to supporting informal 
arrangements for accessing water or recognising widespread agricultural practices), 
these areas are in general poorly understood by policy makers and often disregarded, 
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and as a consequence are defined by increasing marginalisation in formal policy and 
planning (Marshall et al., 2009). A policy process approach encourages this study to 
take a step back and examine critically the knowledge reflected in polices, and also to 
examine why particular views for addressing impaired water quality are still powerful in 
spite of their apparent failures.   
Central to the policy process framework proposed by Keeley and Scoones is the 
recognition that what different groups or categories of actors believe and do about a 
policy question is partly a reflection of their own interests (Keeley and Scoones, 2000). 
Furthermore, the influence of different interest groups is likely to play a role at each 
stage of the policy process, from agenda setting through to implementation (ibid). The 
trend of displacing the ‘visual signs of poverty’ (Fernandes, 2006: 22) and pollution to 
the peripheries observable in Indian cities, and the way this is driven by a new middle-
class identity, suggest that worsening levels of water quality are not merely the outcome 
of poor environmental management practices. It suggests that they are linked to the 
particular alignment of the urban policy and environmental planning agenda with 
middle class interests, facilitated by the wider imperatives of India’s neo-liberalisation. 
Policy implementation in the peri-urban context is also likely to be shaped by different 
interests. For instance, the fact that the peri-urban poor may lack access to infrastructure 
that could reduce their overall exposure to water pollution is linked to the fact that 
government agents operating in these spaces do not often see this as a priority. Further 
symptomatic of this is the ‘decline in the ability of existing structures of representation 
to provide poorer social groups influence over policy’ (Harriss, 2005:1041) that Harriss 
has observed in the context of Delhi. It is important to consider that because policy can, 
and often does, represent different interests it may not be executed in a pluralist way, 
but rather it can actually propagate the inequalities of exposure to water pollution 
observed in the peri-urban context.  
Another important element concerning how interests shape the policy process, relates to 
the role of the expert advisory system which is examined in this thesis. The expert 
advice and policy positions adopted by scientists working for the Board and State 
Boards can be understood as being not only the result of ‘science’ alone, but also part of 
an exercise of defending the ‘status quo’ of environmental regulatory organisations in a 
context where environmental regulation is largely perceived as being ineffective. As a 
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consequence, policy attention is shifted to these water quality problems that are well 
defined and largely presented as ‘solvable’, or otherwise as existing ‘outside’ the 
control of the Board and State Boards. This has the effect of obscuring more political 
and power-laden issues, such as why poorer social groups tend to bear the heavier costs 
of ineffective regulation, or the underlying political reasons for the perpetuation of 
polluting practices in a peri-urban context.  
Greater attention to politics and interests also shifts analytical attention away from a 
more instrumental-rationalist account of policy towards an approach that treats policy as 
more of a ‘negotiative’ exercise between different groups (Barrett, 2004:253). 
According to this understanding of policy, more attention is given to the ways in which 
decisions or specific policy outcomes are mediated by power, and how power shapes 
relationships between actors participating in the policy process (ibid.). This relates to a 
deeper engagement with two types of power dynamics perceived by the author as being 
influential in how water quality is currently managed in peri-urban areas. Firstly, the 
thesis discusses the ways in which power is embedded and reinforced in the dominant 
expert advisory system (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2006). This dimension of power is 
explored in detail in Chapter 4. Secondly, it gives emphasis to the power of 
governmental agents to shape policy implementation in a peri-urban setting (Barrett, 
2004). Government agents (bureaucrats as well as scientists and engineers working for 
the bureaucracy) have varying degrees of power to negotiate or execute policies relevant 
to water quality management. It is important to understand the implications of their 
practices, in terms of whether they can facilitate or undermine equity and environmental 
sustainability in spaces that are often highly contested, such as the peri-urban.  
In the context of the Indian water sector, scholars do indeed recognise that the 
production of such knowledge and research experience would be of ‘strategic’ value for 
the sector, because it focuses on the politics and power relations that can often stand in 
the way of improving equity and sustainability in water resource management 
(Mollinga, 2008:341). This understanding of policy also means that the overall analysis 
of water quality used in this thesis is not so much ‘place-based’ but instead attempts to 
integrate different contexts and locations, recognising the importance of actor groups 
operating both at micro as well as macro levels of decision making (Keeley and 
Scoones, 1999). In this study, the macro level is represented by the Board and the actor 
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networks that it entails, while the micro level is mostly represented by the actor 
networks identified within the Ghaziabad region of peri-urban Delhi. By bringing to the 
fore the mismatches and contradictions between the knowledge and perspectives that 
shape water quality priorities at these two different levels, the study hopes to propose 
features of a more integrated approach to the management of water quality. For 
example, suggestions for an alternative engagement with water quality are developed in 
Chapter 6 where the lessons learnt from the two empirical case studies are synthesised.   
2.2. Relationship between knowledge, power and policy 
With this multilevel perspective on policy in mind, this section introduces a separate 
body of literature that is relevant to this thesis and considers specifically how relations 
of power and knowledge between citizens, the experts and policy makers select which 
voices or perspectives become dominant in or are excluded from debates on policy.  
A starting point for much of this work is the recognition that discourse is an important 
medium through which certain kinds of knowledge and perspectives may gain 
ascendance in policy. Through discursive processes certain claims or justifications can 
appear more legitimate while others can be side-lined or excluded (Long, 1992). The 
ability to ensure that certain justifications gain more power and ‘stick’ better in policy is 
therefore partly dependent on the strategic capabilities of the actors making the claims, 
but also on the content and how forcefully a particular ‘discourse’ is put to use (ibid). 
Hajer (1995) further elaborates that environmental discourses can be viewed as ‘a 
specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced 
and transformed into a particular set of practices that give meaning to both physical and 
social realities’ (Hajer, 1995: 44). In his seminal work ‘The Politics of Environmental 
Discourse’ (1995), he explains in detail the ‘ecological modernisation’ ideas which 
suggest, amongst other themes, that a much greater involvement of the private sector in 
the management of environmental problems has been largely facilitated by discursive 
processes (Hajer, 1995).  
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Several analysts have also argued that language in particular plays an important role in 
analysing how a given problem is determined and implemented in policy and practice 
(Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996, Grillo, 1997, Shore and Wright, 1997). In other words, 
although the notion of discourse can be treated as the overarching concept, it lends itself 
to different kinds of analyses and theorisations that stress the significance of the various 
linguistic strategies and terminologies deployed by different actors (Kaplan, 1993, 
Keeley and Scoones, 1999). The language strategies that mainly concern this study are 
often described as part of frame reflection (or framing effects) (Apthorpe and Gasper, 
1996) and ‘narratives’ (or story lines) (Kaplan, 1993). Both framing and narrative, is 
drawn from the empirical analysis of the case studies and form an integral part of the 
thesis’ approach to analysing discourse. 
The idea of ‘frame reflection’ is used to analyse the process by which different frames 
(i.e. central organising ideas) are incorporated into policy positions that are expressed as 
a particular means of knowing, analysing, persuading and acting upon a particular 
situation (Rein and Schön, 1993). Framing further refers to the related ‘assumptions, 
methodological variables, procedural attributes or interpretive issues’ that different 
groups bring to a problem (Stirling et al., 2007: 16). Critical reflection of how a 
‘system’, ‘condition’ or ‘method’ is framed can reveal ways in which it is implemented 
or acted upon in policy practice (ibid). In some cases, such as in expert analytic 
approaches, a particular framing can be so powerful that it dominates the others.  
Specifically, scientific and engineering perspectives tend to be very closely involved in 
the framing of the water resources management sector (a professional field that water 
quality is often considered to be part of) (Movik and Mehta, 2009). Engineering and 
hydrological authority in the organisation and planning of the water sector is partly 
attributed to the use of a variety of linguistic terms for defining the water system. A 
prominent example of this is the close connection between the engineering ethos of 
commensuration and the use of specific terminologies to define water system properties. 
Coelho’s ethnographic study of engineers working for Chennai’s water authority also 
demonstrates that ‘pipes’ and ‘networks’, ‘infrastructural projects’ and ‘monitoring 
programmes’ are often more than just language terms: they also encapsulate particular 
expressions of power employed to demarcate the authority of engineers in the 
management of the city’s water and drainage network (Coelho, 2004:51).  
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Understanding how linguistic terms are used by powerful expert actors to frame water 
quality is of further interest to this study because it illustrates how boundaries are drawn 
around problems according to particular techno-scientific ideals or technical 
configurations (Effluent standards, monitoring frameworks and water sampling 
protocols are all often involved in the framing). In the light of this reasoning, 
engagement with the effects of framing can facilitate a better understanding of the 
discursive approaches available to actors in order to effectively ‘rule in’ certain ways of 
talking about a topic (in this case the topic is water quality), defining an acceptable way 
to talk, write or conduct oneself, whilst at the same time ‘ruling out’ or restricting other 
ways of talking or constructing knowledge in relation to the same (Hall, 2001: 72). Why 
such discursive strategies have been so successful despite their limitations is partly 
attributable to the fact that water quality is linked culturally with embedded notions 
about ‘faeces’, ‘filth’ and ‘dirtiness’, all of which are still largely treated as taboo topics 
by policy makers and politicians (Black and Fawcett, 2008: 72), and by default are 
delegated to scientists for finding policy solutions.    
From a somewhat different viewpoint, a study of framings can also be consolidated to 
explain diversity across the different positions. In the context of the ‘STEPS Rethinking 
Regulation’ project6, which looked at seed and drug regulation, systems are likely to be 
‘explicitly or implicitly understood or framed by users, regulators and legislators in very 
different ways’ (Van Zwanenberg et al., 2008: 41). Similarly, although expert actors 
tend to put forward powerful framings as discussed in the previous paragraph, we can 
also expect the framing of ‘water quality’ to vary between different groups of actors, 
and especially as it moves across scales and different contexts. The undertaking of 
‘regulating’ water quality is likely to be framed in a very different way by national 
experts working from a pollution control standpoint than by the water authorities 
operating in the peri-urban context, whose intention is to provide a supply of drinking 
water to the settlements. Another point of divergence in framing may also emerge 
between the more formalised ‘scientific’ framings of water quality and the less 
understood ‘experience based’ perspectives of marginalised citizens. So the overriding 
                                                
6 The STEPS (Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) Centre is an 
interdisciplinary global research and policy engagement hub, funded by the ESRC.  It brings together 
development studies with science and technology studies in order to research health, agriculture and 
water. It is based at the Institute of Development Studies and SPRU Science and Technology Policy 
Research in the UK: official website, http://www.steps-centre.org.  
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purpose of studying the divergent framings is to understand in more detail the extent to 
which these can ‘capture, understand, and thus potentially intervene in the realities of 
poorer communities’ (ibid: 41).  
An alternative approach where discourses can be understood in relation to power is 
through the identification of stories or ‘narratives’ that participants are prepared to tell 
about a given policy situation (Fischer and Forester, 1993, Kaplan, 1993, Keeley and 
Scoones, 1999). By identifying a set of policy narratives, the aim is to clarify how 
boundaries are drawn around water quality problems, and to identify what is included in 
or excluded from powerful knowledge systems. In India, the scientific-administrative 
vision of the river is shaped by a narrative which assumes that rivers will always adapt 
to continued growth in human settlements and consumptive market demands (Alley, 
2002:238). This narrative however, is currently subject to much opposition. There is 
empirical evidence that suggests important rivers are in fact experiencing rapid 
degradation due to pollution, and are increasingly less able to sustain new pressures and 
demands (Sharma and Kansal, 2011).   
Similarly, much knowledge and information circulated within formal organisations can 
be explained through narrative processes (Gabriel, 2004: 73). Organisational narrative 
processes in particular are examined in order to understand how narratives expressed by 
expert advisors become dominant in characterising water quality problems. In Chapter 4 
of this thesis, key narratives through which water quality regulation is understood by 
expert advisors are explored. This analysis demonstrates that the type of regulatory 
priorities proposed by expert advisors, and the expectations around the enforcement of 
water pollution norms and guidelines in local areas, are formed not just by powerful 
assumptions but also by different styles of rhetoric. In cities like Delhi, the inability of 
current technological and administrative systems to control river pollution effectively is 
often attributed by public officials and scientists to a dominant narrative of 
‘implementation failure’. This has led to a predominant emphasis on a ‘project-based’ 
approach for dealing with complex river systems, involving vast financial investments 
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targeting the implementation of various river-cleaning projects7, but this approach tends 
to obscure not only the importance of more profound political processes that influence 
implementation procedures but also the inherent limitations associated with how river 
pollution is defined more broadly in policy processes (Alley, 2002).  
By elucidating how these concerns are formulated in policy practice, the aim has been 
not so much to come up with alternative prescriptions for policy, but more importantly 
to shed light on the specific reasoning strategies that operate in the background behind 
established policy goals and preferences. Narratives further provide an entry point for 
challenging ‘deeper truths’ (Gabriel, 2004: 74) about a particular policy situation or 
organisational logic which are often assimilated without questioning by those that are 
involved directly in the formulation of policies.   
2.3. Scientific authority in the policy process 
This section turns to the literature on scientific expertise and its relationship with policy. 
On the one hand, in India today, formal policies to address water quality are guided by 
powerful water resource management bureaucracies, including water ministries as well 
as water and sewage engineering agencies at city level. On the other hand, significant 
powers in terms of water quality management are placed with a separate group of 
institutions focusing on environmental pollution regulation. Because of the federal 
structure of governance in India, the latter function in two tiers, the central government 
level and ‘state’ level. These are what will concern this thesis the most in the following 
chapters. Such sectors are traditionally directed by technical experts operating within a 
limited range of specialisations, including pollution control and water technology 
specialists, hydrologists, river engineers, and chemists. 
                                                
7 Delhi authorities have invested in an ambitious multi-million dollar technological project to intercept 
domestic wastewater entering the Yamuna river (The Hindu, 2010). Other large-scale initiatives are also 
promoted by global institutions such as the World Bank sanctioning 1$ billion credit and loan for 
cleaning the river Ganges. The criticisms surrounding the implementation of these projects are escalating, 
primarily because of the largely technocratic approach adopted to address core water pollution issues 
presented in the Indian context today (CSE, 2007).   
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The role of this particular group of actors is fundamental to understanding how experts 
influence policy approaches for managing water quality. Bringing in perspectives from 
the academic debate on the function of science (or science studies) is therefore relevant 
and useful because it examines how different relationships between scientists and 
governments are formed and sustained more thoroughly than the policy studies 
literature discussed earlier. However, as this is a very extensive body of literature 
covering a long time span and including many sub-fields and disciplines, the purpose 
here is not to encompass all the different aspects but to present some of the most 
relevant themes, based on authors who have examined the function of science both in 
Indian as well as Western contexts.    
The basis for much of the work on the sociology of science is to highlight how science, 
like other domains of authority (such as religion or law), also needs to be examined as a 
socially constructed phenomenon (Latour, 1987). This means that even though scientific 
knowledge is often presented as ‘objective’ and ‘rational’, in reality the production of 
‘scientific claims’ has associated social and policy commitments (Irwin and Wynne, 
1996). A widely accepted line of explanation emanating from the Mertonian school 
stresses the shared norms that foster cohesiveness in science, even though its 
practitioners may enter from divergent geographic, cultural or linguistic backgrounds 
(Merton, 1973). Other scholars have called attention to the elitist process of entry into 
the scientific community, which is encouraged by invisible colleges8, academic research 
networks and ‘gatekeepers’ comprising senior academic colleagues and lead editors of 
scientific journals (Crane, 1967, 1989).  
As critics of technocracy have further pointed out, these processes have in turn 
legitimised science as an authoritative body of knowledge, and have facilitated the 
perception amongst decision makers and policy makers that science is capable of 
providing accurate and objective answers to what should be achieved in matters of 
policy (Price, 1965, Habermas, 1971, Wildavsky, 1979). Based on these assumptions, 
                                                
8 The term has been used to describe a closed network of individuals that share similar core beliefs 
(mainly technically driven) about a subject area or policy problem. An early use of the term was to 
describe members of the Royal Society in London and to emphasise that they were geographically close 
together and shared common scientific interests (Lievrouw, 1989:618). A related contemporary use of the 
term can also be traced to the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ to describe networks of expert actors 
operating at the international level who can have a powerful role in shaping dominant policy positions 
(Haas, 1992).  
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the state in post-colonial societies has become very supportive of western scientific 
models in development projects and modernisation schemes (Sachs, 1992, Escobar, 
1995, Scott, 1998). In the Indian context especially, Jawaharlal Nehru's conception of a 
‘science-led’ Indian modernity formed the basis for science to become part of the 
modern state, facilitated by the foundation of the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) and technical universities such as the Indian Institutes of Technology 
(IIT’s), and also the nationwide expansion of large-scale engineering projects (such as 
the ‘Dam Era’), thus establishing the role of scientific experts in several domains of 
government functioning and policy making (Visvanathan, 1985, Kumar, 1995, Prakash, 
1999).  
Partly due to the introduction of engineering approaches in formal policy and planning, 
natural resource control, through maximising the utilisation and productivity of nature, 
became the new policy imperative (Scott, 1998). In specific sectors such as irrigation, 
water became the focus of engineering efforts to counteract its natural tendency to run 
to ‘waste’, thereby bringing large new areas of land under irrigation and improving the 
distribution of water to individual users (Gilmartin, 2003). The spread of powerful 
expert-driven views around resource control and the commodification of water 
empowered the state in colonial societies to break through the power of village 
communities and extend a technical system of irrigation into villages that were 
previously seen as development failures (ibid).   
A series of development schemes taking place in India today affirms the continued 
hegemony of some of these engineering doctrines in post-colonial societies. For 
example in the 1950s and 1960s the premises underlying the construction of large dams 
can be seen to be based on the same rational and positivist notion of western science 
that legitimises state control over nature and rivers (Mehta, 1998). Furthermore, more 
recent policy propositions, such as the ‘national river linking project’ involving the 
large-scale transfer of water (using large reservoirs and barrages) across separate basins 
and over long distances, confirm the prevailing prestige of established scientific 
disciplines (hydrology and river engineering) in the management and planning of the 
water sector (IWMI, 2008). 
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The prestige and authority granted to scientific expertise in addressing water quality can 
be traced back in history to Europe’s early modernity. In many towns and cities 
including London and Paris, the emergence of the ‘bacteriological city’9 ideology in 19th 
century Europe was set in motion by scientists, and this brought about a set of drastic 
state reforms for centralised public water and sanitation (Gandy, 2006). This was a 
period of profound transformation in people’s attitudes to and perceptions of the very 
notions of water and waste. The rapidly growing popularity of the newly established 
disciplines of microbiology and sanitary engineering meant that novel hygiene standards 
were quickly adopted by urban citizens and established traditional customs associated 
with water were soon forgotten (Goubert, 1989). People who had previously relied on 
their sensory perceptions (such as taste, colour and appearance) of water and its quality 
were becoming familiar with the technical logic of ‘monitoring’, ‘distribution’, and 
‘drainage’ based on the newly acquired scientific knowledge (ibid: 32).   
Specifically, concerns about the ‘contamination’ of drinking water quality were often 
the precursor for scientists to promote a broad range of institutionalised practices 
(Johnson, 2006). The harm caused to human health by typhoid and cholera bacteria 
meant that water contamination had to be contained by the vigorous monitoring and 
purification of drinking water sources (e.g. lakes or underground aquifers), or 
alternatively by installing an alternative ‘pipe’ system for the supply of ‘pure’ water 
(Goubert, 1989:109). Hence, from being merely a field of scientific enquiry, the pursuit 
of pure water in early modern Europe quickly became a large-scale political and 
administrative priority. With expert assessments of water quality being entrusted to 
scientists, health practitioners and technical experts were recruited at various levels 
within the administration to assist the bureaucracy with the accumulation and 
dissemination of water quality information.
                                                
9 The term has been employed in order to suggest an organic conception of the modern metropolis that 
viewed human faeces not only as a matter of unpleasantness but also as a source of danger to public 
health (Gandy, 2006).   This was a core principle for introducing sanitary reforms in urban areas, in that 
public health fundamentally depended on water moving through the whole urban body, thus eliminating 
disease.  
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Today, with experts extending their power and authority beyond the traditional 
boundaries of urban and sanitary reform, water quality has become a subject with new 
meanings and interpretations. More importantly, early modernity water quality concerns 
were focused around the potability of water in cities and towns, whereas attention has 
now shifted towards environmental protection, river conservation and pollution control 
concerns (Alley, 2002). This has contributed to the creation of new forms of hegemonic 
discourses and practices around water quality which will be explored in subsequent 
chapters. The doctrine of ‘assimilative capacity’ has formed a basis for viewing rivers 
not as ecosystems but rather as waste management commodities with the capacity to 
recover and dilute urban waste (Keeling, 2005). Furthermore, water quality has also 
become associated with new metrologies and monitoring strategies such as Biological 
Oxygen Demand (BOD) which helps assess the level of pollution a river system can 
sustain (Keeling, 2005). (The use of the BOD is explored again in section 4.4.2).   
This shift of attention around environmental water quality has encouraged the designing 
of new institutional structures and has promoted legislative changes that extend beyond 
public health concerns (particularly the contamination of potable water sources) to 
include a core environmental perspective as well. In India particularly, the fact that 
water quality became associated with the environmental degradation of important 
national river systems was a precursor for the inception of the Board (the subject of 
Chapter 4) in the 1970s and the founding of the Water (Pollution and Prevention) Act 
(Gazette of India, 1974).     
Although the different measures that have been adopted over time for managing water 
quality are still greatly celebrated within the wider scientific community, in many 
regions of the Global South they have not produced the same positive outcomes 
observed in Western contexts. More importantly, the eagerness of policy makers to 
provide ‘quick fixes’ for complex, technical, environmental and social dilemmas around 
water and sanitation has, in many instances, contributed to segregation between the 
European elite and indigenous communities and also the changing by force of 
traditional practices, behaviours and cultural relationships with water (Prashad, 2001, 
Sharan, 2002, Broich, 2007). All this has brought about the added cost of widening 
disparities between the rich and the poor, particularly in terms of access to clean water 
and sanitation (Gandy, 2006, 2008). These inequalities are also highly apparent in peri-
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urban environments. Chapter 5 in particular demonstrates that, at present, in peri-urban 
Delhi a clear demarcation between the poorer and the more affluent groups is sustained 
by the formal system for providing sanitary and water technologies. The way water and 
sanitation technologies are distributed among different populations determines the 
extent of their exposure to deteriorating water quality. Yet another unintended 
consequence of the granting of exclusivity to technical knowledge is the 
underestimation of the importance of experience-based knowledge and perceptions 
regarding water quality (see Black and Fawcett 2008; UNDP 2006). Also discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5 are citizens’ assessments of water quality. It demonstrates that 
a better awareness of citizen-based perspectives has repercussions for improving the 
living conditions of the poor. At present, however, these are not granted the same 
focused attention accorded to science and engineering, while policy makers in 
developing countries continue to draw upon technocratic approaches for proposing a 
diverse array of water reforms (Mehta et al., 2007).   
2.4. Expert knowledge systems and policy practice   
As the previous section has attempted to illustrate, historical processes have played an 
important role in establishing a particular form of expert knowledge for addressing 
water quality. However, in order to study science as a contemporary phenomenon, other 
scholars have also argued in favour of a more systematic examination of scientific 
practices and discussed how these can be implicated in experts’ efforts to maintain 
credibility, influence and institutional authority (Wynne, 1992, Hilgartner, 2000). This 
is certainly more relevant when scientists’ work relates to policy because the need to 
safeguard themselves against charges of inaccuracy becomes an institutional imperative 
(Jasanoff, 1987). 
However, when the questions posed to scientists cannot necessarily be answered by the 
prevailing technical knowledge, upholding credibility becomes increasingly more 
difficult. In the case of water quality, scientists were in the past asked to deliver 
solutions to clearly bounded policy problems such as the potability of drinking water or 
the disposal of raw sewage (Goubert, 1989). Now concerns have shifted from these 
more discrete policy domains to potentially more complex and cross-sectoral water 
quality problems, such as the effect of specific heavy metals and toxins found in the 
40 
 
 
 
water on human health and wellbeing, regional food systems and river ecology. The 
limitations of science to produce accurate solutions to emerging environmental concerns 
becomes more problematic in the context of ‘regulatory science’10 (Weinberg, 1985: 
68), when the regulator is expected by law to regulate (and provide definitive answers 
to) complex environment concerns, but science has often proved inadequate for 
providing reliable answers. From the point of view of the science practitioner, this 
creates a series of unresolved tensions, including the inability to defend as ‘credible’ a 
range of expert driven solutions, as well as the difficulty of developing effective 
communication with public stakeholders (Irwin and Wynne, 1996).   
Social studies of science, by taking a more critical stand on the practice and diffusion of 
scientific knowledge, attempt to shed light on how scientists resolve these dilemmas. 
The technical and the social aspects of scientific work are no longer perceived as 
separate worlds. Instead, the technical aspects are analysed in conjunction with the 
performative aspects of scientific activity, thereby highlighting the social practice and 
culture of scientists and engineers (Pickering, 1992). The scientist is no longer looked 
upon just as a technical worker, but instead as a ‘heterogeneous engineer’, whose role is 
to engage in political, economic, and sociological activities (Law, 1987: 10). Out of this 
framework a series of empirical studies of contemporary scientific developments and 
scientific controversies has emerged, illustrating the socially constructed nature of 
scientific knowledge (Bloor, 1976, Jasanoff, 1990, Barnes et al., 1996). The intention of 
these studies is to reveal that simple ‘facts’ cannot be accepted by virtue of their truth 
alone, and that their development is in fact subject to a sociological process (Callon and 
Latour, 1992, Barnes et al., 1996).   
This body of literature is particularly relevant for developing a better understanding of 
the role of environmental regulatory institutions such as the Board, discussed in Chapter 
4. It focuses on the individual scientists working within the institution, by examining the 
practical application and discursive representation of various routine procedures, 
measurements and water quality monitoring programmes that they put into practice. 
Many of these have been modelled on the basis of Western knowledge systems and 
institutional plans inspired by institutions such as the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) (Lele et al., 2010). But because of the relative acceptance of scientific 
                                                
10 ‘Regulatory science’ is defined in Weinberg (1985) as science used in environmental regulation.  
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routines related to water quality management in Western contexts, they have not been 
subjected to much scholarly attention nor indeed has their viability in the context of 
developing countries been adequately examined. In other words, the nature of the 
‘expert knowledge systems’ (that pertain to water quality management) largely remain 
‘black boxed’ (Knorr Cetina, 1999: 7). As well as explaining the specific constructions 
of water quality adopted by the scientists, using water quality as an entry point 
encourages further questions on the interweaving of expert knowledge with society and 
public policy (Jasanoff, 1987, 1990, Shackley and Wynne, 1995). This is an area of 
research that has been addressed by previous social studies of science in India11 but not 
specifically in relation to the particular implications of regulatory and scientific 
decision-making for the livelihoods of poorer populations and local environments that 
are exemplified by peri-urban areas.    
Water quality also provides an interesting study focus for examining expert scientific 
practice because it encourages the research to traverse across different contexts that are 
not normally included in social studies of science. For instance, scholars who have 
observed scientists in their workplace have, in most circumstances, tended to select the 
‘laboratory’ as the main site of inquiry (Latour, 1987, Pickering, 1992, Knorr Cetina, 
1999). In contrast, this study examines scientific practice not just in regulatory 
institutions, but also in peri-urban pollution control agencies and water and health 
authorities. In these semi-bureaucratic environments, scientific practice is more likely to 
be informed by a different set of experiences and work pressures. Scientists working in 
the laboratory are obliged to produce ‘innovative ideas’ and ‘experiments’ (Knorr 
Cetina, 1999) while scientists whose work is closely linked to policy are subordinate to 
institutional pressures that critically influence their professional attitude towards issues 
of proof and evidence (Nelkin, 1975, Renn, 1995). Furthermore, political demands for 
speed in gathering and assessing evidence imposed by public stakeholders and political 
interest groups (such as the media, the courts and environmental NGOs) can result in 
narrowly defined policy recommendations and assessments of risk situations (Jasanoff, 
1990).   
                                                
11 See for instance (Visvanathan, 1985)  Organising for Science: the making of an industrial research 
laboratory. 
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2.5. Responding to risk, uncertainty and ignorance 
Within risk research, a range of theoretical and empirical studies have also illustrated 
why focusing solely on expert assessments of risk can be particularly problematic. The 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck was the first to use the term ‘risk society’ to describe 
how responses to risk have shifted with the evolution of modern societies (Beck, 1992: 
92). According to Beck, during the early stages of industrial development, risk was 
primarily perceived as the product of natural hazards, such as floods and epidemics. 
During this period scientific and technological progress is rarely brought into question, 
and neither are the experts and government representatives that guide the management 
of these risks. Risks are further perceived as quantifiable and easily controlled, solely on 
the basis of available expert analytic methods and approaches. 
During late modernity, the period that Beck describes as ‘reflexive modernisation’, 
science and technological progress become increasingly more important in the 
‘creation’ of risks (Beck, 1992: 93). Another prominent sociologist from the United 
Kingdom, Anthony Giddens, expanded upon Beck’s ‘risk society’ to suggest that risks 
presented during reflexive modernisation are, in essence, ‘manufactured risks’, and 
therefore deeply embedded in the process of industrial, technological and scientific 
development (Giddens, 1999: 4). Environmental risks in particular are intimately linked 
with both Beck’s and Gidden’s conceptualisation of the risk society, whereby risks 
related to chemical pollution, toxic wastes, nuclear energy, and biotechnology are risks 
that industrial society has generated and are typically marked by high levels of 
uncertainty in terms of both their long term side-effects and the types of options 
available for their effective management (Dryzek, 1997:149).  
Under these conditions, dealing with risk on the basis of science-based methodologies 
alone can be acutely problematic. Particularly in the context of environmental risk 
systems, as Wynne argues, ‘the very considerable amount of scientific work which has 
gone into the modelling of risk cannot be taken as reassurance that even the main 
dimensions of environmental harm from human activities have been fully 
comprehended’ (Wynne, 1992:113), not least because there are a range of uncertainties 
and sources of incomplete knowledge involved in the definition and subsequent 
evaluation of environmental harm (Wynne, 1992, Stirling et al., 2007). Brian Wynne 
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further illustrates his point by reference to how risk from radiation was evaluated in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident (Wynne, 1992). In May 1986, a radioactive 
cloud passed over the UK. Despite reassurances from the scientists that there would be 
no lasting effects of the radioactive cloud, elevated levels of radiocaesium (the 
radioactive element which was likely to pose environmental harm) were observed in the 
soil and for a long time after the accident. As it turns out, scientists were wrong in their 
predictions of how radiocaesium would behave after it entered the soil (ibid:113). 
However, at the time when the scientific investigations were carried out, the 
uncertainties involved in the measurement and evaluation of possible risks from 
radiocaesium were grossly understated, damaging as a result the credibility of the 
scientists and institutions involved.  
The regulation of risks to human health from water pollution can also be subject to 
uncertainty even though risks are typically viewed as being ‘determinate’ and easily 
‘quantifiable’ (Stirling et al., 2007: 59). Risk from water pollution is perceived as being, 
in principle, parameterisable through the development of standards for toxic substances 
and pollutants, when in practice the management of water quality on the basis of 
standards can be seriously limited, either because the standards are not implemented 
properly12 or because specific toxic substances that have an impact in local contexts are 
omitted from the evaluation of possible risks (Ziem and Castleman, 2000). In addition, 
there can be divergent expert interpretations of what are deemed ‘acceptable’ pollution 
thresholds. The standard setting process can thus be viewed very differently by health 
professionals, community organisations and representatives of industries as well as 
across different levels13 (Dunn et al., 2008). Perception and admission of uncertainty 
can also vary depending on the position of the actor involved in the production of 
knowledge (MacKenzie, 1990). Scientists that are institutionally committed to the 
knowledge being produced may crucially undermine uncertainty, offering instead a 
                                                
12 This can often be the case in peri-urban contexts exhibiting high levels of environmental pollution.  
13 The comparison of the case studies later demonstrates that scientific advisors working for the Board at 
the national level assume implementation of water quality standards to be vigorous in peri-urban areas. 
By contrast, fieldwork observations in the Ghaziabad region demonstrate that standards for industrial and 
domestic water are, in reality, weakly enforced. 
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picture of ‘misplaced concreteness’14 (Stirling, 2011)(85) around the process of risk 
assessment (MacKenzie, 1990, Keeley and Scoones, 1999). 
‘Ambiguity’ and ‘ignorance’ are also characteristic properties of any risk appraisal 
(Stirling et al., 2007). Under the heading of ambiguity, disagreements may exist 
between different actors over ‘selection, prioritisation and measurement’ across a 
different range of risk situations (Stirling et al., 2007)(10). The Board for instance has 
its own framing of what are the right questions to pose in in the context of water quality 
regulation. Questions such as ‘where to monitor water pollution?’ or ‘what type of 
pollution sources pose greater environmental harm?’ are therefore posed quite early on 
in the water quality assessment process (see also section 6.1.1). However, answers to 
these questions are often highly contested across different specialisms, disciplines and 
social groups. For instance, the issue of river pollution may be identified as an important 
source of risk from the perspective of pollution scientists, but from the perspective of 
water engineers, drinking water quality appears much more central to how risk is 
perceived.  
The problem of ignorance is by far the most elusive hazard in risk assessments because 
it involves the position where ‘we don’t know what we don’t know’ (Wynne, 
1992:114). It differs from ambiguity in that the parameters are not just contestable, but 
at least partly unknown (Stirling et al., 2007). For instance, whether problems of water 
quality are likely to be exacerbated in the near future is conditioned by a range of 
ecological, economic and social factors of which knowledge can be either lacking or 
highly fragmented. Climate change is likely to accentuate certain problems due to 
changes in rainfall, temperature and the incidence of floods (Petit, 2005). However, 
there are other key drivers of change such as urbanisation, industrialisation, and wider 
socio-political and economic transformations (particularly in developing countries) that 
are likely to impact on water quality as well. Under such circumstances, bringing 
ambiguity and ignorance into the evaluation of risk requires not only intense and open 
examination of the existing evidence sources and their competing interpretations; it 
further requires a deeper understanding and recognition of the types of incomplete 
knowledge surrounding the problems that are being assessed. 
                                                
14 I elaborate further on this concept in relation to the way Board members solicit expert advice on water 
quality in section 6.1.2.  
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Largely due to the prominence of expert science in the evaluation of risk, one important 
source of knowledge that has so far been given far less attention is that of citizens. A 
discussion of citizen knowledge in the risk literature has come into existence primarily 
as a reaction to the growing mistrust amongst citizens in techno-scientific evaluations, 
and often following catastrophic failures of risk regulation (Freudenburg, 2003). In the 
1970s at Love Canal, at Three Mile Island, and at Wolburn, Massachusetts (to name a 
few prominent cases) citizens conducted their own assessments to better understand the 
risks associated with their own exposure to toxics, in response to the discovery of the 
presence of toxic waste (Levine, 1982 , Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990). Through a 
process that Brown (1992) has coined as ‘popular epidemiology’15 they exercised their 
own political power in risk communication, and used their own exposure assessments to 
challenge expert opinion, the state and local authorities (cf. Fisher, 1993). Although it is 
important to avoid reifying categories such as ‘local’, ‘traditional’ or ‘lay’ knowledge 
when referring to citizen knowledge as if these were invariably monolithic entities 
(Agrawal, 1995, Wynne, 1996), a number of published papers have highlighted that 
better recognition of citizens’ own accounts when dealing with environmental risk 
systems can be helpful in broadening risk appraisal and taking it beyond the confines of 
expert science (cf. Funtowicz, 1993, Irwin and Wynne, 1996, Leach et al., 2005).  
An important point of divergence of citizen knowledge from expert knowledge is that ‘it 
does not owe its origin, testing, and degree of verification, truth, status or currency to 
distinctive…professional techniques, but rather to common sense, casual empiricism, or 
thoughtful speculation and analysis’ (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979: 12). As a 
consequence, experts and lay people can often perceive risk in very different ways and 
employ different kinds of rationality for deriving risk estimates (Tesh, 1999). For 
instance, in a study conducted by Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstain to understand 
ordinary people’s perception of risk from technological hazards (such as nuclear power 
and pesticides), it was found that values and belief systems had a much more prominent 
role in making judgments about risk than in the case of professional risk assessments 
(Slovic et al., 1980). Citizens were observed to take into account issues like fairness and 
                                                
15 Brown (1999) defines popular epidemiology as the process whereby lay citizens ‘gather scientific 
information and other information, and also direct and marshal the knowledge and resources of experts in 
order to understand the epidemiology of disease’ (ibid: 269).  
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equity in how they perceived risk, while they also considered community cohesion and 
the impact of technological hazards on their personal lives and future generations (ibid).  
Given the problems of risk evaluation on the basis of reductive-aggregative methods 
discussed earlier, citizens’ accounts can therefore allow for greater ‘interpretative 
flexibility’ in the evaluation of risk, and encourage a better engagement with less salient 
properties of risk assessment, namely those of uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance 
(Stirling, 2011: 85). In the context of peri-urban citizens’ exposure to risks from 
worsening levels of water quality, it is explored, for instance, how citizen knowledge 
comes in part from actual sights, smells and tastes along with the tactile and emotional 
experiences encountered in everyday life (cf. Corburn, 2004). This is in contrast to the 
professional knowledge of scientists which is based on technical criteria of risk 
evaluation (Karpouzoglou and Zimmer, 2012).  
2.6.  ‘Interface’ situations between multiple actor groups 
Another useful way in which the interaction of different types of knowledge systems 
can be further conceptualised is by examining those instances when actors from 
different social and professional positions interact in ‘interface situations’ (Keeley and 
Scoones, 1999: 20). It is during these instances that social actors negotiate, adapt and 
sometimes clash with each other’s ‘life worlds’ (Long and Long, 1992). In contrast to 
examinations of knowledge outlined in previous sections, the main defining feature in 
this literature is that knowledge production arising out of ‘interface situations’ should 
not always be equated to some set of ‘professional’ or ‘scientific’ ideas and procedures. 
It is also a part of ‘everyday’ forms of knowledge that are tied to social categories, 
beliefs and practices, all contributing to the sustenance of more practical forms of 
knowledge (Arce and Long, 1992:211). Furthermore, processes and outcomes of such 
practical forms of knowledge are here too arbitrated by sources of power, authority and 
legitimising processes in a similar way to professionalised knowledge (ibid:214). 
Through involvement with ‘interface situations’, the aim is to explore the key synergies 
and interactions, but also conflicts that exist between the various actor groups involved 
in the policy process.    
One such interface situation that the thesis explores in more detail is the interaction 
between pollution scientists working at the national level and enforcement officials 
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operating in a local context. This is an important interface because it highlights the 
types of contrasts that emerge when the functioning of national expert advisors are 
compared to that of officials working within peri-urban areas. Insights from social 
studies of pollution draw attention, for example, to the fact that the role of enforcement 
officials can provide unique insights into the realities of non-compliance and help to 
‘zoom-in’ on the primary causes of a range of implementation failures (Hawkins, 1984, 
Fineman, 2000, Lo et al., 2006:390). More importantly, for expert advisors technical 
‘know-how’ is much more central to their everyday activities, whereas officials in peri-
urban areas are often driven by more pragmatic motives geared towards resolving 
practical problems (Lipsky, 1983). The knowledge and perspectives of officials in peri-
urban areas are explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
In particular, the more practice-based learning that officials bring to their involvement 
with water quality issues draws attention to actor networks that are not well recognised 
by expert advisors at the level of policy formulation. In effect, it draws attention to 
power-laden interactions taking place between official agencies and other institutions. 
These include, for example, the influence of industrial representatives on the 
performance of pollution control institutions operating in the peri-urban. 
Another interface of interest to this study is one that emerges between pollution control 
officials (and other official practitioners) and everyday citizens. Here the interest is 
related to that described previously since it explores the role of practical knowledge in 
shaping interface situations. However, the emphasis is on identifying ways in which 
policy agents may exercise various ‘labelling’ strategies, and as a consequence may 
often respond in highly stereotyped ways to the particular needs of their clients (Lipsky, 
1983). This is a line of inquiry that may be more imperative in policy situations that are 
often perceived to be resolved purely on the basis of technical or managerial knowledge. 
For example, even in a highly technical field such as urban water supply, engineers can 
categorise their clients on the basis not only of technical considerations but of normative 
judgments such as the social status, geography and water needs of different citizens 
(Coelho, 2004). Such categorisation patterns in turn significantly influence how 
engineers prioritise their time and workload for servicing different groups of citizens. It 
is more common for citizen categorisation patterns to favour to a large extent the urban 
elite over poorer populations.  
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One of the implications of examining how experts employ categorisation strategies is 
that they provide deeper insights into how the poor in particular are positioned in the 
implementation of formal plans and policy programmes in peri-urban areas. As Coelho 
noticed in her study, the main reasons why poorer citizens were often inadequately 
served by Chennai’s Metrowater engineers was because they were characterised as 
‘disorderly’, ‘demanding’, representing an ‘over-politicised’ public, and typically 
unwilling to pay for public services (Coelho, 2004:215). Particularly in the Indian 
context, the power of labelling can be traced back to the role of the judiciary who view 
urban poor settlements as ‘illegal’ encroachments on public land (Ramanathan, 2006). 
This reframing of poor settlements as being ‘illegal’ has furthered a major programme 
of slum demolitions and clearances that act against the constitutional right of citizens to 
live and work within expanding metropolises (ibid). As a result of this new discursive 
representation of urban poor settlements, they are identified as ‘nuisances’, with 
labelling terms such as ‘infesting’, ‘mushrooming’ and ‘bursting’ being used to evoke 
Malthusian fears that mere presence of the poor in the cities is a threat to the welfare of 
society as a whole (Ghertner, 2008: 64). Laying emphasis on labelling is therefore 
essential for identifying in discursive terms the powerful images and stereotypical 
characterisations that officials may frequently draw upon when considering the poorer 
citizens’ specific needs and exposure to poor water quality.  
2.7. Conclusion  
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the aim here has been to relate emerging 
water quality challenges (particularly those affecting peri-urban environments) to 
different epistemologies and theoretical positions. Because the debate on water quality 
is still often dictated by scientific perspectives, it was helpful to draw insights from both 
policy studies as well as science studies.  This proved to be of value for understanding, 
not only how a technical approach to water quality emerged in the first place, but also of 
how it still manages to appeal to decision makers in spite of its inherent failures. Both 
policy and science studies retain a long tradition and involve many sub-disciplines. The 
aim of this chapter was not to provide an exhaustive account of these literatures but to 
demonstrate how these literatures, and the links between them, can be valuable for 
understanding the types of knowledge and actors that are steering the appraisal of water 
quality priorities in peri-urban areas at this point in time.  
49 
 
 
 
In examining the functioning of expert knowledge systems, a historical perspective is 
useful for demonstrating how certain interpretations of water quality have managed to 
gain authority by the forming of a close relationship between scientists and state 
bureaucracies. Although science is viewed as a tool for providing legitimacy to policy 
decisions, it also has its limitations. To be more specific, it can operate in a way that 
undermines uncertainty (e.g. in dealing with selected risks of limited pollutants to 
environment and health), and can also restrict the level of involvement of public 
stakeholders in decision-making. Through the use of case studies, the thesis will try to 
demonstrate that these ideas also affect the way problems of impaired water quality are 
addressed. Also it hopes to demonstrate that water quality can be a useful entry point for 
exploring the interaction between science and policy in environmental regulatory 
institutions in India, an issue that so far has received less focused attention from science 
studies scholars.  
The fact remains that the science studies literature focuses a great deal more on the 
scientists’ views and much less so on the points of view of other actor groups. This is 
why scholarly accounts of the policy process are valuable for the integration in research 
of potential synergies and contestations that may arise in the framing of water quality 
across levels and by different actors. What sets a policy process framework apart from 
traditional analyses of policy is that it addresses both policy agenda setting and 
implementation procedures. As a consequence, it provides more scope for peri-urban 
realities concerning impaired water quality to be compared with the prevailing opinions 
and views of expert advisors. Furthermore, it fosters a better understanding of 
alternative accounts of the policy process emanating from civil society, poorer groups 
affected by poor water quality and officials who work in peri-urban areas, by drawing 
upon narrative processes and framing effects, as well as ‘interface’ situations which 
emerge between the different actors. 
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Chapter 3 Research Design and Methodology  
Building on the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2, the methodology used 
treats social actors not simply as separate social categories or passive recipients of 
interventions, but rather as active participants who in their own capacity (and operating 
at different levels) are in a position to process information, plan strategies and produce 
knowledge using a variety of arguments (Long, 1992, Hajer, 1995, Keeley and Scoones, 
1999, Mehta et al., 2007). Firstly, the main categories of actors that the research has 
attempted to capture are those in positions at the national level, and it draws from the 
influence of expert advisors on framing policies related to water quality. Secondly, it 
captures those groups of actors operating at the local level in a peri-urban district of 
Delhi, and introduces empirical insights into the translation and implementation of 
formal policies, directly from peri-urban areas.  
A central feature of the research, as explained in Chapter 2, is the recognition of 
‘discourse’ as an important medium in order for certain kinds of knowledge and 
perspectives to gain influence in policy. More importantly, in the description of the case 
studies, discourses attached to the different actors have been identified in order to 
explain the work, the social relations and routines that are often drawn upon for 
legitimising policy decisions. As an overall approach, it attempts to question the ‘status 
quo’ of expert advisors who have been granted the scope to introduce their insights into 
decision-making somewhat unrestrictedly. In particular, a discursive frame 
accommodates the influence of power as an underlying cause for failure of expert 
advisory systems to respond to the inherent complexities of the peri-urban.  
The centrality of discourse also implies that the methodological tools used here rely 
heavily on the interpretation of subjective data, tracing the production of knowledge as 
presented in the form of narratives, situational descriptions, and various textual 
accounts. Therefore while this study is not purely ethnographic, it draws on features of 
ethnographic methods (such as interviews, reviews of official documents and field-
based observations) in order to understand the different problematisations of impaired 
water quality. This was considered to be the best methodological approach because 
ethnographic style research allows for flexibility in the type of information used, and as 
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such is not far removed from the sort of approach that we use in everyday life for 
making sense of our surroundings (Genzuk, 2003).  
However, placing too much emphasis on subjective data can also be a source of bias in 
the presentation of the research findings. For example, how does one measure the extent 
to which a particular discursive mechanism has influenced a policy outcome? This 
problem arises in this study in measuring, for instance, the precise level of influence the 
Board may exert over specific peri-urban issues and concerns. That is why Hardy and 
Philips (2008) have argued that an appreciation of discourse should not ultimately 
prevent the importance of ‘material’ and ‘resource’ dependencies from being included 
in the interpretation of the findings. With this idea in mind for the whole duration of the 
research, the aim has been to link subjective sources of information to the material in a 
variety of ways: referring to specific examples where policies and tools (such as 
pollution emission standards) to enforce water quality may fail (e.g. as in the case of 
regulating water quality in industrial zones in the peri-urban case study); drawing from 
official documentation (assembled using the Right to Information Act, see 3.6 for 
details) to ascertain whether a particular discourse is in agreement with or contradictory 
to the observed realities of impaired water quality in peri-urban areas.  
On the basis of the above, this study has consulted a wide range of methods in order to 
construct the thesis. To name the key ones, information was collected using semi-
structured interviews, voice recordings, written observations from fieldwork sites 
recorded in the form of a fieldwork diary, and official documents obtained from 
government departments and public libraries. With this in mind, the following chapter 
justifies the research design and describes how the different sources of information have 
been utilised to inform specific aspects of the research.   
3.1. Conceptual framework and research design 
The conceptual framework is based on combining concepts drawn from the science 
studies and policy studies literatures. Science studies perspectives have been drawn 
upon to shed light on the relevance of social values as an independent variable for 
shaping science and technology (Jasanoff, 1987, Latour, 1987, Pickering, 1992, Wynne, 
1992). Communities of scientists mobilise their own skills and knowledge for putting 
forward credible arguments about identifying, selecting and evaluating different policy 
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options, thus contributing to the framing of water quality in the early stages of the 
policy process. By contrast, theoretical perspectives of policy studies have helped to 
trace the translation of formal policies in peri-urban areas. The roles of 
knowledge/discourse formation, actors/interfaces, and politics/interests are important 
considerations for presenting a more complete picture of how policies are implemented 
in local situations (Hajer, 1995, Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996, Shore and Wright, 1997, 
Keeley and Scoones, 1999). Referring to these two different strands of theory has 
therefore been useful for creatively expanding what is ethnographically ‘in the picture’ 
and for examining the reasons why policies are formulated and designed in particular 
ways, and then their actual implementation on the ground.  
 
                         Figure 1: Conceptual framework, own illustration 
The research design emanates directly from the conceptual framework and focuses on 
analysing the two-way interaction between problem-framing and peri-urban policy 
translations (see also, Figure 1). The use of case studies for exploring this interaction 
was considered the most appropriate method for focusing the empirical enquiry on a 
contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, (Yin, 1994). Case studies are often 
used to meet different research objectives such as the testing of theory or the 
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development of new theoretical insights (ibid). In this thesis, a selection of multiple case 
studies was considered the most appropriate research approach for strengthening the 
generalisability of the overall findings. Firstly, by developing a sense of the patterns of 
decision-making occurring at different levels of the policy process, discussed separately 
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Secondly, by examining the complex interactions that take 
place between the two case studies, the thesis’ critique of expert knowledge in relation 
to water quality is validated (in Chapter 6).   
The examination of the case studies is discursive and aims to outline the influence of 
competing drivers influencing policy processes at each level. The conceptual framework 
is meant to capture the influence of both ‘formal’ and ‘unarticulated16’ policy drivers. 
The relationship between formal and unarticulated drivers is dynamic and their 
interaction is understood as having the potential to strengthen the institutionalisation of 
specific priorities and policy commitments regarding water quality management. In the 
first case study, formal drivers influencing the Board’s functioning are defined as those 
that are ‘officially’ recognised and tend to be clearly articulated in policy texts, norms 
and procedures, such as the Water Act, which stipulates many of the official functions 
and responsibilities of the Board. ‘Unarticulated’ drivers influencing the functioning of 
the Board are less clearly defined and are mostly played out in the discursive realm. For 
instance, the use of particular discourses to defend the status quo of the organisation, or 
discursive strategies used to ‘play down’ uncertainties associated with the approach 
adopted to monitor water quality can generally be understood as unarticulated drivers 
that are interpreted by the researcher on the basis of the interviews, discussions and 
fieldwork observations that inform this case study.  
The second case study takes a close-up view of the translation and implementation of 
expert-driven policies in peri-urban Ghaziabad district. Here the emphasis is on the 
interaction of formal and unarticulated drivers that influence how policies are executed, 
contested or re-configured in a local context. It attempts to compare the perspectives of 
those citizens whose voice is rarely considered in expert assessments of science and 
technology (Leach and Scoones, 2006, Mehta, 2008) with the ‘official knowledge’ 
                                                
16 ‘Unarticulated’ drivers refer to those that are part of the policy process yet are not immediately 
recognisable by reference to policy documents alone. Unarticulated drivers can be distinguished through 
an analysis of the discursive process influencing policy, as well as by following closely the interactions 
between different stakeholders involved in both the policy problem formulation and implementation.  
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associated with water engineers, planners and other actors that constitute the 
administrative system in Ghaziabad. The aim here is a more careful examination of the 
nature of policy implementation. For instance, the ‘infrastructure’ (such as STPs, drains 
and sewerage networks), which is installed to treat excess wastewater discharged from 
the district, is a formal policy driver that has an influence in achieving certain water 
quality objectives (such as improved river water quality). But the installation of this 
infrastructure can be further influenced by unarticulated policy drivers, regarding for 
instance the type of residential settlements that are regarded as ‘eligible’ to be 
connected to an STP facility. Political influence in the policy process can further play a 
role in policy implementation by means of encouraging an exercise of ‘cherry picking’ 
locations where it is deemed desirable to minimise pollution (i.e. in the affluent 
residential colonies of the district), versus those locations where policy implementation 
appears to have little practical impact.  
The choice of case studies has been made with the aim of highlighting the contrast that 
exists between ‘peri-urban’ policy negotiations and the negotiations that tend to take 
place at the national level within institutions such as the Board. These can also be 
described as ‘policy spaces’17 that are contrasting in several ways. At one level, the 
Board represents a policy space where expert knowledge plays an important role; 
decision making is highly technocratic and appears to be driven almost exclusively by a 
model of negotiation based on rationalisation and bureaucratisation; a model which is 
very much in line for instance with Weber’s ‘iron cage’ portrayal of bureaucracy 
(Weber, 2002:121). This policy space, one could argue, is of a type that is normally 
found to exist at a ‘macro’ policy level and is explored with a view to providing insights 
as to why even though there is an abundance of regulatory mandates for water quality 
protection in India, the implementation of these mandates remains problematic, and can 
be heavily influenced by competing state interests and priorities. For example, the 
continuation of policies that foster industrial growth with minimum environmental 
restrictions is often a more dominant state priority, yet is clearly in opposition to the 
                                                
17 This is a concept used to suggest that there are specific entry-points or policy spaces that can be 
identified in the policy process; a deeper examination of these policy spaces can be used to map relevant 
actor networks, as well as the strategies which are commonly used by key actors to influence decision-
making (Keeley and Scoones, 1999).  
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regulatory mandate to protect water quality in the first place. In this case, Board 
scientists evidently have to play the role of ‘knowledge brokers’, having to balance 
wider state interests with the mandate of environmental protection entrusted to them as 
pollution control agents.  
This ‘macro’ policy space contrasts with the peri-urban policy space, yet is by no means 
unrelated. The peri-urban case study is used to demonstrate that there is a unique ‘socio-
spatial’ dimension that influences policy negotiations. The peri-urban case illustrates, 
for instance, that deeper causes of the deterioration of water quality in a peri-urban 
setting are not just a matter of straightforward bureaucratic inefficiency. The 
perpetuation of existing problems is also related to wider urban transformations taking 
place under the changing urban political economy in India. It is because of the changing 
political economy that some polluting activities are shifted to the peri-urban space while 
environmental regulation remains relatively weak. During this process, negotiations 
take place, and the politicised nature of these negotiations becomes much more visible 
in this policy space than at the macro level. It is also in peri-urban spaces that variations 
in exposure based on ‘social indicators’ (such as class, ethnicity and location within a 
peri-urban locality) are more clearly visible than from the macro level standpoint. In 
other words, there is little known about the geography of water pollution and whether it 
affects mostly middle class or low-income settlements. Given also the diversity of 
occupations, residential locations and spatial movements within the group of the ‘urban 
poor’ and that of the ‘middle class’, understanding exposure to water pollution becomes 
even more complicated (Veron, 2006:2100). Exposing this complex and inherently 
diverse picture of exposure to pollution at the micro level is therefore central for 
building on this understanding of the policy process, as opposed to the linear ‘top-
down’ perspective of policy procedures. It is also important for broadening the scope of 
expert-scientific policy frameworks, a subject to which the thesis will turn in Chapter 6.  
However, anticipating two likely objections from a cautious reader, I will explain 
briefly here some of the limitations and biases in selecting the cases to be studied. 
Firstly, the focus in the selection of cases has been on breadth as opposed to depth in 
explaining policy processes influencing water quality. That means that in writing up the 
case studies, I have explored the contrasting accounts which exist on the subject of 
water quality, as this is the crucial subject that links the cases together. This was a 
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strategic choice that arose from the research questions. However, the case study 
selection also has some limitations. For example, in Chapter 4 it could perhaps have 
been particularly insightful to explore the underlying politics of corruption and 
particularly to assess to what extent ‘agenda setting’ can be dominated by political 
influence or the influence of powerful industrial lobbies. This is an important point 
especially because lack of transparency is often the one key point of criticism of the 
Board emerging from environmental NGOs and civil society (CSE, 2009). However, at 
the same time political influence can be notoriously difficult to assess, given the 
problems encountered in trying to access sensitive information from environmental 
regulatory institutions in India (Jasanoff, 1993). As a result, in this research much of the 
focus in discussion of the Board is on the ‘expertise’ of the scientists, and how this is 
shaped by the wider political economy of environmental management. To assess 
whether the Board scientists themselves are indeed ‘corruptible’ requires a different line 
of inquiry, which, despite its relative merits for understanding policy failure, it has not 
been possible to explore, primarily because of the problems of accessing sensitive 
information mentioned earlier.   
Secondly, the research approach might have benefited from including international 
policy agenda-setting institutions (e.g. understanding the role of the World Health 
Organisation in setting water quality standards would make a very interesting line of 
inquiry). The exclusion of the international level has partly been due to time constraints 
and also to the inevitable logistical difficulties that limit carrying out research in India 
and Europe or the United States where the headquarters of international policy agencies 
are based. Nonetheless, given the depth and complexity of the issues at national and 
regional levels, and the fact that these are still relatively under-researched, a focus on 
these two sites was deemed to be the most appropriate research strategy. 
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3.2. Research timeline  
On the basis of the research design described above the fieldwork took place over the 
course of two visits to New Delhi, India. The Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) funded both trips as part of my studentship award, and the timing and duration 
of each trip was as follows:    
1st visit: January 10th 2009 – May 10th 2009 
2nd visit:  November 1st 2009 – April 28th 2010 
The first visit involved mainly a series of discussions and semi-structured interviews 
with researchers, activists, scientists, engineers and civil servants. The choice of 
interviewees was based on their involvement in different capacities in environment 
debates, but also on their specific knowledge and professional experiences with regard 
to water quality. The interview strategy was largely exploratory by nature and was not 
intended to answer directly the questions pursued as part of the case studies. However, 
this part of the fieldwork was essential in other aspects. Since this was my first visit to 
India, an extended stay in Delhi was essential for familiarising myself with the city, the 
language, and the culture, as well as for managing the overall logistics of my stay. 
It was central for making the necessary contacts with informants who would help me 
later on to identify key actors and institutions for interviews. This first visit also 
provided me with a greater understanding of the debates related to the policy context 
being studied. Environmental problems facing Delhi were often a lively starting point 
for discussions that were particularly useful for appreciating how and by whom water 
quality problems are commonly framed, as well as for tracing the nature of the policy 
process and the ways in which it becomes relevant to different domains of society. In 
order to avoid bias in my engagement with the various actors, I sought to keep a sense 
of balance by liaising not only with government representatives but also with private 
firms, academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
After this first visit to Delhi, I returned to the UK for a period to consolidate my early 
findings and improve the research design. My second visit was dedicated entirely to 
studying the selected case studies. Fieldwork activities were divided as follows: 
between November 2009 and January 2010, daily visits were conducted to the Central 
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Pollution Control Board, based in the eastern part of Delhi. The focus of these visits was 
to examine specifically the influence of national experts in the framing of water quality, 
the first case study. Fieldwork in Ghaziabad district for supporting the second case 
study was conducted in the latter part of my stay from 15th February – 20th April 2010.  
Despite having allocated different time slots to investigating each case, the nature of the 
research meant I had to be constantly mobile, working on both case studies 
simultaneously. This meant for example that I had to conduct ‘one-off’ visits to various 
departments (including the Board) operating within the capital in order to substantiate 
issues raised during the time spent in Ghaziabad. Therefore, in many ways, as the 
fieldwork evolved my investigation of the two case studies became more interlinked, 
since issues emerging at the district level helped me to understand what was being 
overlooked at the national level. Similarly, having a firm grasp of the regulations and 
procedures at the national level sharpened up my investigations into the implementation 
process at the district level. This placed me in a better position for understanding how 
industrial water pollution in peri-urban areas was linked to various bureaucratic 
procedures. Finally, to develop my own knowledge of the policy process also meant that 
I had to refer to additional sources of information. These included short periods away 
from the fieldwork sites, conducting archival research in institutional libraries and 
participating in Delhi-based conferences, workshops, and academic talks (more details 
on this in section 3.6).    
Because of the wide spectrum of locations and respondents included in the study it was 
important to keep a good record of fieldwork observations made during my stay in 
India. This was done in various ways. Progress reports enabled me to keep a record of 
how research problems were being shaped during the course of fieldwork. These were 
regularly communicated to my supervisors allowing feedback and advice to be 
considered actually during fieldwork. In addition, keeping a research diary and updating 
field notes on a daily basis allowed me to incorporate information that was based mainly 
on personal observations and ‘quotes’. These sources of information are regularly 
referred to in the thesis. The next section provides a more detailed description of the 
methodological approach used to examine each case study.  
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3.3. Case study 1: Problem framing and the role of experts  
This case study is based on an in-depth account of the Board. It focuses on 
understanding the relationship between formal decision-making and scientific expertise. 
Broadly speaking, the reasoning behind the specific choice of case studies has been to 
identify ‘critical cases’ that are of strategic importance in relation to the overall problem 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229 ). A critical case can be one that either verifies or disproves the 
propositions and assumptions that have contributed to defining the research problem 
(ibid: 231). The Board’s account was selected because it was considered likely to 
support some of the earlier claims made in part of this thesis about the function (and 
possible failings) of expert advisory groups in addressing water quality.  
In the first place, this is because the Board has a significant claim to expert authority 
with respect to addressing water quality. It was founded on the basis of the Water 
Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1974 (Gazette of India, 1974), as an exclusive 
body for coordinating water quality restoration programmes throughout India. Several 
policies for addressing water quality are therefore directly drafted or arbitrated by the 
Board. It is active in the design and enforcement of water quality standards, in the 
implementation of India’s national water quality monitoring programme, and in 
providing assistance to city and district authorities on how to implement related policies 
(Trivedi, 2008). The centrality of ‘science-based’ decision-making in the execution of 
its various roles was the fundamental factor for choosing the Board as one of the case 
studies.   
Secondly, the Water Act also grants a number of regulatory powers to this same 
organisation18. Many of these responsibilities are transferred to State Pollution Control 
Boards (SPCBs, or State Boards) that oversee environmental regulation at the state, 
regional and district level. Hence the links with the peri-urban are strong, since 
important water quality decisions in peri-urban areas are mediated through these 
‘offspring’ institutional branches of the Board. In Chapter 5, for instance, the interaction 
between the Board and the regional office of the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board 
                                                
18 The fact that the Board has accumulated policy advisory and regulatory roles is an intriguing point 
because it questions the ability of the organisation to function independently. Furthermore although the 
Water Act explicitly recognises these two sets of roles, the fact that these can intersect is not formally 
recognised, nor are the implications of this interaction between the Board’s roles sufficiently understood. 
These points are addressed in detail in Chapter 4 and section 6.1.1 of Chapter 6.  
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(in short, regional office UPPCB) operating in Ghaziabad district, is explored in more 
detail. It should be noted however, that even though the Ghaziabad district pollution 
control board and the Board are both part of the same institutional structure, scientists 
working for the Board rarely had direct contact with peri-urban areas and had limited 
knowledge of specific details pertaining to water quality management in peri-urban 
Ghaziabad. This meant that the implications of an expert-led approach for addressing 
water quality emerged largely from a range of discussions with the scientists on water 
quality issues in general rather than on peri-urban Ghaziabad in particular.    
In order to gain access to the Board I planned to obtain an internship in the head office 
in Delhi where I would be provided with a temporary membership as a visiting 
researcher. However, due to several bureaucratic obstacles to having an internship 
approved within the stipulated period of fieldwork research, I had to resort to a 
somewhat unorthodox approach for gaining access to the Board. To begin with, using a 
‘snowball’ approach (Patton, 1990) I started off with a small pool of contacts working at 
the Board. I had become acquainted with them through informal conversations with 
researchers working for organisations that collaborated with the Board, and academics 
working in Delhi. During my short visits, I gradually gained the confidence of more 
members of the Board who took an active interest in my research and I was thus in a 
position to prolong my visits to the organisation. In a relatively short time my visits 
became more frequent (normally on a daily basis) and less formal, and at the same time 
I was able to add to my pool of contacts with members of the Board. Members became 
familiar with my presence and did not feel threatened by my research objectives. Within 
the period of three months that I had allocated to this research (see previous section 3.2 
for exact dates), I found I was in a position to engage in discussions with both junior 
and senior members despite their busy schedules. In addition, I managed to join in 
informal discussions during lunch hours and coffee breaks, which were very informative 
and would not have been an option if I had been relying solely on scheduled interviews.   
Not being a formal member of the organisation, however, did present some difficulties 
with gaining access to particular sources of information. Basically, Board members did 
not want to be held liable for sharing sensitive information on regulatory aspects of the 
management of water quality. For example, the probable contribution of industrial 
sources to impaired water quality, was looked upon as a sensitive topic that could 
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critically undermine the Board’s authority as a pollution law enforcement agency. So, 
although Board members were in favour of sharing their knowledge and experience, the 
fact that I was conducting ‘unofficial’ visits made them wary of the type of issues being 
disclosed in the discussions, both informally and during interviews.  
This required a certain degree of flexibility in the fieldwork strategy. In particular, the 
way that I presented my research aims and objectives carried weight for ensuring that 
visits to the Board would not be compromised. For example, although the failure of 
regulatory institutions to reach out to peri-urban areas was of interest to this study, 
maintaining a certain degree of psychological distance from its regulatory functions by 
focusing more closely on the advisory-scientific functions lessened the likelihood of the 
Board members putting an end to the research. Although at the beginning this strategy 
seemed likely to impose limitations, in retrospect it did not jeopardise the overall 
findings of the research. On the one hand, important insights into the influence of the 
Board in areas such as water quality assessment and monitoring were still successfully 
assimilated. On the other, when information on specific regulatory failures in peri-urban 
areas was needed, it was sought from alternative sources. These included the request of 
official documents through the Right to Information Act, numerous discussions with 
independent researchers, and my participation in fora, workshops and conferences 
taking place in Delhi (additional sources of information are also discussed in section 3.6 
of this chapter).    
While access was one of the main challenges when examining this case study, the other 
noteworthy challenge entailed coping with the inherent subjectivity as well as the 
plethora of information that presented itself during the course of the research. Water 
quality is a complex subject that touches on various aspects of the Board’s routine work 
and commitments. It is associated with the work of several departments within the 
organisation and has a core ‘administrative’ as well as a ‘science’ element. My 
background in ecology and the environmental sciences proved to be an advantage 
because it meant I could quickly familiarise myself with the scientific discussions that 
took place during my visits at the Board. But my brief previous engagement with social 
science methodologies also meant that I often found myself despairing when searching 
for clues as to how water quality problems are played out in the discursive realm. 
Insights from studies of discourse in an organisational context helped me to cope with 
  
62 
this problem and organise my inquiries in a more systematic fashion. These studies 
highlight the centrality of exploring the shared assumptions (and shared categories) that 
tend to be replicated in the Board’s practices, discourses, and ‘ways of doing things’ 
(Schein, 1991). From a researcher’s point of view, it is vital to go a step behind the 
shared assumptions and beliefs and examine the production of knowledge which forms 
their base. During the fieldwork, this involved several tasks initially such as 
familiarising myself with the organisational structure (i.e. division of departments and 
hierarchies) and then following through, from design to implementation, particular 
strategies that occupy a more central role in the Board’s routine involvement with water 
quality. As an example, I examine the Board’s water quality monitoring programme. 
This is because the Board invests a large proportion of its financial and human resources 
in monitoring water quality, and therefore the particular approach adopted for 
monitoring water quality (e.g. the locations chosen for monitoring water quality) has 
particular implications for understanding the main beliefs and assumptions that inform 
the Board’s routine work.  
Similarly ‘texts’ (such as annual progress reports) create power relationships through 
the selection of the types of problems and water pollution concerns that are deemed to 
be of higher priority. They also provide the basis for establishing those sources of 
information that are perceived as both authoritative and credible (Hardy & Philips., 
2008). Dorothy Smith’s sociology has time and again highlighted the fundamental role 
of texts for understanding the work of ‘ruling’ within regulatory institutions, 
corporations and public bodies (Smith, 2005). To a great extent, documents can govern 
the nature of the institution, in terms of what can be treated as real or relevant in the 
functioning of an organisation. In the Board’s reports for example, the term ‘water 
quality’ can be used specifically for highlighting certain interpretations and causes of 
pollution while obfuscating or undermining others. Interpreting the use of text is 
therefore essential for gaining insights into how the Board sets its own ‘professional’ 
boundaries around water quality problems. In Table 1, a set of open-ended questions 
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based on different topics show how these perspectives have assisted in exploring the 
influence of discursive processes in expert decision-making19. 
Table 1: Factors influencing organisational culture, adapted from (Schein, 1991) 
 
 
Relationship with 
other actors  
 
How powerful, passive, or harmonious do the scientists believe the work of 
the Board and State Boards to be? 
In general, do they see themselves as ‘expert authorities’ exercising 
substantial influence on broader issues regarding pollution, or more 
specifically on water pollution?  
How are work boundaries defined (in terms of their individual 
responsibilities in addressing water quality)? 
How do Board members envisage their involvement with diverse 
stakeholder groups (e.g. political interest groups, industry and NGOs)? 
 
 
 
Effect of time 
 
 
How has time (since the founding of the Boards) altered the roles, 
responsibilities and functions of these organisations? 
How do Board members relate to these alterations? 
Has the element of time led to significant changes in the ways ‘pollution’ 
and water quality have been dealt with (for example, division of 
expenditures, outside policy priorities influencing the scope of the Board)? 
 
 
 
Conceptual 
categories 
 
What are the underlying scientific assumptions for developing an approach 
to manage water quality (stemming from engineering, chemistry etc.)? 
What terminologies are incorporated in every day discourses? 
To what extent does policy design take into account procedural issues (i.e. 
heavy pollution impact on peri-urban areas)?   
What type of standards and activities are more important for monitoring 
sources of water pollution?  
Are these standards inclusive of risks that could pose a threat to peri-urban 
areas?  
What are the scientific uncertainties that are not expressed in the Board’s 
discourse?  
 
 
 
Social effects and 
environmental 
integrity  
 
How does water quality, addressed in a very technical context, create 
dynamics of exclusion for poorer communities (this question is also 
explored with examples from the peri-urban)? 
How well do science-based approaches to addressing water quality go along 
with environmental integrity? 
 
                                                
19 Note that these questions are not the same as those used during interviews and have been derived to 
inform my own understanding of the Board’s functioning. For more details on the questionnaire used 
during interviews with Board members see Appendix 3.    
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Over the duration of the fieldwork notes were taken to record observations in real time. 
These notes focused on aspects of daily organisational functioning, informal discussions 
with members, and observations of technical work such as laboratory experiments. 
Semi-structured interview questionnaires were also designed with reference to the topics 
mentioned in the table above. Questionnaires led to more prolonged discussions with 
the scientists. The interview strategy adopted is explained in more detail in section 3.5. 
Approximately 20 individuals have been interviewed as part of the research carried out 
for this case study. The scientists, academics and NGO representatives that are quoted 
in this thesis are listed in Appendix 1. Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of 
those interviewees who did not want their real names to be disclosed in this thesis.  
3.4.  Case study 2: Peri-urban policy translations 
The second case study is based on fieldwork conducted in the trans-Hindon region of 
Ghaziabad district in the state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), very near the eastern border of 
New Delhi. The site was first introduced to me through research colleagues at the 
STEPS Centre, who were conducting fieldwork visits in Ghaziabad district during the 
same period that I was based in Delhi. The purpose of these visits was primarily to 
conduct interviews with stakeholders on issues relating to water and sanitation in peri-
urban areas, as part of a wider study carried out by the STEPS Centre on peri-urban 
water sustainability in South Asian cities20.  
By the time I came to know about Ghaziabad district, I had already conducted several 
field trips to different locations on the outskirts of Delhi. The purpose of these visits 
was to identify specific geographic locations in the peripheries of Delhi where the 
accumulation of wastes was increasing as a consequence of Delhi’s growth. A 
secondary purpose was to identify those spaces where, as Amita Baviskar describes, 
‘smokestack industries, effluent-producing manufacturing units and other aesthetically 
unpleasant sites, are discreetly tacked away out of sight, polluting some remote rural 
wasteland’ while the capital is transformed into a ‘world-class’ city (Baviskar, 2002: 
                                                
20 In more detail, ‘The Peri-Urban Interface and Sustainability of South Asian Cities’ is a STEPS Centre 
project which seeks to bring together the social, technical and environmental dimensions of peri-urban 
areas. Water was used in this project as an entry point to ask questions of policy, science and engineering, 
in regard to supply, access and quality. For more information see: 
http://www.periurbansustainability.org/. Eight core researchers have contributed to this project, which 
was co-convened by my two DPhil supervisors, Lyla Mehta and Fiona Marshall.  
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41). Particularly after studying the cool crisp rhetoric of Board members that often led 
me to assume that everything regarding waste management is in ‘order’ (at least on 
paper), identifying a peri-urban site that exhibits symptoms of being bypassed by the 
formal system of waste management became central to highlighting some of the 
contrasts that arise when shifting attention away from the more ‘scientific’ policy 
framing to a much more politicised process of implementation.  
I started my investigation with Gurgaon city (about 32km away from Delhi). I regarded 
this as a logical entry point to my peri-urban Delhi exploration given that real estate 
development and the process of land acquisition happening in Gurgaon was receiving 
considerable media and civil society attention, at the time I was in Delhi, particularly for 
the agitation it was causing to farmers (Narain, 2009). However, during these 
preliminary visits and discussions with Gurgaon residents and officials, the issue of 
water pollution and waste was not so visible nor did the local residents raise it as a 
serious environmental threat. Local concerns about the water source in Gurgaon 
appeared to be mainly to do with the ‘over-abstraction’ of groundwater as a result of 
urban growth, and less to do with pollution of the water source (Lal Seth, 2011).  
It was after discussions with Dr. Pritpal Randhawa, who at that time was leading the 
fieldwork component of the STEPS ‘peri-urban’ study, that I considered paying a visit 
to Ghaziabad. My own affiliation with the STEPS Centre as a DPhil student21, was 
helpful in enabling me to join Dr. Randhawa during field trips, and I was also able to 
participate in conducting interviews and fieldwork observations. During these visits I 
was surprised to notice the heavily polluted condition of the local river Hindon, and the 
fact that both local residents and officials were quick to describe the Hindon as a ‘dead’ 
river. It also came as a surprise that for local residents, the polluted nature of the river 
was simply ‘no news’; there tended to be mutual agreement that pollution has existed in 
the district for a very long time. 
                                                
21 Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to carry out DPhil research as part of 
the STEPS Centre. 
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For me as an ‘outsider’, conducting research on the ‘distance’ between the macro level 
of policy agenda setting and ‘local’ level implementation, the perilous condition of the 
Hindon prompted a number of relevant questions. Firstly, given the relative proximity 
of Ghaziabad to the capital of Delhi (about 30km distance), why is there no real 
regulation of river water quality? Especially given that the key national authority for 
pollution control and prevention, the CPCB (with its main headquarters in in Delhi), 
operates so close to the district. Secondly, it was equally surprising that despite much of 
the planning discourse in Delhi being focused on the ‘integration’ of peripheral towns 
and districts into the urban core (e.g. through policy incentives that stimulate commerce 
and real estate expansion in the peripheries), why is there arguably so little discussion 
on the pollution problems which are affecting these areas? For instance, the Delhi 2021 
Master Plan makes a casual reference to the environmental degradation of Ghaziabad 
(particularly the trans-Hindon region, which is closer to Delhi) which is understood to 
be taking place because of the migration of traditional industries from the city (MoUD, 
2007). However, the same plan provides little scope for discussion on the possible 
implications of environmental degradation for residents of the district, nor on the 
likelihood of a ‘spill-over’ of pollution from Ghaziabad into the capital. Given also that 
the relationship of Delhi with its peripheries is usually explained in terms of the impact 
of population explosion, commerce and real estate development (as in the case of 
Gurgaon), my early visits to Ghaziabad suggested that there is much more scope for 
examining Delhi’s peri-urban transformation from the perspective of water quality.    
I began my exploration firstly with the intention of understanding why deteriorating 
water quality remains so poorly addressed in the district. Furthermore, I wanted to draw 
from the fieldwork deeper insights into the ‘interconnectedness’ of different water 
quality risks, and to understand better how these are presented to diverse social groups 
residing in the district. Specifically in this case study, the fieldwork attempted to bridge 
two foci. The first is a focus on the water resources: to develop an understanding of 
what happens to the river and the groundwater that at present seem to be only the 
recipients of wastewater. And following on from this, to understand how this failure 
might be perceived by residents, government officials, and scientists operating in the 
district with different roles (such as health, water and pollution control specialists). The 
intention of this inquiry was to illustrate that implementation of water quality policies in 
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a peri-urban setting is often negotiated amongst diverse stakeholders who may often 
‘frame’ the problem of water pollution in rather contradictory ways.  
The second is a focus on the particular ‘socio-spatial’ relations that determine exposure 
to risk from deteriorating water quality. This required an approach to data collection that 
could unpack the preconceived notion that deteriorating water quality has the same 
impact across all types of populations found in the district. For instance, while it is 
generally recognised that following a Delhi Supreme Court judgment, many polluting 
industries from Delhi have relocated to the peripheries (see also, Navlakha, 2000), it is 
less understood whether there are particular ‘hotspots’ where these industries tend to 
operate and whether such hotspots correspond with residential settlements, particularly 
those of the poorest peri-urban citizens. This ‘socio-spatial’ dimension of exposure was 
further explored with particular reference to the level of access of different social 
groups to wastewater and water treatment facilities.  
To address these two focal points I weaved my way through a diverse array of data sets, 
elicited by way of several data collection techniques, adopting a fieldwork strategy that, 
in hindsight, appears to have grown by way of an ‘outward layering’ of data sets. 
Guided by few prior assumptions about how problems of deteriorating water quality 
were created in the district, I attempted to trace the relations between individuals and 
groups who appeared to define and debate the problems, or appeared to be involved in 
the exercise of solving them. Starting from the ‘official’ representation of the problems 
(i.e. the pollution of the river Hindon, the unregulated disposal of industrial effluents, 
the depletion of the groundwater etc.), I gradually expanded my field of inquiry to 
include other perspectives from other professional and cultural spheres including 
members of NGOs, environmental activists, journalists, and citizens from different 
socio-economic backgrounds. This outward layering approach to conducting the 
fieldwork led to a widening of the ‘geographical’ space examined (i.e. inclusion of new 
field sites), as well as gradually developing a richer understanding of the types of 
discourses and framings related to the core water quality problems affecting the district. 
However, this outward layering of data also meant that integration was a continuous 
challenge, where I regularly had to come to terms with the inherent limitations of trying 
to integrate data from fairly distinct cultural spheres.  
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I started my engagement with ‘official’ representations of deteriorating water quality 
with the regional office of the Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB). Given 
my prior engagement with Board scientists, I was interested in exploring whether 
pollution control officials at the district level were likely to share a similar vision to 
pollution control scientists working at the national level. When that was not the case, 
my aim was to explore what the ‘grey’ areas of divergence or contradiction were. To 
guide my inquiries I developed the following open-ended questions: 
-­‐ How do perceptions of risk pertaining to water quality differ between 
Board scientists and pollution enforcement officials? 
-­‐ How do officials interact with different social groups?  
-­‐ How enforceable are the water quality criteria and standards proposed 
and developed by the Board in a peri-urban context?  
-­‐ What types of technological and formal policy interventions exist in peri-
urban areas for addressing water quality?  
-­‐ How do power relationships bring about the persistence of water quality 
deterioration?  
After a few visits to the regional office, UPPCB, I realised that eliciting responses from 
pollution control officials to these kinds of questions could only be partially achieved. I 
found, for instance, that because of my own identity as a ‘foreign’ researcher, officials 
were puzzled about the underlying motives for my research. If I had been a pollution 
scientist myself, interested only in the technical performance of existing wastewater 
treatment installations, and the scientific methods available to officers for monitoring 
water quality, I could sense that discussions would have flowed much more easily. By 
contrast, if my study was intended to expose ‘internationally’ the underlying politics of 
bureaucratic inefficiency, particularly in their own domain of pollution control, officials 
would have to tread more carefully in responding to my questions. Despite my efforts to 
distance my own identity as a researcher from these rather polar positions, 
communicating the objectives of my research in such a way that I was not considered 
‘threatening’ to the organisation was a constant struggle.
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In retrospect, I can see that carrying the identity of an ambiguous foreign researcher 
generated obstacles that blocked access to ‘deep data’ concerning the day-to-day 
functioning of the regional office, UPPCB. For instance, one morning I was taken on a 
tour of the river Hindon (i.e. the stretch of the river that passes through Ghaziabad 
district) by two of the regional office UPPCB employees. By car, we took a route 
upstream along the river, noting points at which pollution control officials took regular 
samples of water for further water quality testing. However, when I inquired whether 
we could visit points of industrial effluent disposal (e.g. by entering some of the 
industrial premises), or enter the government operated wastewater treatment plants to 
which some of the wastewater was being diverted prior to entering the river Hindon, my 
request was simply denied. Upon return to the regional office, I asked the director of the 
regional office UPPCB the same question, to which I received another negative 
response. The reason quoted was that I needed ‘special permission’ to enter industrial 
premises, and the process of obtaining such permission was, I felt at times, left 
deliberately ambiguous.   
With many questions left unanswered from my visits to the regional office, UPPCB, I 
moved between different bureaucratic spaces to gain a sense of how officials working in 
other government departments understand (and possibly intervene in) problems of water 
quality. I found that by changing my own vantage point I could achieve a level of access 
to official decision-making processes that would not have been possible if I had 
confined my investigations solely to the role of the regional office, UPPCB. I visited 
local offices of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam (the Uttar Pradesh Water and Engineering 
Board), the Ghaziabad Municipal Corporation (Nagar Nigam), the waterborne disease 
monitoring agency based at the district hospital (operating under the Integrated Disease 
Surveillance Programme) and the district offices of the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial 
Corporation (UPSIDC). On some occasions when access was granted, I also visited 
government offices within the premises of wastewater and water treatment installations 
in order to gain a better understanding of the role of technological applications in 
managing water quality in the district.  
My visits to the different offices were initially guided by limited information as to how 
water quality management relates to other departments in the bureaucracy. Since my 
first point of departure was the regional office, UPPCB, I asked pollution control 
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officers to provide me with contacts of officials that I could approach in other 
government agencies. After a considerable amount of meandering around the periphery, 
of bureaucratic decision-making, I slowly built my own ‘mental map’ of relevant 
official stakeholders and developed a pool of contacts in different departments that I 
was able to approach for interviews and informal discussions. Thus the sampling 
strategy, at the level of understanding formal policy processes in the district, was 
primarily the result of a gradual process of learning the ‘official system’, as opposed to 
having a predefined ‘list’ of officials and departments for conducting interviews.   
By keeping myself mobile and moving between different official agencies, I was able to 
construct a more complete picture of the water quality problems affecting the district, 
going beyond the ‘biophysical’ representation of the problems (i.e. the ecological 
deterioration of the river Hindon22). For instance, it was after several meetings with Dr. 
Shastri, a microbiologist working at the district hospital, that I came to know about the 
names and locations of villages and slum areas where water used for drinking purposes 
was obtained from tubewells and was regarded by hospital officials as ‘unsafe’. It also 
turned out that the hospital was conducting its own water quality assessments, but these 
assessments were rarely communicated to pollution control officials. I was also 
surprised to learn that waterborne diseases did not unequivocally signal the failure of 
government or stir civic consciousness amongst officials. On the contrary, many 
officials would blame water users23 for contracting illness and held them accountable 
for their own misfortunes. As I gradually included more official actors in the fieldwork, 
my understanding of how professional boundaries are formed deepened: a process 
which later on allowed me to draw my own conclusions about the interplay between the 
technical and the political representation of water quality problems.  
In the layering effect I was creating, it was also important to include the perspectives of 
the citizens themselves, and to develop deeper insights into how problems of water 
quality are embedded in their daily lives. I also wanted to show the contrast between the 
‘official’ knowledge of water quality and the ‘experiential’ knowledge of citizens. To 
realise this aim during the fieldwork demanded a fair amount of crossing-over activities. 
Initially, I identified public spaces where I could hold informal conversations with 
                                                
22 This subject came up frequently in discussions with pollution control officials of the regional office, 
UPPCB.  
23 This was the case for water users coming from lower socio-economic backgrounds.  
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residents of the district. I met with residents at typical Indian tea stands (in Hindi, a 
‘chai wallah’) and at local restaurants, and probed them to describe their understanding 
of problems of environmental pollution in the district. I also met with local shopkeepers 
and became a participant observer at police depots, to develop a better understanding of 
particular ‘hotspots’ of pollution. For instance, residents often referred to the owners of 
‘illegal’ factories as being the major perpetrators of environmental regulation. I 
therefore asked questions that would allow me to develop a better understanding of 
where these factories are located, and whether there are any residential settlements in 
proximity to industrial areas.  
Midway through the fieldwork and after I had developed an overall impression of the 
social and environmental topography of the trans-Hindon region, I narrowed down to 
specific field locations where citizens encountered different water quality risks on a 
regular basis. These sites were identified mainly by inference from my discussions with 
citizens and government officials. I understood that citizens from lower socio-economic 
background residing in the urbanised villages, commonly located in the proximity of 
industrial estates, were exposed regularly to both domestic and industrial sources of 
pollution. However, deteriorating water quality in these areas was often ignored or 
downplayed in official representations. I therefore selected Arthala village, KarKar 
Model and Maharajpur village to develop insights regarding the ecological and urban 
settlement conditions of these spaces. I guided my queries with a set of open-ended 
questions that explored native understandings of water pollution. I asked residents to 
describe specific elements or instances of pollution, and in the process attempted to 
synthesise a more a complex picture of the type of water quality risks (and causes of 
those risks) presented to poorer peri-urban citizens.  
During the entire length of the visit I benefited from the assistance of Sushil Raghav, a 
local resident and committed environmental activist24. His engagement with 
environmental activism in the district helped me identify field sites that were of 
strategic interest to my research aims. Barred from the everyday functions within 
industrial sites, I was often forced to view industry from outside their physical 
                                                
24 A video documentary in which Sushil Raghav offers his own views around water pollution and access 
in peri-urban Ghaziabad district, see the STEPS official website on peri-urban sustainability:  
http://periurbansustainability.org/resources/item/water_and_justice_peri_urban_pathways_in_delhi?filter
=resources&list=true&theme=sustainability   
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boundaries. With the support of Sushil, I was able to identify bypass drains and effluent 
disposal sites that industrial operators strived to hide from view (i.e. using concrete 
blocks). With Sushil, I also visited the rooftops of houses to obtain a more critical 
understanding of the spatial topography of environmental pollution. It was this ‘higher’ 
vantage point for instance that opened my eyes to the irregular pattern of smoke 
formation above industrial sites, which I later came to realise was due to the fact that 
some industries regularly interrupted the functioning of their air pollution control 
equipment in order to reduce their pollution abatement costs. Apart from locating sites 
where polluting practices lay ‘hidden’ from the public eye, Sushil also helped me on 
several occasions to overcome language barriers by acting as a translator during 
discussions with citizens who did not speak English. In addition, the fact that Sushil 
knew or at least recognised many of the village residents in the sites that I chose to 
study was a powerful ice-breaker and helped respondents feel more comfortable and 
conversational during interviews.   
Approximately 30 individuals have been interviewed for this case study. The district 
officials, village residents, scientists and NGO representatives that are quoted in the 
discussion of the peri-urban case are listed in Appendix 2. Pseudonyms are used to 
protect the identity of those interviewees that did not want their real names to be 
disclosed in this thesis. 
3.5. Interview strategy 
The interview strategy can take on different forms and yield a variety of information, 
depending on the person being interviewed. The interviewee’s own position in relation 
to the policy process can be very different, and this is what determines the type of 
experiences and perspectives that are introduced for discussion. Consequently, the 
interviewee’s status as a scientist, a bureaucrat, or a powerless citizen holds different 
implications for the way an interview proceeds.  
With this in mind, different questions were put to the different groups of actors. That is, 
during my engagement with Board scientists I asked them a different set of questions 
from those I used in the Ghaziabad case study. The protocol followed was to send a 
short one-page brief by email, outlining the research topic and main questions, in order 
for respondents to have some knowledge of the topic prior to the interview. Because of 
  
73 
the nature of the organisations under study and the difficulties inherent in gaining access 
in bureaucratic contexts, often more than one appointment was necessary to secure an 
interview. Sending out briefs in advance did not always guarantee that that they were 
read or that respondents were always prepared to answer questions directly. Generally, 
it was necessary to be flexible when using prepared questions, and sometimes 
respondents were encouraged to speak more freely. Very often scientists and officials 
were reluctant to give their consent for their real names to be disclosed. For this reason 
quotes from interviews with officials and scientists used in this thesis are attributed to 
their roles and functions but their real names have been replaced with pseudonyms in 
order to protect their anonymity. An example of the interview schedule is provided in 
Appendix 3.  
Most interviews were ‘semi-structured’, where detailed questions are formulated ahead 
of time, starting with more general questions or topics. Should the interviewee introduce 
new information that was not part of the proposed interview plan, the interview could 
alter its course to accommodate them (Creswell, 2009). This was crucial when 
interviewing Board scientists because although members shared similar views, they 
reported their individual experiences, influenced by their positions and specialised 
functions in the organisation. It is noteworthy that for example discussions with 
laboratory workers provided deeper insights into scientific ‘uncertainties’ when 
measuring water quality in the lab and comparing the findings with regulatory 
‘standards’ (these features of the Board’s work did not figure as prominently during 
arranged interviews). Senior members who had been in the organisation for longer were 
able to elaborate on the organisational history and its relationship to other actors such as 
the MoEF. As it was difficult to anticipate the kind of information the respondent would 
be willing to share, it required openness and scope for re-adjustment of the questions 
during the interview process.  
In some interviews I applied a more ‘conversational’ style of engagement. Particularly 
during my first visit to Delhi, ‘elite’ interviews with academics, policy practitioners and 
other experts allowed me to get a first-hand view of how problems regarding water 
quality are understood by those working outside government. In fairly unstructured 
interviews, I also approached retired officials, scientists, and engineers who were in a 
position to discuss issues from the ‘outside’, recalling their own past professional 
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experiences, and revealing their personal views of the contemporary situation. This type 
of engagement was facilitated by using open-ended questions suggested by the 
researcher or that arose spontaneously during the interview (i.e. ‘Tell me more about...’, 
‘Could you elaborate on the point you just made?’ etc.). These kinds of interviews often 
tended to take significantly longer than others, sometimes lasting several hours. 
The majority of interviews with public officials, scientists and other policy practitioners 
were conducted in English. However, people from poorer groups residing in urban 
villages who were regularly affected by environmental pollution often responded in 
Hindi. As mentioned previously, Sushil normally translated these for me during the 
course of an interview. Obviously this placed restrictions on the interview strategy, 
since not all subtle meanings and details can be translated on the spot. Being aware from 
the start that Hindi being the main language spoken in the villages could affect the 
quality of the data obtained, I customised the fieldwork strategy accordingly. 
Discussions were held with Sushil after walking around the locality and gaining a better 
sense of the environmental issues affecting the settlement. After identifying the specific 
sensitive areas such as waste management efficiency, use of water resources, and local 
sources of pollution (e.g. proximity to industries was regularly flagged as a community 
concern), interviews were then conducted in an exploratory way, encouraging village 
residents to present their views on these problems. The point was therefore not to ask 
respondents abstract questions about how they felt about ‘water quality’ (as this is more 
of a scientific term) but to infer those problems and concerns that were of interest to the 
residents.  
Information drawn from interviews and used in the form of quotes is a central 
component of this thesis. Quotes are taken from the interviews, and are referenced in the 
thesis in the form of footnotes. The overall aim has been to refer to quotations in order 
to illustrate how different aspects of water quality were emphasised by different groups 
of actors. Interview quotes are also utilised for illustrating how involved actors portray 
institutional relationships and how formal responsibility is shared between the actors 
involved in the enactment of formal policies and interventions. Although only a part of 
the interview material is presented in this thesis, the bulk has had a supporting role in 
deepening my own understanding of the issues and in formulating the key arguments.    
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3.6. Additional sources of information 
Coming to terms with the different meanings, contrasting knowledge systems and 
interventions attached to water quality also involved engaging with a diverse range of 
additional sources of information. The main additional sources that influenced this 
research included official documents accessed via the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 
2005, government audit reports dealing with regulatory institutions, and participation in 
workshops and other fora as part of my affiliation with the STEPS Centre. Each of these 
sources is described briefly in this section.  
Access to official documents from government departments operating at various 
executive levels (i.e. national, state and district) is often discouraged. This was a major 
setback when claims made by respondents during interviews needed to be further 
substantiated. It also hindered the research in getting to the bottom of the official 
rhetoric of senior civil servants and scientists and in examining the facts in more detail. 
It is in this context that the use of the Right to Information Act, 2005 proved so 
important. Starting with small-scale sporadic initiatives, RTI has now become a 
nationwide people’s movement for exposing corrupt government practices by gaining 
access to government information. Specifically, the RTI empowers citizens, research 
NGOs and civil society groups to scrutinise government decisions and to ensure that 
they are consistent with the principles of public interest, probity and justice (Mander 
and Joshi, 2010). By using the RTI Act, 2005 this research was able to gain access to 
valuable sources of information that would have otherwise been unavailable, if the 
methodology had relied on fieldwork observations and interviews alone. 
Not being an Indian national meant that I could not apply directly for access to official 
documentation. Sushil Raghav who was also helping me during my fieldwork in 
Ghaziabad district agreed to send the RTI requests in his name and with his 
authorisation. This became an effective partnership as on the one hand I benefited 
directly from answers received and on the other hand, Sushil also benefited by 
extending his knowledge and information sources to support his own environmental 
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activism in the district25. Although the procedure seems simple, there are several points 
that require careful attention in order to ensure the quality of the information received 
through RTI. For example, questions posed to government departments have to be 
carefully worded in order to ensure that answers received from officials are not 
misleading. To some extent this requires some prior knowledge of the organisation to 
which an RTI application is filed. These are aspects of using the RTI that I had little 
prior knowledge of, but with Sushil’s prior experience I was able to submit effective 
applications which returned valuable official information.  
Given the centrality of environmental regulatory institutions to the investigations carried 
out as part of this research, the majority of RTI requests were made to the Board and 
UPPCB regional office in Ghaziabad. Different questions were put to the departments 
concerned, on the basis of how my understanding of the key issues developed over the 
course of the fieldwork. In the case of the Board, questions were primarily focused on 
details of bureaucratic practice and organisational structure. The questions posed 
concerned public complaints received by the Board on issues related to pollution, 
minutes of meetings of Board members, inspection of industries carried out under 
specific pollution enforcement initiatives, and details regarding the annual allocation of 
the Board’s financial budget. In the case of the regional office, UPPCB, questions were 
primarily focused on details of pollution enforcement practice. These included details of 
the locations within Ghaziabad where water samples are collected, factories operating in 
the district which failed to comply with environmental norms, and the frequency with 
which pollution enforcement inspectors visited villages, residential colonies and other 
departments within the district. On the basis of the information received I was able to 
develop a better picture of the numbers of industrial units operating illegally in the 
district. I was also able to form better judgments about the water quality status of 
various water resources in the district.  
                                                
25 An important area of Sushil’s involvement with the RTI process that overlaps with the interest of this 
study has been in exposing industries that operate either illegally in the district or without effluent 
treatment plants. He uses information received through the RTI to approach pollution control authorities 
and put pressure on regulators to take remedial action.  
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Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are several constraints to using the RTI Act. 
The first relates to the time it takes to receive a response following an RTI request. This 
usually takes up to 30 days, depending on the nature of the request and the number of 
questions put to the department concerned. Given that my fieldwork proceeded in two 
relatively short visits of approximately three months each, I could not afford to rest 
entirely on the RTI process, and simply wait idly for the departments concerned to 
provide a response. Once I received the information I carefully examined it, but the fact 
that I could not predict when this would be meant that I had to treat information 
provided using the RTI Act essentially as a secondary source of information, while 
interviews and fieldwork observations were the ‘primary’ source26.  
The second limitation relates to the quality of information received. Ultimately, the RTI 
Act has been mobilised by civil society in India to identify specific problems faced by 
people in their interface with the public authority (Mander and Joshi, 2010), and, more 
specifically, problems that relate to corruption, or the exercise of power in ways which 
adversely affect citizens. This means that officials are not always comfortable with 
answering questions put to their departments on the basis of the RTI Act. As a result, it 
is not always certain that documents received have not been altered, or that officials 
have not withheld specific information and documents. Another, simpler, strategy for 
officials to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information is to provide ‘short answers’ 
to questions that relate to contentious topics, such as in this case the topic of industrial 
pollution regulation. These issues meant that I was cautious in how I used RTI 
information, and in many cases I observed that the ‘real problems’ and the respective 
causes of bureaucratic failure were identified much more easily during interviews and 
informal discussions than when I used the RTI Act. Generally, however, it must be said 
that the quality of information received using the RTI process depends largely on the 
questioner’s experience of making the information requests, and because officials are 
likely to be ‘defensive’ in the responses that they provide, usually a number of RTI 
requests have to be sent to the same agency in order to put pressure on officials, 
something which in turn requires more time than was available for the completion of 
this research project.  
                                                
26 For an example of an official response to an RTI request refer to Appendix 4.  
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Another source for collecting additional information was a series of short visits to 
government institutions including Parliament House, the National Institute of Public 
Finance and Policy, the Indian Institute of Public Administration, and the Comptroller 
Audit General (CAG) of India. Specifically, the aim of these visits was to locate reports 
prepared by independent auditory bodies and committees of experts on the performance 
of environmental regulatory institutions, especially the Board and State Boards. 
Examining these reports was important for understanding how the state mobilises its 
own evaluation of regulatory performance and implementation, but also for interpreting 
how these evaluations have evolved over time and especially since the establishment of 
the Board. Not all reports are referred to directly in the text. However, those that are 
referred to in this thesis include the Comptroller and Auditor General Review of the 
Board (CAG, 1992), as well as the more recent audit of the Board by the Parliament 
Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment & Forests (Parliament of 
India, 2008)  
As already mentioned, during the course of the research I attended several fora that 
proved to be an invaluable source for the data collection process, and for participating in 
discussions related to this research, as well as gaining access to individual experts and 
documentation. As a member of the STEPS team27, my study has benefited greatly from 
my attendance at a series of ‘peri-urban’ specific workshops, academic discussions, and 
access to research papers and documents related to the STEPS peri-urban project28 . 
These sources of information have been invaluable for formulating ideas as well as for 
triangulating and substantiating information received during the fieldwork. Because the 
STEPS project’s focus was on exploring questions of water ‘supply and access’ as 
opposed to water ‘quality’, there are several points of intersection but also of departure 
between the STEPS project and this thesis. They differ in terms of their emphasis, with 
this thesis being more oriented to water quality and not just to issues of supply and 
access, while also adding another dimension to the discussion by introducing the 
Board’s role in the process, which is not accounted for in the STEPS project.   
                                                
27 Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to carry out DPhil research as part of 
the STEPS Centre.  
28 ‘The Peri-Urban Interface and Sustainability of South Asian Cities’ is a STEPS project that seeks to 
bring together the social, technical and environmental dimensions of peri-urban areas. Water is used in 
this project as an entry point to ask questions of policy, science and engineering, with regard to supply, 
access and quality. For more information, see: http://www.periurbansustainability.org/.    
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3.7. Ethics and Confidentiality 
Ethical considerations required that I ensured informed consent of participants in the 
research, thereby protecting the interests of the subjects, maintaining confidentiality, 
and preventing the disclosure of identities where it could harm those participating in the 
research (Hill, 1995, in Mehta, 2007). Therefore, in the case of the institutional study of 
the Board, the research objectives were always made explicit from the beginning as well 
as throughout the time spent visiting the organisation. Reference letters from my 
University were made available as and when requested or before an interview 
commenced.    
Prior to initiating interviews, meetings were held with senior members of the Board for 
presenting the research plan and for ensuring that the organisation was aware of and 
comfortable with my visits. As mentioned previously, all interviewees are kept 
anonymous in the empirical chapters that follow. This decision was taken because of the 
sensitive nature of the field of study, which relates closely to regulatory practices, 
policies and performance.  
3.8. Funding 
The research was funded entirely through a +3 Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) scholarship. This scholarship included a living allowance for the period of the 
doctoral programme, and also provided additional funding for overseas fieldwork, 
which allowed for significant time and resources to be dedicated to collecting 
information abroad. As previously stated, nine months were spent overall conducting 
fieldwork in New Delhi, India. 
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3.9. Reflections on the methodology 
The research task I embarked upon was an ambitious one, particularly because of the 
nature of the case studies that I wanted to explore. It is not common practice for 
research on peri-urban processes to include a fieldwork component at a location that is 
physically situated ‘outside’ the peri-urban context. However, in my research I did 
precisely this by including the case of the Central Pollution Control Board. This is an 
expert-led organisation, performing all the tasks of a national policy advisory body on 
water quality management, but situated in the capital of Delhi instead of peri-urban 
Ghaziabad. In doing so, my intention is to show how these two different worlds of 
policy action can be at the same time ‘contrasting’ as well as ‘similar’, and to illustrate 
the ‘cross-scale’ interactions that can influence policy success as well as failure. This is 
important both in terms of being consistent with the conceptual framework that informs 
this study, and for illustrating how problems of water quality are defined from multiple 
perspectives. But at the same time in moving across these different worlds, cultural as 
well as geographical, dilemmas arise, puzzles confound and social relations are formed 
that shape the final written output. I would like to list a few here to give the reader a 
sense of how the process of research and fieldwork has influenced the researcher in a 
more personal way.  
First is the issue of maintaining a position of neutrality when engaging with multiple, 
and often adversarial points of view. Who are to blame for the persistence of water 
pollution in a peri-urban setting, and who are the victims? And more importantly, where 
does one draw the line between the science and the politics in understanding the 
underlying causes of water pollution? I pondered these types of questions throughout 
this research journey, and in many situations I found myself being pulled between 
different positions. Particularly in my exploration of the Board, I attempted to present a 
‘balanced’ account of how water quality management is perceived both from the 
perspective of the scientists working ‘inside’ the organisation, as well as from the point 
of view of other stakeholders not immediately related to the functioning of the Board. 
These include activists working for environmental NGOs based in Delhi, academics and 
former employees of the Board. But when it came to doing the research, I could sense 
that the risk of privileging certain perspectives or misrepresenting others always loomed 
large.  
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For example, I sometimes wondered whether I was identifying too much with the 
environment NGO positions I encountered, particularly the position of activists based in 
Delhi who were normally fierce critics of the Board. During my engagement with Sushil 
Raghav and in the process of searching for ‘clues’ to corrupt industrial and government 
practices, I often found myself feeling frustrated with the pollution problems I 
encountered and became acutely aware that these feelings could lead to biases and 
weaken my own capacity to maintain an objective stance in my own interpretations. 
Equally, there were times when I questioned whether my prolonged engagement with 
Board scientists was bringing my own views too close to theirs, particularly because I 
had to learn a lot about the actual ‘science’ of water quality management before I could 
come to write about it from a critical point of view. I therefore found myself in doubt 
about whether I was replicating the same explanations for water quality problems I 
encountered that the scientists discussed with me, or whether my own engagement was 
indeed fruitful for identifying ‘grey’ areas and possible limitations in the science. I 
found that resolving these dilemmas took time, and only after attaining a certain degree 
of distance from the subjects of my research, for instance only after coming back to the 
UK, was I able to look at my data with some degree of impartiality. But more generally, 
managing the dangers of misrepresentation and the inevitable difficulties of having to be 
both impartial and involved with my research subjects was at various times a source of 
tension.  
Secondly, personal dilemmas arose in the process of data collection. Early on in the 
fieldwork I used a pre-designed questionnaire as my primary method for data collection 
(see Appendix 3). This questionnaire was designed on the basis of certain expectations, 
particularly regarding the level of access to information I could gain from the 
respondents working in the organisations I was interested in. However, in the event, I 
discovered that the contexts I was studying were much more challenging than I had 
earlier anticipated. For instance, when I met with some officials in Ghaziabad, I would 
frequently receive fragmented stories and partial ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to questions I 
was expecting a fair degree of elaboration. Given the central role of discourse in this 
research, this quickly became a serious obstacle to my data collection strategy. It also 
made me question the usefulness of questionnaires in the Indian bureaucratic setting, 
where I found that the officials I was engaging with were keen to keep their knowledge 
and experiences secret.   
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This problem is not easily overcome, but after spending some time in the field I found 
that developing ‘partnerships’ with a small number of actors became a useful strategy 
for overcoming some of the difficulties of access. One such partnership building 
exercise was with Dr. Shastri, a microbiologist working for Ghaziabad hospital. Yet 
another was with environmental activist, Sushil Raghav (see also section 3.4). Also, at 
the level of understanding how the Board functions, I decided to interact more closely 
with a small number of scientists as opposed to all the scientific staff that were 
employed by the Board. To develop these partnerships I deviated considerably from the 
standard questionnaire approach. I invested considerable time in getting to know my 
research partners; I met with them regularly, and accompanied them to their place of 
work. I took time to interact with them at a social level and met them outside their 
normal office hours as well.   
The limitation of building such partnerships with the research subjects, however, is that 
it can be a rather slow and time-consuming process. For instance, only after meeting 
with Dr. Shastri regularly at his office over several months was I able to take note of his 
‘own’ views regarding the pollution problems affecting the district. This differed 
strikingly, for instance, from the normal rhetoric of officials in the district, which 
focused mainly on ‘listing’ the functions of his or her respective organisation. Similarly, 
only after my meetings with Sushil became more regular (i.e. on a daily basis, when I 
was conducting fieldwork in Ghaziabad), was I able to gain his trust and use some of 
the official documents he had collected over several years of exercising his rights under 
the RTI Act. If I were conducting this research in a different setting, where there was 
perhaps less secrecy around official decision-making processes, a structured 
questionnaire would have been a more useful methodological tool, and presumably 
would have allowed the research to draw insights from a larger pool of respondents. But 
given the issues of access encountered both in the context of the Board as well as in 
peri-urban Ghaziabad, many of the main insights of this research are drawn from the 
partnerships which I formed with a relatively small group of actors.
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A key aim of this research has been to bring to the forefront the perspectives of those 
citizens who are often excluded from expert and technical framings of water quality. 
However, as Mehta has also highlighted, researching marginality can often be a 
complex task (Mehta, 2008). Although I have tried to provide an honest portrayal of the 
events I experienced while engaging with marginalised citizens, I was also aware that 
the risk of essentialising certain citizen views and accounts was always present. For 
instance, it was not always straightforward to establish clear links between marginality 
and exposure to deteriorating water quality, not least because at some level, water 
pollution was having visible negative affects across different social classes. 
In rapidly changing peri-urban contexts where there is often widespread environmental 
degradation, identifying who is being marginalised and who is better served poses even 
greater challenges. In Ghaziabad, the middle-classes, although less vocal about 
problems of water pollution, were also affected in important ways, for instance because 
of the proximity of the polluted river Hindon to their location of residence, or because it 
was evident to them that wider policies drawn at the capital made serious concessions to 
environmental protection when it came to managing the towns where they chose to live. 
I decided to ‘single out’ citizens residing in the villages on the basis of how these spaces 
were represented in official discourse, and the fact that in these spaces peri-urban 
citizens faced risks that were seriously harmful and at times even life threatening, as 
highlighted by my experiences. However, in practice, when conducting social science 
research these choices can often be highly arbitrary and heavily influenced by the way 
we as researchers experience marginality. In other words, investigations proceed 
sometimes through a certain degree of intuition, which arises from being situated at a 
particular place and at a particular point in time (Mehta, 2008:237).  
Finally, in my engagement with those citizens regularly exposed to risks from water 
pollution, the fieldwork was on several occasions confounded by problems of 
communication. With environmental activists and scientists, literacy was valuable to the 
extent that exchange of knowledge could generate a certain measure of partnership 
building. In my engagement with citizens, however, this exchange had numerous 
unstable moments. I can recall that after one of my visits to the village settlements, an 
article appeared in the local newspaper that noted in the headline that ‘a researcher from 
the UK’ had visited the villages to study problems of environmental pollution. This 
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made me rather conscious of the type of impact my research was having on the 
communities I was studying. I did not want to create false expectations, nor to adopt the 
image of a ‘social benefactor’ for the communities I studied. I have tried to overcome 
the dangers of being misunderstood by creating the time and space needed for research 
participants to get to know me, in the same way that I was aspiring to learn more about 
their own lives. But as Mehta suggests, it often cannot be helped that as researchers ‘we 
can be painfully aware of the power relations that shape our research, and the fact that 
that most of us conduct research from positions of privilege about people in difficult 
situations’ (Mehta, 2008:248). In these circumstances, all players know that they are 
vulnerable to being misrepresented, while language differences can only accentuate the 
problems.  
3.10. Conclusion  
This chapter has attempted to describe the methodology used to collect and analyse the 
data for this research. I have discussed the research strategy and how it has been used to 
develop deeper insights on water quality policy processes. The methods of data 
collection have been described and the methods used to explore the separate case 
studies have been outlined. Finally, I have discussed briefly some of my own reflections 
on the methodology, its limitations and how something of my own position as a 
researcher may have come to shape the final delivery of the pen. 
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Chapter 4 Expertise and decision-making at the Board 
This chapter turns its attention to the Central Pollution Control Board (hereafter known 
as the Board), which is often described as being the ‘technical arm’ of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF) for environmental pollution regulation and abatement. 
Within government, the Board is the scientific organisation almost synonymous with 
‘environmental expertise’ and it operates as a principal advisory body for a number of 
stakeholders, including policy makers and regulators. The Board was first founded in 
Delhi in the early 1970s by a team of scientists and engineers specialised in the field of 
environmental pollution. This was a time when river pollution was a major concern. 
Although river pollution formed the basis for developing comprehensive guidelines and 
research strategies for addressing ‘water quality’, the Board has now grown 
significantly and operates as a national level organisation for pollution prevention in 
India.   
With its main roles being centred on the design and enforcement of water pollution 
prevention strategies, the Board represents a useful starting point for exploring the 
influence of expert advisors on the development of water quality priorities. The insights 
of this chapter are informed by the examination of the particular ways in which 
scientists routinely talk about water quality, linking concepts and scientific notions with 
specific policy priorities. The chapter further illustrates, by way of a set of narratives29, 
the type of shared assumptions and biases that have become internalised by the Board 
scientists with respect to water quality regulation.
                                                
29 The narratives referred to are: The deteriorating levels of water quality (caused by overpopulation), the 
development and enforcement of standards, the locations chosen for monitoring and the relationship 
between the Board and civil society.   
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4.1. The Board and the context of environmental policy in India 
Environmental policy in India emerged as a priority in the seventies and acquired public 
appeal in subsequent years. It is argued that the enactment of environmental laws and 
employment of a range of regulatory instruments in India emerged firstly as a response 
to global environmental policy initiatives and secondly because of the realisation of an 
environmental policy agenda by India’s policy makers (Dwivedi, 1997). The 
international stimulus came primarily from the 1972 United Nations conference on 
international environmental issues held in Stockholm (also known as the Stockholm 
Conference). India, was both a participant as well as signatory to the environmental 
principles decided at that time (Bajwa and Bains, 1992). Since then, a number of 
landmark regulatory reforms have been pursued domestically including the Water 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 197430, The Forest Conservation Act of 
1981, The Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act of 1986, and the Environment 
(Protection) Act of 1986. These legislations have facilitated a paradigm shift from a 
system of environmental law that mainly consisted of tortuous actions against nuisance 
or negligence, to a system that endorses specific priorities for individual sectors and 
problem areas (Divan and Rosencranz, 2001).  
The Board and State Boards have emerged as part of this process of institutional and 
regulatory reform and specifically as the key mechanism for monitoring compliance of 
pre-existing and planned industrial installations with the environmental laws set out by 
India’s policy and law making community (Bowonder et al., 1994). Initially founded on 
the backdrop of the Water Act of 1974 (with a specific agenda for water quality 
management), as more environmental legislations were put in place, these institutions 
gradually acquired additional responsibilities for monitoring compliance beyond the 
scope of water pollution, to include for instance a focus on toxins, corporate issues, and 
airborne pollution (Reich and Bowonder, 1992). More broadly, it is noted that there are 
over 200 Central and State statutes that have at least some relevance to environmental 
protection, and are therefore either directly or indirectly relevant to the functioning of 
the Boards (Divan and Rosencranz, 2001). 
                                                
30 The Water Act became the first real foundation for environmental protection in Indian law.  
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The environmental policy context has been further shaped by the 1984 Bhopal gas 
tragedy, which exposed internationally the inadequacies of the state machinery in the 
field of pollution control and triggered a renewed emphasis on central government in 
India’s environmental affairs (Jasanoff, 1993). As a result, the MoEF, together with the 
Board and State Boards saw their regulatory powers being expanded. For instance, the 
Environment Act of 1986, which came into force soon after the Bhopal disaster, granted 
the central government authorities (namely the MoEF and the Board) the power to close 
down facilities not complying with environmental requirements, or to stop their supply 
of electricity, water and other essential services31. Another important legislation that 
followed the Bhopal accident was the 1987 Factories Act which authorised State Boards 
to demand risk information from hazardous facilities under construction, or to issue 
restraining orders against industries that were perceived as ‘high risk’ in terms of the 
likelihood of violating emissions standards (Jasanoff, 1993: 10).   
 
Despite this wide set of regulatory and institutional reforms that have taken place in 
India, environmental conditions continue to deteriorate. Most of the rivers and other 
bodies of water in India are polluted, and large-scale deforestation is being carried out 
with impunity. With the additional pressures of urbanisation and population growth 
environmental degradation is becoming highly concentrated in cities and in the 
peripheries of large metropolises. Reich and Bowonder associate these changes with a 
widening gap between the ‘intent’ of environmental policy making in India and the 
actual ‘achievement’ of policy (Reich and Bowonder, 1992:643). This is a problem 
which is further compounded by what Sheila Jasanoff terms an ‘insensitivity to 
feasibility’ which consistently leads India’s law makers to create new governmental 
obligations without providing the institutional infrastructure needed for their effective 
realisation (Jasanoff, 1993: 39).  
The insensitivity to feasibility that Jasanoff has noted has over the years been subject to 
various interpretations. Furthermore, given the centrality of the Board and State Boards 
in the bureaucratic structure for implementing environmental laws, it is hardly a surprise 
that these institutions are often at the centre of discussions on implementation failure. 
Singh et.al., for instance, write: ‘unfortunately these Boards have little success to justify 
                                                
31 In 1988 this authority was used effectively to issue 43 notices of closure. (Bowonder et al., 1994) 
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the responsibility reposed in them. The Boards are virtually defunct. Organisations or 
individuals in public interest file most environmental cases, but hardly ever does one see 
a case initiated by a Pollution Control Board’ (Singh et al., 1993: 2). They further note 
that the Boards can sometimes work in support of polluters (such as industrial operators 
and corporations) in court as ‘party respondents’, as opposed to working with those 
individuals filing a case in the first place, thus rendering the overemphasis and ‘total 
monopoly of power’ vested in these Boards ‘misplaced’ (ibid: 2). Singh concludes that 
this is ‘probably the most important reason for the failure of these Acts32’ (ibid: 2).   
Others commentators perceive the problem of poor implementation to be linked to a 
deeper conflict between an agenda of environmental protection and promoting growth 
in India. For instance, the liberalisation of India’s economy since the mid-1990s has 
arguably accelerated growth; however this growth would not have been achieved 
without the state’s active role in tilting the economy in favour of industry (Kohli, 2006, 
Williams and Mawdsley, 2006). India’s annual growth rate has risen to 5.8 percent in 
the period of 1980-2004, and much of this growth is attributed to the increase in 
productivity of the industrial, mining and manufacturing sectors (Kohli, 2006:1365). As 
a result, the Congress Party, which has created most of India’s environmental laws, has 
also had the ‘ear’ of the business lobby (especially the large scale business lobby) 
(Stuligross, 1999: 5), advocating the removal of ‘unreasonable’ constraints on the 
‘international’ competitiveness of Indian industry(Jasanoff, 1993: 13). The fact that 
there is a coherent interest at the highest levels of government in keeping business 
booming no matter the environmental costs is in turn reflected domestically. For 
instance, in 1991 more than 4000 pollution cases 33 were pending around the country. 
Since then this figure has been constantly on the rise34, while the rate of conviction has 
remained rather low irrespective of the growing number of legal cases currently being 
filed in court (CSE, 2009: 30).  
Weak implementation of environmental norms is further complicated by the fact that 
despite legislative provisions that confer special powers to the Boards to impose 
                                                
32 Referring to the environmental legislations put in place since the 1970s by India’s law makers.  
33 The majority of which are filed against industries. 
34 It is hard to determine an aggregate nationwide figure based on current trends since there is high 
variation across the different states. But as an indication of the increasing trend of non-compliance, for 
the state of Madhya Pradesh alone, no less than 8,000 pollution cases are currently pending action by state 
courts (CSE, 2009).  
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sanctions on polluters, in practice it lacks real authority to deal directly with violating 
industrial units. This is partly a consequence of federalism in India. For instance, even 
though the Water Act provides that ‘no person or firm can discharge sewage or effluents 
into a stream, well, sewer, or on land’ without consent of the Boards, ‘water’ is 
ultimately a subject under the control of the state and not central government (Gazette 
of India, 1974: 15). As result the Board is often in no position to intervene directly and 
depends heavily on state authorities to enforce norms and regulations. The results in 
terms of policy implementation can therefore be surprising and vary hugely between 
different states. In Kanpur for example, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Uttar 
Pradesh Pollution Control Board, it appears that when pushed the pollution control 
board will selectively inspect and report the malfunctioning of some industrial units and 
use these reports to divert attention away from the many other effluent treatment plants 
lying idle inside industrial units (Alley, 2002: 174). Industrial operators that have made 
payoffs to the State Board, or are otherwise in favour with the Minister in power at the 
state level, are therefore in a position to manipulate the regulatory process and evade 
compliance with the Board’s norms.  
In theory the MoEF could step in in instances where State Boards are viewed as corrupt 
or too heavily influenced by state level political and industrial interests. However, this 
also seems to be a policy avenue that encounters significant barriers. This is partly 
because of the relative weakness of the MoEF to have any practical influence in 
bureaucratic struggles. This is particularly the case when environmental problems are 
likely to originate from policies implemented by other ministries, or indeed by the 
cabinet of the Prime Minister of India. For instance it is noted by Menon that the MoEF 
has played a key role in ‘re-engineering’ the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
guidelines so that large infrastructure projects (initiated by other ministries) are given 
faster clearance (Menon and Kohli, 2008: 14). From the perspective of other ministries 
as well there is often little incentive to pay attention to the environmental consequences 
of their policies in light of the relatively ineffectual role of the MoEF. Arguably the 
current trend of economic liberalisation and deregulation of industry could further 
weaken the influence of the MoEF. Ineffective leadership on environmental matters by 
the MoEF is therefore another factor which poses a barrier to better implementation and 
strengthening of the functioning of the Boards, as their continued existence is closely 
tied to the MoEF in terms of both getting access to funds and executive support.   
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The problem of poor implementation is further confounded by the fact that the Board 
and State Boards are often over-bureaucratised and understaffed. This means that even 
without political interference it would be difficult for this set of institutions to perform 
to the required standards. The reasons behind this are several. Firstly, this is because the 
sources of pollution are simply too many and include both industrial and household 
wastes. In the state of Andhra Pradesh for example there are 700 large and medium 
sized factories and about 70,000 small-manufacturing units (Reich and Bowonder, 
1992:652). Secondly, given that the Boards are often constrained by lack of resources, 
pollution control officials are often barely able to ‘inspect’ pollution levels at the point 
of discharge, and often tend to transfer a pollution case to the district or municipal 
authority. Thirdly, at the municipality level as well, enforcement of regulatory norms 
remains relatively inadequate and is often delayed further by arduous court struggles 
and far too many official and legal loopholes.  
Another important challenge presented to these bureaucracies is linked to non-point 
sources of pollution, such as domestic wastewater sewage. This is a source of pollution 
that is increasing more rapidly because of growing population pressures, particularly in 
large cities and towns. Given the challenges posed to the Boards in terms of human and 
financial resources for monitoring industrial pollution alone, domestic sewage has 
become an area of concern which is largely left to the municipalities. As a result there is 
considerable variation both in the technological options adopted to control water 
pollution, as well as the public resources available to municipalities for pollution 
abatement. This makes it exceptionally difficult for the Boards to administer a 
command control approach model to dispersed sources of pollution in the same way as 
it monitors and controls industrial effluent. 
Growing public distrust in the capacity of government agencies both at the centre and at 
the state level to implement environmental laws has led to an increasing number of 
activists and NGOs getting involved in shaping India’s environmental governance. 
Some of the civil society initiatives have turned into social movements, the most 
popular being the Narmada Bachao Andolan (or Save the Narmada Movement) against 
the Narmada river valley project, which emerged from the grassroots to oppose the 
range of dam building programmes planned for the Narmada Valley. Since opposition 
to the Narmada river valley project began in 1985, civil society action has emerged in a 
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variety of forms, including marches, hunger strikes, barring officials from entering 
villages in the submergence zone and the threat to commit mass suicide by drowning 
(Williams and Mawdsley, 2006). These actions have been backed up outside the 
Narmada valley by pursuing legal challenges through the Supreme Court and a whole 
range of lobbying activities supported by international networks and NGOs.   
Other civil society actions have been initiated and taken forward by individuals through 
public interest litigations (PILs) filed in courts (Divan and Rosencranz, 2001). The 
prominent litigator M.C. Mehta has become something of a folk hero, because he has 
single handedly pursued penal sanctions and closure of factories in violation of 
environmental norms. In M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, popularly known as the Delhi 
Gas Leak Case, the Supreme Court sought to close and relocate Shriram caustic chlorine 
and sulphuric acid plants located in the 76-acre industrial complex in West Delhi. Other 
actions instigated by M.C. Mehta have taken up the issue of improving river water 
quality by pursuing lawsuits against polluting industries on the Ganga (Sathe, 2002). 
Because of a growing number of activists adopting the PIL route, the courts are 
increasingly seen to play a much more important role in environmental matters, often 
extending their realm of influence into fields traditionally left within the remit of the 
Board and State Boards, such as issuing directions to close down factories, enforcing 
interim directions as a measure to activate other executive authorities, cutting through 
bureaucratic gridlock, or by liberalising the scope of public interest litigation in a way 
that encourages citizens’ groups and NGOs to take up an active stance in environmental 
affairs (Divan and Rosencranz, 2001).  
The judicial and civil society route, however, also runs into a number of significant 
problems. In the case of the judiciary, litigation can be time consuming and there can be 
a large backlog of cases pending both in the High Courts of the states and the Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, prosecutors and courts may be reluctant to press criminal charges 
criminal against corporate managers and senior executives due to their social positions 
(Reich and Bowonder, 1992, Singh et al., 1993). In the case of civil society, their 
energies tend to be scattered, often operating through rather dispersed networks which 
makes it difficult for more lasting and widespread reforms to take place through civil 
society influence alone. Another limitation is that those environmental issues that 
become NGO campaigns may not necessarily reflect a broader public interest but might 
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instead reflect the rather narrow interests of elite or middle class groups. For instance as 
discussed in section 1.1 on the drivers of urban change in Delhi, it is noted that it is very 
rare for city level NGO campaigns to include the environmental and social welfare of 
the poor as part of their mandates. This leads to generally lower visibility of peri-urban 
concerns, as opposed to Delhi environmental concerns, in the realms of both 
environmental litigation and environmental management.   
These wider processes of change in the context of India’s environmental policy have an 
impact on the functioning of the Board. In particular it becomes important to determine 
how this underlying political economy influences the actions of Board members. For 
instance, how are Board member priorities balanced across an overall objective to 
maintain the status quo, achieving a specific degree of improvement of environmental 
quality or preventing health damage caused from pollution? Given also the fact that 
multiple actors are increasingly more involved in policy negotiations ranging from the 
role of the Supreme Courts, NGOs and an increasingly more powerful industrial lobby. 
It is important to examine whose environmental priorities and values are better reflected 
in the Board’s mandate. It has been argued that despite a growing public debate on 
environmental matters, major environmental policies are still adopted without public 
consultation, reflecting a strong adherence to secrecy within the Indian bureaucracy 
(Reich and Bowonder, 1992, Menon and Kohli, 2008). Based on a more critical 
evaluation of ‘scientific’ knowledge as constructed knowledge, the influence of 
personal judgment and values, in defining objectives for policy making and 
implementation are explored. These themes are examined with a specific focus on the 
Board’s approach to water quality management, and with a particular focus on 
highlighting how the influence of Board members may pose barriers to the better 
articulation of peri-urban water quality concerns. 
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4.2.  The Board’s mandate and role in policy  
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 marked an important 
milestone in environmental legislation in India as the first law for pollution control. It 
required 12 years of political negotiations and jurisdictional battles between the central 
and state governments for the law to be enacted (Dwivedi and Kishore, 1982). 
Following the enactment of the Water Act in 1974, the Board was expected to play a 
leading role in the abatement of water pollution with the overarching objective of 
addressing the ‘maintenance and restoration of wholesomeness of water’ in surface 
water bodies such as rivers, streams and lakes (Gazette of India, 1974). The same Act 
further stipulated an inventory of specific tasks and functions that the Board should 
perform which included ‘promoting cleanliness of streams and wells’, ‘conducting 
investigations and research on water pollution’, ‘inspection of sewage and industrial 
effluent emissions, from installations and plants’, and the ‘laying down of standards’ 
(ibid: 9). In more detail, the lists of functions as set out in the Water Act are:  
-­‐ To advise the Central Government on any matter concerning the prevention and control 
of water pollution;  
-­‐ co-ordinate the activities of the State Boards and resolve disputes among them; 
-­‐ provide technical assistance and guidance to the State Boards, and to carry out and 
sponsor investigations and research relating to problems of water pollution and 
prevention, control or abatement of water pollution;  
-­‐ plan and organise the training of persons engaged or to be engaged in programmes for 
the prevention, control or abatement of water pollution on such terms and conditions as 
the Central Board may specify;  
-­‐ organise through mass media a comprehensive programme regarding the prevention and 
control of water pollution; 
-­‐ collect, compile and publish technical and statistical data relating to water pollution and 
the measures devised for its effective prevention and control, and prepare manuals, 
codes or guides relating to treatment and disposal of sewage and trade effluents and 
disseminate information connected therewith;  
-­‐ lay down, modify or annul, in consultation with the State Government concerned, the 
standards for a stream or well; and  
-­‐ plan and cause to be executed a nation-wide programme for the prevention, control or 
abatement of water pollution 
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The above functions can be categorised as those that are ‘advisory’ and those which 
carry penal sanctions and are better described as ‘regulatory’. The Pollution 
Assessment, Monitoring and Survey (PAMS) division takes up those functions that are 
related to pollution assessment35 and relate more directly to the Board’s advisory role. 
One important activity of PAMS is to coordinate the national water quality monitoring 
programme (henceforth referred to as “monitoring programme”). This was initiated by 
the Board in 1976 with 18 stations (i.e. for collecting water quality samples) on river 
Yamuna and has been gradually extended over time. In 1989, there were 324 and by 
2001 784 monitoring stations (Goldar and Banerjee, 2004) including water sampling 
locations along rivers, lakes, canals, ponds, drains and groundwater. At present the 
monitoring programme comprises the greatest part of the Board’s financial budget for 
pollution assessment36 and comprises 1,429 monitoring stations distributed across 27 
states and 6 union territories, envisaged to cover most Indian states and large cities 
(CPCB, 2009). The water quality monitoring programme therefore relates to the type of 
expert advice the Board can deliver on the water bodies and regions where policies for 
water quality restoration are required (monitoring practices are explored in detail in 
section 4.4).  
Although in principle the Board is the central body for implementing environmental 
regulations, in practice regulatory functions are shared between the Board and the 
MoEF. On the one hand, the question of whether to grant environmental clearances to 
industrial and development projects and the coordination of EIAs is under the principal 
authority of the MoEF (2009), while on the other, the monitoring of pollution standards 
falls within the mandate and established formal roles of the Board. Part of the reason for 
this division of regulatory responsibilities is that the founding of the Board preceded the 
establishment of the MoEF. In recent years, however, the MoEF has grown and has 
become a more powerful regulatory and policy making body, taking more roles into its 
mandate. However, partly because of the Water Act (1974), the Board has remained in 
                                                
35 Subsequent to the Water Act of 1974 new legislations including the Air (Prevention and Control of 
Pollution) Act (1981) and the Environmental Protection Act (1986) have meant that additional pollution 
assessment responsibilities have been devolved to the Board in the areas of air quality, noise pollution and 
industrial planning. However, as the focus here is on water quality these other areas of the Board’s 
pollution assessment activities are not discussed directly in this chapter.   
36 The second largest proportion of the allocated budget for pollution assessment is towards air quality 
monitoring. Together the national air quality monitoring programme and the water quality programme 
form the core pollution assessment activities of the Board. 
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existence, keeping the design and monitoring of pollution standards firmly under its 
own authority.  
More specifically, the Board’s regulatory functions are more clearly articulated for 
addressing industrial sources of pollution. The Pollution Control and Planning (PCP) 
unit, together with the Pollution Control Implementation (PCI) division, develops 
standards that carry specific limits for the discharge of pollutants into water bodies. The 
majority of these standards are associated with four categories of industries: 
petrochemical industries such as oil refineries, air polluting industries such as power 
plants, agro-based industries such as pulp and paper mills37 and distilleries. Recently, 
PCI has also included in its mandate a division that deals with small scale industries 
such as tanning factories. Industrial units are expected to comply with the standards 
prescribed by the Board where specific penalties are imposed for non-compliance.  
At the state level of governance, many of the Board’s regulatory functions (i.e. in terms 
of ensuring compliance with regulatory norms) are devolved to the state pollution 
control boards (in short, State Boards) (Gazette of India, 1974) and from there are 
passed on to regional, district and city authorities. In the case of Union Territories38, 
regulatory functions are transferred to pollution control committees (PCCs). This basic 
division of power between the ‘centre’ and ‘state’ follows the federal nature of the 
Indian constitution and aspires to a more decentralised system of environmental 
regulation (Goldar and Banerjee, 2004)39. In general, the Water Act envisages a 
cooperative relationship between the Board and the State Boards, where the Board 
maintains an advisory role to the State Boards (i.e. the design of industrial standards), 
while the implementation of the Water Act is considered a matter for the state (ibid).   
                                                
37 Paper mills based on nonconventional agro residues (i.e. wheat straw, rice straw, and sugarcane 
bagasse) are being encouraged due to increased demand for paper and acute shortage of forest-based raw 
materials (Kumar et al., 2012).  
38 A Union Territory is a sub-national administrative division in the federal framework of Indian 
governance. Unlike the states of India, which have their own elected governments, union territories are 
ruled directly by the federal government. Examples of union territories include Delhi, Chandigarh and 
Pondicherry (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_Territory, last accessed 17/09/11).    
39 The reader is here reminded of the federal structure of governance in India, where the central 
government (or Union Government) is the governing authority of 7 union territories and 28 states (see 
also Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Institutional structure for pollution abatement in India 
Curiously, because of the way the Board’s functions have been stipulated in the Water 
Act (1974), it has accumulated powers to guide two very different types of processes. 
First, it administers a set of functions that relate to the ‘assessment’ of risks to health 
and the environment from water quality (this is closely linked to the Board’s advisory 
roles). Second, it supervises those functions which relate to the ‘management’ of those 
risks (i.e. the Board’s regulatory roles) (Jasanoff, 1987:211). Given the separation of 
policy advice and regulation in the science studies literature40, it must be borne in mind 
that the Board has a hybrid role, providing policy advice on one hand, while also 
influencing the regulation of water quality. Thus it is not only a scientific advisory 
board, but one endowed with political decision-making powers and potential influence 
too. This duality in the Board’s functioning and implementation of its advisory and 
regulatory roles can be perceived as intensely problematic given the competition of 
interests in the enactment of those two simultaneous roles. 
                                                
40 See for example Sheila Jasanoff’s study of the US Environmental Protection Agency (Jasanoff, 1990). 
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Examples of this are provided in section 4.5.4 of this chapter and in Chapter 5, which 
describes how environmental NGOs and citizens have come to be increasingly sceptical 
of the Board’s activities and consider that it is too easy for regulatory decisions to be 
influenced by industrial interests. The MoEF controls a substantial part of the Board’s 
budget, and there is no precise mechanism for ensuring the Board’s spending is 
‘independent’ of the ministry’s influence. This financial dependence jeopardises its 
capacity to take decisions without political interference (Lele et al., 2010). (Section 
4.4.4 explores how MoEF policy makers can affect decisions taken at the Board).    
Another complication arises from the Board’s current structure and this is perhaps less 
examined by the Board’s critics: in practice, the delivery of its policy advisory and 
regulatory functions is not always straightforward and can be heavily influenced by the 
discretion of the Board members. This is demonstrated in section 4.4 of this chapter that 
discusses how water quality monitoring is defined and acted upon by Board members. It 
is also demonstrated in section 4.5 where it is argued that Board members in their 
professional position as ‘regulators’ become actively involved in the construction of 
‘regulation-rules in practice’ (Fineman, 1998:953) in order to determine what risks from 
impaired water quality should be regulated more closely.   
4.3. Participation of Board members 
The way the Board executes its functions relates directly to the expertise of the Board 
members. In the case of the Board Chairman, Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of the Water Act 
state that ‘a full time Chairman should possess special knowledge or practical 
experience of matters relating to environmental protection’ (Gazette of India, 1974: 3). 
However, in the actual functioning of the Board, this clause is interpreted narrowly by 
its members in that ‘special knowledge’ is solely linked to ‘scientific’ expertise, and 
‘practical experience’ is demonstrated by Board members having held additional 
government posts. Examples of this can be found in both tiers of management.  
The first tier of management is made up of the Board of Directors. At this level the 
Board is composed of current and former bureaucrats, academics and representatives of 
the various central government ministries. The Board of Directors is led by the Board 
Chairman, Mr. Sinha, who has held senior government posts in the past (including that 
of Chairman of M.P. Pollution Control Board) and the Member Secretary, currently J.S. 
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Kamyotra. Amongst the Directors there is also a strong representation from the 
industrial and energy sectors, including the technical director of the National Thermal 
Power Cooperation, R.K. Jain, and the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Mines, Ajita 
Pande. Except for the Chairman and the Member Secretary, who are employed full-time 
and share the bulk of responsibilities, the term of appointment for all other members 
cannot exceed three years. All appointments are decided by the government, which has 
complete control over the appointment of Board members (Gazette of India, 1974). 
Notably, at this level there is no-one who is not affiliated to the government: there are 
no representatives of local community groups or environmental organisations, for 
example.     
The second tier of management involves the scientists who run the different divisions of 
the Board. At this level the appointment of Board members is hierarchical and based on 
a rank system. The posts held by individual scientists are normally dependent upon the 
residency period and designation, which are both measures of performance. Scientists 
are gradually upgraded from Grade B, which is a junior post, to Grade F, which is a 
very senior post in the organisation (CPCB, 2010). Once a scientist has completed a 
minimum residency period he can be promoted to a more senior post. The directors of 
the Board divisions (PAMS, PCI etc.) are normally scientists who have spent a 
significant length of time in the organisation. Therefore, although ultimate executive 
power rests with the Board of Directors (namely the Chairman and the Member 
Secretary), the appointment of scientists is the main avenue for the Board to source 
‘expert’ advice.  
The appointment of experts is based primarily on prior background in science and 
technology (ibid). The Board norms make it mandatory for scientists to have a 
bachelor’s degree in engineering, technology or physical science, while a master’s 
degree or doctorate in engineering and technology is preferred (ibid). There is no direct 
requirement, however, for members at this tier of management to have relevant 
ecological expertise or expertise that is more closely related to environment fields.    
The current system for appointing Board members has led the Parliamentary Committee 
on Science & Technology, Environment & Forests to argue that the Board’s ability to 
function independently has been critically undermined. For example in its 2008 report 
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on the functioning of the Board, it is stated that ‘with a composition dominated by 
bureaucrats and constituted by central government, the Board cannot be expected to act 
as a watchdog of environmental protection’ (Parliament of India, 2008: 5). The report 
further notes that ‘key posts of the Board are manned by officers of the Indian 
Administrative Service, who neither possess the necessary capabilities and expertise in 
properly managing pollution control activities, nor do they invest enough time to pay 
attention to these activities’ (ibid).    
Despite the potency of the critiques coming from the Parliament, they do not take into 
consideration the role of scientists working within the organisation (that is, the second 
tier of the Board’s management). Does the appointment of scientists influence the 
Board’s capacity to function ‘independently’ and be truly representative of a broad 
range of interests? For specific pollution abatement priorities such as ‘water quality’, 
does a reliance on a particular kind of ‘science’ influence the types of expert advice the 
Board can deliver? Subsequent sections will attempt to shed some light on these issues. 
More importantly, in considering the Board’s practices, this study places more emphasis 
on understanding the types of ‘knowledge’ constructions that dominate a regulatory 
setting and, in particular, the influence Board scientists have on the dissemination of 
this knowledge.  
4.4. Expert advice and policy practice: the case of water quality    
Turning first to the Board’s role as an expert advisor, the type of advice the Board can 
deliver depends largely on how water quality problems are discussed by Board members 
in an organisational context. There is therefore an important discursive element to 
understanding how Board members convey their expert advice that is expressed through 
(i) the use of the Board’s definition of water quality, (ii) the scope of the Board’s water 
quality monitoring programme, (iii) the production of written texts (i.e. the Board’s 
annual achievements reports), and (iv) the influence of the policies themselves upon 
Board members. 
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4.4.1. Defining water quality: the role of the Designated Best Use (DBU) approach  
The first point of departure is the definition of water quality adopted by the Board. As 
described earlier, the 1974 Water Act and the setting up of the Board and State Boards 
became the formal institutional machinery for addressing water quality. However, what 
was still lacking then was a clear strategy for achieving this goal in policy practice. 
Specifically, the definition of water quality used in the Water Act with its emphasis on 
maintaining and restoring the ‘wholesomeness’ of water was regarded as too ‘broad’ for 
the Board members to be able to design pollution abatement schemes41. It is of interest 
then how the Board scientists have influenced the adaptation of that definition to a 
discursive framework that has a direct relation to science.     
A powerful conceptual tool which has emerged from the Board for planning water 
quality restoration is the Designated Best Use (DBU) framework (CPCB, 2002).  
According to the DBU, water quality restoration is organised on the basis of achieving a 
range of standards of water quality judged to be ‘desirable’ for human use. According to 
this concept water is prioritised into different ‘classes’ that encompass different water 
quality criteria. The highest water quality classification (Class A) is for drinking water 
sources and the lowest (Class E) for industrial, irrigation and waste disposal uses (see 
Table 2). 
                                                
41 Interview with Dr. Joshi, the former additional director of the Board, 23 November 2009. 
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Table 2: Use-based classification of surface waters, adapted from (CPCB, 2002) 
Designated-Best-Use (DBU) Class of water Criteria 
 
Drinking water source without 
conventional treatment 
but after disinfection 
 
A 
 
Total Coliforms Organism 
MPN/100ml shall be 50 or less 
pH between 6.5 and 8.5 
Dissolved Oxygen 6mg/l or more 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand  
(20oC), 2mg/l or less 
 
Outdoor bathing (organised) 
 
B 
 
Total Coliforms Organism 
MPN/100ml shall be 500 or less 
pH between 6.5 and 8.5 
Dissolved Oxygen 5mg/l or more 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 5 days 
(20oC), 3mg/l or less 
 
Drinking water source after 
conventional treatment and 
disinfection 
 
C 
 
Total Coliforms Organism 
MPN/100ml shall be 5000 or less 
pH between 6 to 9 
Dissolved Oxygen 4mg/l or more 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand, 
(20oC), 3mg/l or less 
 
Propagation of wildlife and 
fisheries 
 
D 
 
pH between 6.5 to 8.5 
Dissolved Oxygen 4mg/l or more 
Free Ammonia (as N) 1.2 mg/l or 
less 
 
Irrigation, industrial cooling, 
controlled waste disposal 
 
 
E 
 
pH between 6.0 to 8.5 
Electrical Conductivity at 25oC 
micro mhos/cm Max.2250 
Sodium absorption Ratio Max. 26 
Boron Max. 2mg/l 
The definition of water quality following the DBU approach strongly influences the 
type of expert advice Board members perceive they can deliver. In the first instance, the 
DBU framework influences the type of water uses that are of ‘scientific’ interest to 
Board members. The Board’s role in this case is tied to the monitoring of existing water 
quality trends at a national level and whether water uses identified under the DBU can 
be met in policy practice through the implementation of water quality restoration 
programmes. The objective of the DBU has been to plan pollution control activities in a 
way that is not ‘cost-prohibitive’ and does not significantly ‘deter’ development 
activities (CPCB, 2008). However, implementing the DBU also carries assumptions 
about the criteria for the framing of ‘credible’ sources of information, as well as for the 
choice of ‘suitable’ scales of assessment that in practice may not be appropriate for 
addressing complex water quality concerns affecting peri-urban areas.  
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This is firstly related to the language adopted for describing water quality. From the 
Board’s perspective, water quality is evaluated against pre-described parameters such as 
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), pH and dissolved oxygen (CPCB, 2008). 
However, such a narrow technical definition of water quality fails to recognise the 
different meanings that water users attach to problems of water quality. For instance, 
insights from the peri-urban case study explored in detail in Chapter 5 suggest that 
water quality is evaluated by poorer citizens on the basis of their own criteria, such as 
aesthetic considerations (colour and appearance), and far less on the basis of formally 
prescribed physico-chemical parameters. These more subjective interpretations 
emanating from water users not only propose a more complex account of the local 
impact of worsening levels of water quality, but also tend to expose the seriousness of 
protecting the quality of water used for purposes that are not taken into account in the 
DBU definition.  
Another implication of the DBU approach is that the avenues for channelling expert 
advice are, at their core, sector-derived, which makes it difficult to integrate water 
quality priorities that are not represented in the DBU definition. More importantly the 
link between water and environmental quality has not been given sufficient emphasis in 
the DBU classification. Because of this omission, pollution abatement measures to 
address deteriorating water quality focus selectively on those water bodies which there 
is a strong incentive to protect for direct beneficial uses. Smaller water bodies, or those 
with no significant water-use, are therefore excluded following the DBU classification. 
This explains why there have been many comprehensive water quality studies on the 
river Yamuna42, while for river Hindon (a smaller river located in Ghaziabad district) 
there is almost no water quality data available (Suthar, 2009). It also explains why the 
water quality of the river in the peri-urban case study is so poor that is often described 
as a ‘drain’, in spite of the fact that it is used for different purposes including bathing 
and local religious ceremonies (ibid). 
Finally, the use of the DBU reflects the Board’s efforts to focus attention more closely 
on the ‘science’ of water quality and away from the politics. More importantly, 
addressing water quality involves political questions that do not figure prominently in 
the Board’s discourse. Section 4.4.3 of this chapter explores how written reports and the 
                                                
42 Such as the 2006 report on the ‘Water Quality Status of River Yamuna’ (CPCB, 2006). 
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presentation of findings encourage an ‘apolitical’ view of water quality protection. A 
fairly ‘apolitical’ representation of contemporary water quality problems and their 
solutions is also verified by the relationships that are formed between the Board and 
other powerful institutions. In particular, section 4.4.4 explores how the more powerful 
MoEF can influence decisions in important ways, such as the type of expert advice the 
Board can deliver. Examples include the MoEF’s control over the implementation of 
river action plans, including the Ganga Action Plan (GAP) and the Yamuna Action 
Plan, thus influencing the ambit of the monitoring strategies and the process of 
prioritising limited organisational resources for pollution assessment.  
4.4.2. Trust in numbers: the practice of water quality monitoring 
On the basis of the DBU definition of water quality, the Board has devised a national 
water quality monitoring programme. The Board’s monitoring programme is largely 
framed as a scientific research exercise that fits well within the Board’s advisory role. 
But it also occupies a central role in the Board’s discourse that is worthy of more 
focused attention because it carries a number of assumptions regarding the robustness of 
the monitoring criteria, decisions on the type of scale which is appropriate for 
monitoring and the type of information it aims to deliver. For example, the Board 
decides whether information can be ‘quantitatively’ represented according to the 
selected criteria identified in the monitoring programme. Although the heavy emphasis 
on the ‘numerical’ measurement of water quality appears obvious to the scientists 
working for the Board, it needs to be examined for the particular rhetorical functions 
that it serves.  
Porter (1995) proposes a more cautious examination of the use of numbers in expert 
advisory systems. He argues that quantitative methods do not simply reflect the 
technical requirements of researching complex subjects; they also have an important 
role to play in protecting experts against charges of ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘subjectivity’. 
More so in the case of the Board with its regulatory functions that necessitate the 
production of an image of authority and of control over the evidence used to inform 
decision-making. Quantification further offers a framework which is both rigid (i.e.in 
that it refers only to numerical information) and highly standardised (presenting 
monitoring criteria as a legitimate tool for decision-making), and which can be used to 
cultivate trust in scientific organisations in the light of sceptical critics (Jasanoff and 
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Wynne, 1997, Hilgartner, 2000). In this context the Board’s overriding interest is to 
delineate a space of professional authority that is credible, that distinguishes the 
function of the Board from that of other stakeholders such as environmental lobbying 
organisations, and that can also stand up against potential conflicts with political groups 
and opposing interests. However, what is at stake is the disclosure of a number of 
uncertainties and inherent subjectivities associated with the monitoring process by 
claiming the support of science.  
Such considerations are seen to play a significant role in how scientists relate to the 
practice of monitoring. Firstly, water quality criteria play an important role in 
legitimising the Board’s claim of objectivity. Because water quality information is 
organised in terms of the agreed criteria defined in the monitoring programmes, it is 
assumed that the need for scientists to take their own stance or employ their individual 
judgment is eliminated. As one senior scientist in charge of the Board water quality 
testing laboratory said, ‘In order to assess the water quality of the rivers we measure 
BOD, DO (dissolved oxygen), TDS (total dissolved solids), and pH’43. These measures 
‘give us a good picture of whether the class of the water body should be A, B, C, or D’5. 
Because these criteria are evaluated using scientific norms, the validity of relying solely 
on the Board’s predefined criteria in order to justify policy decisions is rarely 
questioned.  
An emphasis on numbers is also important in cultivating trust in the Board’s role as an 
expert advisory body on pollution prevention. Scientists have significant symbolic pride 
and a sense of ‘being in control’ of expert knowledge because of a perceived superiority 
in the handling of numerical information. A senior scientist leading the Board’s 
monitoring programme described this: ‘Our power is that we have the data, people come 
to us for information’44. The superiority of the Board as ‘information keepers’ is further 
strengthened by a sense of prestige attached to the processing of numbers. A scientist 
working in PAMS division said, ‘Monitoring is a truly difficult task; the Board needs to 
keep track of more than 1,400 observation points across the whole country, and this 
                                                
43 Interview with Dr. Verma, senior scientist of the Board laboratory, 22 November 2009. 
44 Interview with Dr. Desai, senior scientist of the PAMS division, 13 November 2009. 
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requires a huge investment from us both intellectually and in terms of time and 
resources’45.  
Numbers are equally important for separating the Board’s expertise from that of 
different stakeholders such as those working for State Boards and environmental NGOs 
who are perceived not to have the same disciplinary background and specialisation. The 
Board’s Water Quality Monitoring Guidelines report highlights that ‘the optimum 
situation is when the entire monitoring procedure, from sampling to final analysis, is 
within the hands of one group of experts’ (CPCB, 2008: 19). This framing of the 
monitoring process lays down the Board’s professional boundaries in important ways. 
For instance, there is an assumption that it is hard for Board scientists to trust pollution 
enforcement agencies to do the same type of numerical work that the Board does 
because they do not have the same level of experience in technical matters. Referring to 
the role of the State Boards, a Board environmental engineer said ‘State Boards can give 
us a distorted account of the problems so that is why we usually rely on our own data 
for producing the reports’46. At the same time, attributing a sense of powerlessness to 
non-governmental organisations that do not possess the same type of specialisation in 
monitoring, a senior member said, ‘The Board cannot rely on NGOs for monitoring 
water quality; their role is much more about creating awareness’47. In this way Board 
members are in a position to defend monitoring as an ‘internally’ managed operation, 
significantly restricting how far different interest groups can influence the water quality 
assessment process.   
This is the dominant view of the monitoring process adopted by Board members. But 
how representative is it of the local realities of worsening levels of water quality 
impacting local contexts? An important area of contestation between the technical view 
and the local implications of impaired water quality is exemplified by the large 
discrepancies between the desired permissible limits and the higher values often 
recorded in monitoring stations. Senior scientists from the PAMS division attributed 
this to the fact that the water quality criteria had not been compiled with a view to 
addressing local conditions48. Board members also agree that when the water quality 
                                                
45 Interview with Dr. Bhatt, senior scientist, PAMS division, 10 November 2009. 
46 Interview with Mr. Raj Kumar, environmental engineer, PCI division, 22 December 2009. 
47 Interview with Dr. Modi, senior scientist PAMS division, 6 December 2010. 
48 Interview with Dr. Rao, senior chemist and additional director, 15 November, 2009. 
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criteria were put in place, they were perceived primarily as a ‘desk-based’ exercise 
dictated by the ‘international literature’, and not by ‘baseline studies’49 which might 
have encouraged prescribed parameters to be more responsive to local conditions. 
Because, as a Board member claimed, ‘things are moving ahead based on experiences 
from abroad’50, 51, the water quality criteria recommended by the Board are often too 
stringent to be implemented in the Indian context. Peri-urban areas are representative of 
the contradictions which arise when attempting to implement the water quality criteria 
prescribed under the Board’s water quality evaluation framework. BOD, an indicator of 
organic pollution load which is central to the Board’s monitoring programme, has to a 
recommended limit of 3 mg/l for water used for bathing purposes under the DBU (see 
Table 2). However, when predefined parameters such as BOD are monitored outside the 
Board’s institutional framework, their value is questionable because observable values 
commonly far exceed the limits recommended by the Board. This may well be the case 
in local situations where criteria are often not met. In the peri-urban case study an 
environmental NGO’s own assessment of the Kali river, a tributary of the Hindon river, 
denotes observable values of BOD that are in fact much closer to 1000 mg/l, a level at 
which the river is entirely devoid of oxygen! (Lewis, 2007). Under conditions of over-
abstraction of water for industrial and agricultural uses, meeting this target becomes 
even more problematic because there is little fresh water to dilute the excess organic 
pollution load.    
Part of the reason why such quantitative rules remain dominant despite their ambiguities 
is that they often carry assumptions that are validated through science. From the 
perspective of an IIT engineer who is more sceptical about the 3 mg/l limit prescribed in 
the DBU, it can be argued that this is based on the ‘outdated’ assumption that rivers can 
autonomously lower the level of BOD without pollution control interventions due to 
their self-purifying properties52. Nonetheless, the fact that this argument is ‘outdated’ 
does not mean that it is not supported through local level regulatory practices. The 
majority of the water quality targets set by the Board are still referred to by pollution 
                                                
49 Studies defined as those that consider the specific country where water quality criteria are being 
applied. 
50 Interview with Dr. Modi senior scientist, PAMS division, 1 January 2010.   
51 Referring to the WHO ‘Guidelines for drinking-water quality’ (WHO, 2008).  
52 Interview with Mr. Ajay Prasad, an environmental engineer from IIT, New Delhi. 
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control authorities despite the inherent difficulties and ambiguities they face when 
attempting to meet these targets in practice.  
To some extent, recognition of these contradictions necessitates a shift away from the 
DBU classification which, despite its inherent limitations, continues to have such a 
marked influence on the Board’s approach to water quality management. Many 
scientists who are familiar with the work of the Board have expressed this view. The 
former director of the Pollution Assessment Division, Dr. Joshi, argues that one of the 
reasons why monitoring programmes continue to fail is because ‘the DBU concept only 
focuses on the direct utilisation of water by human beings, when today it is generally 
acknowledged that even the survival of life itself may depend on the health of the 
environment and ecology as whole’53. But how ready is the Board to face this 
challenge? And does it possess the necessary expertise and resources to do so? Board 
members are often sceptical amongst themselves about the ability of pollution 
enforcement institutions to effect this transition. According to Dr. Verma, leading the 
Bio-science and Instrumentation Laboratory, ‘we are only in the early stages of using 
novel approaches such as biomonitoring for instance, and these are piloted only in a few 
locations across the country’54. Another noteworthy concern raised by Board members 
about bringing to scale alternative monitoring techniques is the technical capacity 
constraints of the State Boards. The Board members tend to agree that State Boards are 
in a position to ‘conduct basic measurements but for more elaborate monitoring 
techniques, water samples for analysis should be sent directly to the Board’55. However, 
even though the Board has greater ‘in-house’ expertise, it too is constrained by its own 
limited resources and manpower, which in practice means that, for non-conventional 
measurements, it prioritises only a limited number tests every year (CPCB, 2009).  
The above discussion demonstrates that scientists can often present fairly biased 
opinions on a number of critical issues which are relevant to water quality monitoring. 
Most importantly, there is general agreement that some of the Board’s monitoring 
approaches may be inadequate for responding to current water quality challenges. For 
instance, some of the key scientists, such as Dr. Joshi, affirm that the DBU 
classification may offer little scope for evaluating water quality beyond the range of a 
                                                
53 Interview with Dr. Joshi, former additional director of the Board, 23 November 2009. 
54 Interview with Dr. Verma senior scientist of the Board laboratory, 22 November 2009. 
55 Ibid. 
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prescribed set of standards. However, what is surprising is that Board scientists do not 
perceive that other stakeholders, beyond the remit of the Board, could have a more 
meaningful influence over water quality monitoring processes. For instance, the fact 
that the role of environmental NGOs was perceived solely in terms of creating public 
‘environmental awareness’ was partly because some scientists feared that a more 
meaningful involvement of NGOs in the knowledge creation process could potentially 
damage the credibility of the Board. This could occur, for instance, if NGOs were to 
start providing information on sources of pollution that contradicted the assessments of 
the Board, or information that in the Board’s opinion carried management implications 
not directly linked to its own mandate (e.g. the human health effects of industrial 
pollutants).  
4.4.3. Water quality information in the public domain: the logic of official reports 
The previous section demonstrated how information is communicated ‘internally’ 
amongst Board members. However, the type of expert advice the Board puts forward 
can also be interpreted through the way water quality information is communicated 
‘outwards’ to non-experts. As Hilgartner argues in his study of the United States 
National Academy of Science, official reports are often crucial for expert advisors to 
produce ‘credible’ knowledge by controlling the enclosure and disclosure of 
information (Hilgartner, 2000: 20). These experts reveal information to their intended 
audience and place it on public display, but also actively conceal valuable information 
by simply omitting it from the reports (ibid: 17). Based on these insights, the Board’s 
reports should be interpreted not only on the basis of the water quality information that 
they usually reveal and how this information is presented, but also for their complete 
exclusion of specific problems and concerns from the realms of policy.  
Particularly central to the Board’s efforts to communicate information to a wider 
audience is the production of annual reports. When the Board was founded, annual 
reports were short and lacking in detail. However, with the expansion of the Board’s 
mandate and resources, these reports have developed in terms of length (on average 300 
pages) and the range of topics covered. They outline the progress made in specific 
studies conducted by the Board over the year, the prosecutions set in motion against 
polluting units, and the orders for closure of specific industrial units as well as the 
financial aspects of the Board’s functioning (CPCB, 2009).  
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The nature of these reports is to summarise the Board’s activities on a yearly basis and 
to ‘showcase’ the organisation’s main achievements over the preceding year. Annual 
reports are more widely circulated than other reports compiled by the Board. They are 
available both via the Board website and in hard copy and are read by a number of 
stakeholders including researchers, environmental NGOs, students, industrialists and 
State Board officials. Thus the production and distribution of scientific information 
through annual reports can be understood as a central ‘out-reach’ strategy of the Board 
that has wider implications for the nature of water quality information than the scientists 
might anticipate, in that they are communicating with a larger audience. The following 
insights are drawn from the report of 2008-2009, which has been selected for closer 
scrutiny because it represents a more recent example of the Board’s report-writing and 
range of organisational activities.  
Water quality is dealt with most comprehensively in chapter 5, ‘Air and Water Quality 
Monitoring Network’ (CPCB, 2009). As the title suggests, the aim of this chapter is to 
outline the main research findings by drawing from the Board’s monitoring 
programmes. It is in the interest of the Board therefore, to convince its readers not only 
that the information provided is credible (produced with the support of expert 
knowledge) but also that it provides a representative basis for wider consultation. In 
order to achieve these objectives, the writing style, the use of specific terminologies and 
the overall presentation of the findings become central ingredients in producing a 
convincing narrative.  
Drawing attention to the robustness of the scientific rationale employed to compile the 
information is an important strategy for building trust in the report findings that follow. 
Again, numbers play an important role. When referring to the monitoring ‘network’, 
which includes ‘1,429’ stations in ‘27’ states and ‘6’ union territories, the reader is left 
with little doubt that the assessment has covered a wide geographical area including a 
range of water bodies (CPCB, 2009, p. 13). The table entitled ‘River Basin Distribution 
of Water Quality Monitoring Stations’ which includes the list of names of water bodies, 
as well as the numbers of monitoring stations set up for each water body, serves to 
demonstrate the robustness of the programme. In the same text, there are also several 
references to monitoring parameters included in the assessment: ‘Water samples 
analysed for 28 parameters consisting of physico-chemical and bacteriological 
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parameters’ and ‘9 trace metals parameters’ and ‘28 pesticide residues’, and 
‘Biomonitoring in specific locations’ (ibid: 16). By emphasising the monitoring stations 
and the parameters in an interchangeable way, the Board is able to justify its water 
quality assessment rationale, as well as the findings that emerge as a result of this 
approach.    
Another important aspect of the report writing strategy is the presentation of the main 
findings, which becomes more apparent as one proceeds through the Board’s report. 
The water quality findings are conveyed with the support of figures and therefore 
deserve more attention with regard to the report write-up. The use of figures aims to 
summarise water quality trends across the whole range of water bodies and involves a 
combination of statistical analysis and graphical interpretation of numerical data. At 
first reading, these figures seem to be a fairly routine way of communicating scientific 
information. On closer inspection, however, the figures aim to justify how the reports 
make the significance of certain water quality trends appear self-evident to the reader, 
while completely omitting others. These omissions are not random; on the contrary they 
are an integral element in writing the report (Hilgartner, 2000: 53).     
Figure 3, which describes the water quality of the river Ganga, illustrates some of these 
concerns. This, and similar figures in the same report, commonly draw the reader’s 
attention to water quality trends that are apparent on fairly large scales. For example, it 
refers to the level of a river basin (the Ganga Basin), the state (Uttaranchal) and the city 
(i.e. cities that are located within the state or the river basin), without telling us much 
about water quality trends that occur on smaller scales. Focusing on the city or the 
district levels for example reveals a much more diverse range of water quality scenarios. 
Some of this diversity is scarcely addressed; for example in the case of air quality 
monitoring, where the report distinguishes between different air quality trends in 
‘industrial’ and ‘residential’ areas (CPCB, 2009: 34). However, these and related figures 
remain rather silent as to the patterns that form amongst different types of settlements. 
Indeed, the peri-urban scenario illustrates that poor colonies are often far more exposed 
to deteriorating water quality than middle class and more affluent colonies (see also 
Chapter 5).  
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Figure 3: Water Quality of river Ganga (Uttaranchal Segment)  
Figures can be further understood as discursive devices for reinforcing a bias in the 
public domain towards river basin issues in the assessment of water quality. River basin 
issues are central to the design of the monitoring programme, but also to the type of 
information scientists share amongst themselves. As a senior member of the Board said, 
‘our job is to monitor rivers, slums are not our responsibility’56. This logic, which is 
reproduced in the Board report, implies that monitoring is linked to the ‘biophysical’ 
environment and distracts the reader’s attention from specific places where people are in 
direct contact with poor-quality water. Another limitation of this logic is that it directs 
attention to the river Ganga and the river Yamuna. However, the extra emphasis on 
these two rivers is not accidental. Large-scale policy initiatives such as the GAP and 
YAP and broader socio-economic factors have influenced scientific priorities for 
designing monitoring strategies and for selecting appropriate levels and sites of interest 
(for more details see next section 4.4.4). 
                                                
56 Interview with Dr. Desai, senior scientist, PAMS division of the Board, 13 November 2009. 
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Another important function served by the report is to protect the authority of the Board 
from being undermined in light of its findings. This necessitates the production of a 
certain kind of argument to describe water quality trends that appear in the figures, and 
that guide the reader down specific logical channels (Hilgartner, 2000: 9). It is noted in 
the Board’s description of the national water quality trend that:  
The water quality monitoring results obtained between years 1995 to 2008 
indicate that the organic and bacterial contamination are continued to be critical 
in water bodies. This is mainly due to discharge of ‘domestic wastewater’ mostly 
in untreated form from the urban centres of the country. The ‘municipal 
corporations’ (emphasis added) at large are not able to treat the increasing load 
of municipal sewage because of which sewage may flow into the water bodies 
without treatment. Secondly the receiving water bodies also do not have adequate 
water for dilution, therefore, the oxygen demand and bacterial pollution is 
consistently increasing and may be the cause of water borne diseases (CPCB, 
2009: 16). 
This argument constrains in a number of ways what the reader can learn about water 
quality. The reader is encouraged to assume that organic and bacterial sources of 
pollution attributed to domestic wastewater are the sole causes for deteriorating water 
quality. The statement also makes it very clear that the ‘blame’ for these sources is 
attributed to municipal corporations. However, the same statement does not provide any 
details about industrial sources of pollution and their contribution to water quality 
problems. Industrial regulation is an area that is conventionally attached to the Board 
but is likely to be controversial, and it is not in the interest of the Board to disclose 
sensitive information to the public. Another implication that can be drawn from the 
report is that it tries to convince the reader that the Board has fulfilled its roles by 
providing a fairly dense ‘technical’ description of a specific set of water quality issues 
and concerns. However, one could argue that the ‘regulatory’ responsibilities of the 
Board that seem to emanate directly from these findings are deliberately left ambiguous. 
In this way, and through the support of the annual report, the Board is in a position to 
convince its audience of its institutional authority as a monitoring body, without 
allowing its credibility as a regulator to be undermined.  
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4.4.4. Policy processes influencing the Board’s advisory roles 
So far the interest has been mainly centred on the role of scientists influencing policy 
and research priorities for water quality. However, a better understanding of the Board’s 
functions would be incomplete without some discussion about how policy processes 
influence the Board members. As previous sections in this chapter have shown, the 
Board is more likely to place emphasis on the ‘science’ of water quality. However, this 
underplays how its policy advisory mandate is affected by a wider political economy 
comprising powerful institutions, political interest groups, and heavily-funded policy 
programmes.     
In the first place, the role of the Board has become increasingly political, partly because 
it is positioned institutionally below the MoEF. The Water Act, 1974, states that the 
Board is under obligation to ‘sponsor’ research relating to water quality, and to ‘advise’ 
the central government accordingly. But these statements assign more power to the 
Board on paper than in actual practice. For instance, the MoEF is the most important 
source of funds for the Board and also has considerable leverage over its research 
agenda (CAG, 1992, p. 64). Board members perceive this to be true as well. For 
instance, many senior Board members saw the role of their institution as more about 
‘assisting’ the MoEF by operating as its ‘technical arm’, rather than leading decision-
making on pollution matters57. Even though the Water Act previously conceived of the 
Board as a leader in environmental protection, this role now appears to have been taken 
over by a more powerful environment ministry. However, the implication of this for the 
Board’s function has not been addressed formally in policy, putting the Board in a 
delicate position where it needs to uphold its claim to operate ‘independently’, while in 
practice being largely dependent on the MoEF for its functioning (CAG, 1992).  
Within this broader policy environment the control that the MoEF exerts over the 
Board’s monitoring programmes is equally relevant, yet it can be less obvious. As river 
pollution in the Indian context has always been high on the policy agenda (even though 
the policies have not yet delivered real improvements in the quality of major rivers), the 
government tends to put pressure on the Board members to develop monitoring 
strategies that have a river-related focus. As one of the scientists emphasised, ‘our 
                                                
57 Interview with Dr. Desai, senior scientist of the PAMS division, 20 November 2009. 
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expertise is sought by the MoEF to monitor rivers; other aspects are dealt with by 
departments in the ministry’14. But there is also a focus that prioritises certain rivers 
over others due to their cultural and religious significance. Another scientist pointed out 
that ‘the Yamuna and the Ganges are considered ‘holy rivers’ and that makes them a 
priority for the Board’ 58, suggesting that such priorities are often seen to be imposed by 
policy influences, and not based on ‘scientific’ considerations alone.  
Secondly, in some instances water quality tends to count for more in certain contexts 
than in others. This has been expressed by an environmental activist as follows: ‘Delhi 
has always been more important for the Board because of pressure being placed upon it 
by the Ministry, the Supreme Court and civil society lobbies’59. The preference for 
Delhi in monitoring programmes can be attributed both to Delhi being the capital and to 
powerful institutions often exercising considerable pressure on the Board members to 
focus their activities on the context of Delhi. National spending as part of the river 
action plans also reflects this bias with more than 71 percent of YAP money being spent 
in the neighbouring towns of Delhi, Ghaziabad, Agra, Faridabad, Panipat and 
Yamunanagar (CSE, 2007). The involvement of Board members can be at times hard to 
justify, especially when Delhi has its very own pollution control authority – the Delhi 
Pollution Control Committee. According to Dr. Rao, a Board chemist in charge of the 
water laboratory, the reason why the Board has invested so much in Delhi is firstly 
because the headquarters of the Board are situated in the capital, but also because 
focusing on Delhi helps consolidate the Board’s image as a technical and pollution 
control authority. As he said, ‘We [the Board] want to be the model for others [implying 
State Boards and local authorities], so we have made a model of Delhi’60.  
This emphasis on the capital (and a city centric view of water quality problems) of 
course undermines the water quality concerns of neighbouring districts. This is part of 
the reason why Board scientists do not acknowledge polluting factories that have been 
closed in Delhi and subsequently relocated illegally to neighbouring peri-urban areas, 
even though, strictly speaking, these units still fall within the boundaries of the NCR of 
Delhi. It also partly explains why in Delhi the monitoring programme is more 
                                                
58 Interview with Dr. Patel, additional director of the Board, 22 November 2009. 
59 Interview with Leo Saldanha, director of the Environment Support Group based in Bangalore, 17th 
November 2009. 
60 Interview with Dr. Rao, senior chemist and additional director, 15 November, 2009. 
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comprehensive since it includes biomonitoring and heavy metals assessments and is 
conducted more regularly than in the neighbouring districts61. This implied favouritism 
towards Delhi has emerged as a result of a mixture of institutional influences, including 
the Board itself, the role of the MoEF, city level authorities such as Delhi Government, 
and the judiciary.   
Thirdly, the Board does not operate independently, but instead as part of a combination 
of institutions that limits the influence of the Board on river-basin issues. This is 
regarded as an area of expertise traditionally assigned to the Board. The foundation of 
the National River Conservation Directorate (NRCD) and more recently the National 
Ganga River Basin Authority (NGRBA) jointly took on most of the authority for the 
coordination and planning of river pollution abatement schemes, including those where 
there has been considerable involvement of foreign engineering consultancy groups in 
collaboration with development banks62. These major changes in the way water quality 
restoration programmes are administered have restricted the Board’s advisory roles to 
monitoring only certain regions, while private domestic and foreign firms largely 
supervise the implementation of the programmes. 
 
                                                
61 Interview with Dr. Rao, senior chemist and additional director, 15 November, 2009. 
62 The Government of India is receiving financial assistance by the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation for the Yamuna Action Plan, while the coordination of the programme is led by Tokyo 
Engineering Consultants (TEC), a Japan based engineering consultancy firm (TEC, 2002). 
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4.5. Tracing the contours of regulation: official rhetoric and policy 
practice 
Previous sections have attempted to illustrate how Board members communicate expert 
advice through the use of language, terminology and the orchestration of its monitoring 
programmes. The following sections discuss water quality as an ‘administrative’ 
creation (Hawkins, 1984: 23) that finds practical expression through a combination of 
environmental laws, pollution control standards, industrial consents of operation, and 
enforcement agencies operating at various levels (ibid). The Board’s regulatory 
boundaries are mapped out through a series of narratives. 
4.5.1. Deteriorating water quality: a consequence of implementation failure 
Deteriorating levels of water quality are captured by a widely held view of 
‘implementation failure’ amongst Board members. This narrative suggests worsening 
water quality is a consequence of a perceived weakness in implementation. 
Improvements in water quality are thus perceived to emanate almost entirely from 
higher financial investments in pollution abatement programmes.  
A main argument in support of this narrative suggests that regulatory efforts are being 
hampered by overpopulation. Overpopulation implies that regulatory efforts are very 
rapidly becoming an unrewarding bureaucratic endeavour because of human-driven 
pollution (principally domestic sewage pollution). Amongst Board members, this 
argument tends also to associate deteriorating water quality with a frequently cited 
‘nuisance’ amongst officials, referred to as ‘urbanisation’63. What is often insinuated is 
that sprawling urbanisation is often the sole cause for the deterioration of water quality 
and solutions to deteriorating water quality are therefore considered to lie in areas that 
are not within the Board’s own authority. Highlighting the importance of 
‘regionalisation’20 and imposing controls on population growth as important strategies 
to improve water quality. However, focusing the problem and its solutions around 
escalating population growth and urbanisation in this way has a cumulative effect of 
removing the role of the regulator from the obvious shortfalls in pollution enforcement. 
This is an important reason why Dr. Patel, the additional director of the Board, claims 
                                                
63 Interview with Dr. Desai, senior scientist of the PAMS division, 10 November 2009. 
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that regulatory institutions are ‘strong on paper, but weak in the field’64, giving 
emphasis to the distance created between the legislative framework and the Board 
members. 
There were other reasons too why implementation was considered weak, reasons linked 
more closely to the way the regulatory mandate is shared between the Board and State 
Boards. Partly because the Board is established in the background of the subject of 
water (water quality falls within the same definition) which is constitutionally addressed 
at the ‘state’ level, powers to implement policies rest fundamentally at the state level 
(Parliament of India, 2008: 7). Board members referred to this legislative provision on 
several occasions as a means of defending the Board against charges of poor 
enforcement of water quality standards. In an interview referring to the deterioration of 
water quality in Ghaziabad (i.e. the peri-urban case study), a Board member said ‘we 
take good faith that the State Boards will regulate’ it65. 
The most obvious shortcoming of this view of implementation, is that it presumes a 
fairly ‘robust’ regulatory structure operating at the local level. Chapter 5 provides 
empirical evidence that this is often not the case. Pollution inspectors, constrained by 
resources and manpower, tend to conduct only very basic assessments of water quality 
based on a limited set of ‘physico-chemical’ parameters. And also because State Boards 
are found lacking in sufficient executive power to close down polluting factories, 
regulatory targets are seldom met.  
Although it is true that important regulatory powers do essentially rest with the State 
Boards, the way in which implementation failure is framed by the scientists means that 
they tend have little inclination to seek local level involvement. It assumes for instance 
a ‘top-down’ engagement with State Boards, whereby scientists facilitate technical 
advice at the local level but limit the potential for local sources of information to feed 
into the activities of the Board with the same ease. It also questions the institutional 
architecture of pollution regulation as it is conceived through the simultaneous existence 
of two Boards, one at the centre and one at the state level, and their ability to work in 
harmony together. A government audit of the Board and State Boards mentions that ‘if 
                                                
64 Interview with Dr. Patel, additional director, 25 November 2009. 
65 Interview with Dr. Verma senior scientist of the Board laboratory, 22 November 2009. 
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the creation of the Board and State Boards is seen in the present day context, where 
pollution has started posing numerous challenges, it appears that the very foundation on 
which they have been established is shaky and weak’ (Parliament of India, 2008: 6). 
Other criticisms find State Boards in particular to be highly unresponsive to the present 
complexity of environmental problems, possessing limited resources and manpower for 
ensuring compliance with various environmental regulations (CAG, 1992). The fact that 
important pollution sources linked to industries in peri-urban Delhi have still not been 
contained several years since the setting-up of the Boards, illustrates the cumulative 
effect of the role of the Board being detached from its own regulatory commitments. 
This is addressed in more detail in section 5.2.1 of chapter 5, which discusses the 
weakening authority of the regional office UPPCB in enforcing pollution norms in peri-
urban Ghaziabad.   
A more fundamental problem of framing deteriorating water quality purely as a 
consequence of ‘implementation failure’ is the oversimplification of the complex 
politics that tend to shape regulatory decisions. In some cases, industrial firms often 
have little concern about the environmental consequences of siting decisions, or about 
retrofitting old technologies as a strategy to minimise their pollution abatement costs. In 
the peri-urban context, this appears to be particularly the case with small-scale industrial 
units that have not taken any major initiatives for the control of pollution problems 
inside or outside the units of operations. As explained by pollution control authorities 
and officials interviewed in the peri-urban case study, the fact that ‘some’ industrial 
units can avoid penal sanctions often has less to do with administrative barriers, and 
more to do with political factors. For instance, political connections between the State 
of Lucknow and the district of Ghaziabad mean that pollution control officials may be 
pressured to withdraw or ‘ease’ penal sanctions on polluting industries (see also section 
5.2.1). It is important to consider therefore that while a narrative of ‘implementation 
failure’ appears to appeal to Board members, it can also serve as a discursive strategy to 
conceal the type of politics which tend to dominate regulatory decisions at a regional 
and local level. 
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4.5.2. Policy implications of standard-setting procedures 
Scientists perceive the subject of water quality as demanding a high degree of technical 
competence. This was initially illustrated in the Board members’ perception of their 
‘advisory’ roles discussed in section 4.4. Enforcement of ‘standards’ equally involves 
‘science’, but because it is often attached to ‘legal’ requirements (i.e. emission standards 
are enforceable by law), the problematic role of the Board as both policy advisor and 
regulator becomes more pronounced. This prompts scientists to apply their expertise to 
prescribing specific temperatures, pollution amounts, and the kinds of polluting sources 
that are liable to penal sanctions (Hawkins, 1984). 
For Board members, standard setting then becomes a powerful device for advancing 
particular views about the scope of regulation. In the first instance, standards operate as 
a reference point for scientists to propagate a ‘technical’ view of the regulatory process. 
This is supported through mobilising various arguments. A former scientific advisor for 
Delhi’s EPCA66 said, ‘To set a standard, you need to know the industry and the 
abatement technology… You cannot set a standard unless you know the mechanics of 
how the technology works’67 (referring here to automobile engineering and design). 
Furthermore, setting a standard symbolises the skill of Board members in merging 
different technical disciplines. ‘In order to develop a standard, you need to think 
inventively, since standards are as much about engineering as they are about chemistry 
and physics’68.   
At the level of rhetoric, the technical narrative used in support of developing standards 
provides a more ‘credible’ picture of the regulatory process. In practice however it shifts 
the emphasis away from organisational practices, and the fact that it is often in the 
regulators’ own interest to pursue ‘workable’ solutions with polluters. When it comes to 
factory owners who often try to evade the law (i.e. by negotiating a lower pollution 
standard or by avoiding compliance altogether), Board members have to be 
confrontational, but at the same time supportive, of the interests of industry. This 
                                                
66 Environment Pollution (Prevention & Control) Authority is an independent environment committee and 
regulatory authority constituted by the MoEF to monitor pollution in New Delhi.  As in the case of the 
Board itself membership is based on the close relationship of scientists, industrial lobbies, and 
government representatives. It includes for instance representatives of the automobile sector (New Delhi 
at present becoming a growing market for automobile manufacturers), members of the Board, the New 
Delhi Pollution Control Committee, Delhi government and the MoEF. 
67 Interview with Dr. Khamar, retired engineering professor, IIT, New Delhi, 22 November 2009. 
68 Interview with Dr. Khamar, 22 November 2009.  
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reflects the ambivalence of regulatory control, since Board members strive to create a 
balance between the interests of economic activity and that of public welfare (Hawkins, 
1984, Fineman, 1998). A senior scientist said, ‘You have to be knowledgeable but 
assertive, neither pro-industry or against industry’69. The fact that enforcing a standard 
can result in sanctions placed upon polluting units suggests that Board members share 
the belief that they often have to be sympathetic towards industries. ‘Enforcing a strict 
standard from the start doesn’t work; however by enforcing it gradually there are better 
chances in the long run the industries will put in the investment’70. Making judgments 
about the ability of an industry to comply is more likely to depend on the industrial unit 
owner in question and his personal outlook and attitudes towards pollution mitigation, 
as opposed to technical considerations alone.  
An important point to consider, however, is that during such standard negotiation 
procedures, industries can exert their power and influence to resist adopting certain 
standards. During an interview with Mr. Raghavendra, a retired scientist who 
participated frequently in standard setting negotiations, he explained: ‘although science 
plays a role, often there is a lot of pressure from industry to speed up negotiations’71. As 
a consequence, he further explained, ‘scientists are not given enough time to research a 
new standard, leading to a number of uncertainties about defining acceptable pollution 
limits to be effectively ignored’72. NGOs and citizen groups also have very little 
influence over the entire process because their involvement is usually called for after a 
particular decision has been taken. Mr. Leo Saldhana, an environmental activist based in 
Bangalore, explained that when he put forward a case to the State Board of Karnataka 
regarding a factory that was exceeding pollution standards linked to the emission of 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), as it turned out, the Board and State Boards were 
in liaison with the concerned industry. However neither he nor the community affected 
by the VOCs was called in during the proceedings: it was only after a decision was 
reached that their comments were invited73. It is important to consider therefore that 
while standard setting is framed as being driven by technical considerations, industrial 
                                                
69 Interview with Mr. Manoj Tanti, senior environment engineer, small-scale industries division, 28 
November 2009. 
70 Interview with Dr. Khamar, retired engineering professor, IIT, 22 November 2009. 
71 Interview with Mr. Raghavendra, retired pollution scientist, 22 November 2009 
72 Interview with Mr. Raghavendra, 22 November 2009. 
73 Interview with Mr. Leo Saldanha, director of the Environment Support Group based in Bangalore, 17th 
November 2009. 
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interests can often dominate regulatory decisions in a manner that not only undermines 
the credibility of scientists, but can also restrict in important ways the involvement of 
citizens groups during standard setting negotiations.  
Industrial operators are also aware that speaking the ‘right’ language and establishing 
trust with regulatory bodies can influence outcomes in their favour. This has important 
implications in the context of the peri-urban. For instance, industrialists operating in 
peri-urban areas often hire private consultants who are well informed about the Board’s 
standards, and how to prepare their audit reports in a language that can be understood by 
regulators74. Local enforcement officials respond positively, preferring to enter a 
dialogue with the operation concerned in order to meet a particular standard, as opposed 
to directly exerting their legal influence. By contrast, communities are more likely to 
depend on the expertise of the pollution enforcement officials working in the area for 
evaluating whether or not a pollution standard has been met in their locality75. This can 
take a considerable amount of time, as enforcement officials will rarely visit residential 
areas, and then only after a complaint has been filed with the authority concerned. 
Given that industrialists have hired their own consultants, there is no guarantee for the 
communities affected that the audit reports prepared by the industrial operators have not 
been compiled in a way that plays down violations of environmental norms.  
The fact that communities are in a weaker position to challenge regulatory decisions is 
also explained by the fact that in many cases the same complaint has to be filed 
repeatedly in order to place pressure on local enforcement officials to conduct an 
evaluation76. It is therefore more likely that local enforcement officials will take a 
complaint seriously only after a technical evaluation has been conducted by a local 
NGO or by a scientific representative of the concerned community. The following 
extract from a public complaint regarding noise pollution, filed with the pollution 
enforcement agency in the peri-urban case study, tells of the difficulties faced by 
communities exposed to pollution in influencing regulatory outcomes:  
                                                
74Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, 13th October, 2009, under the 
RTI Act, 2005.  
75 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, 29 October, 2011, under 
RTI Act. 
76 ibid, 29 October, 2011, under RTI Act. 
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“The excess smoke more than permissible limit of 150 nm3 daily comes out of the 
chimney situated at Magnum Paper Mill. I have orally informed you about the 
excess emission of this industry many times. I also filed a complaint dated 
27.8.2010 regarding more smoke that is beyond permissible limits, but no action 
has been taken so far. I immediately called the regional officer and sent a text 
message to monitor the smoke. But the regional officer did not send any team. I 
immediately took the photographs of the smoke that was coming out of the electric 
turbine’s chimney. But the officials do not come.”77  
The above discussion suggests that different stakeholder groups have different claims to 
power when attempting to influence regulatory decisions. Particularly, the various 
examples drawn both from the peri-urban and other contexts affirm that industrial 
operators can often use their influence to shape decisions in such ways that suit their 
own interests. Exerting political influence over standard negotiation processes is one 
such mechanism of strengthening their influence; however it is important to consider 
that ‘speaking the right language’, that is, the technical language which is linked to the 
Board, can also add power and legitimacy to industry. Industrial operators who are well 
informed about regulatory procedures and financially able to source the relevant 
expertise can instigate ‘cooperative’ relationships with regulatory bodies. By contrast, 
for poorer communities this is often more difficult. Their relationship with regulators is 
more likely to be ‘confrontational’ and subject to the willingness of local enforcement 
officials to follow up a public complaint procedure. The above insights therefore 
suggest a more complex picture of why expert bodies can often fail to reach peri-urban 
areas, and how technical discourse can often serve as a political device that can be 
mobilised to serve particular interests.
                                                
77 Public complaint sent to the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, 14 January, 2011, under RTI 
Act. 
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4.5.3.  Forming boundaries: the social practice of industrial monitoring  
The importance of shaping boundaries that are closely linked to industries is certainly a 
subject that comes up frequently in the Board’s organisational rhetoric. By mobilising 
rhetorical statements such as ‘we are responsible for industries’78, the Board constructs 
a narrative of regulatory practice that is closely attached to the industrial sector. This 
focus on industry is influenced by two factors. The first is the legal-administrative 
mandate of the Board with regard to industrial pollution enforcement, a mandate that is 
much more clearly articulated in official discourses. For instance, effluent ‘standards’, 
with ascribed quantitative targets for specific types of industry and categories of 
pollutants, are enforceable directly by the Board and State Boards in accordance with 
the Water Act, 1974. The second is the expertise of Board members. Their background 
training in engineering means that they can apply their knowledge and skills more easily 
to industrial assessments, as opposed to ecological or health related pollution problems.   
The overall approach adopted for monitoring industrial pollution is formulated by the 
Board members’ own discretion and mode of prioritising by way of the different types 
of activities and polluting enterprises. A narrative that focuses on industry tends to bear 
certain assumptions about the type of industries that the Board is required to regulate 
closely. For example, large-scale industrial units such as paper mills and power plants 
are generally perceived to be more central to the Board’s activities. However, smaller 
factories such as dye-processing units (which tend to operate illegally in peri-urban 
areas) are frequently perceived to have a negligible impact on water quality79. This 
approach of allocating industrial pollution concerns to large scale industry is often based 
on the assumption that the pollution load associated with large-scale units is generally 
far heavier and therefore needs to be monitored more closely.  
This is an assumption, however, that is heavily contested in the peri-urban context since 
small-scale factories can emit equally substantial pollution loads. The peri-urban case 
shows, for instance, that small-scale industrial units can contribute significantly to the 
deterioration of water quality, simply because they operate outside the conventional 
areas where regulators are accustomed to controlling. They operate without effluent 
treatment plants and release large volumes of untreated wastewater directly into the 
                                                
78 Interview with Dr. Desai, senior scientist of the PAMS division, 10 November 2009. 
79 Ibid. 
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ground and into the drains80. This is in fact something that Board members prefer to 
ignore. According to the Chairman of the Board, the reason for the deliberate 
downscaling of regulatory efforts with regard to small-scale industrial operations is 
because smaller operators are perceived to be uncooperative or simply ‘not bothered’ 
about the environment by comparison to larger companies who are better informed 
about environmental standards, since it is perceived that they are obliged to comply with 
‘international norms’81. These tensions in turn expose the unwillingness of Board 
members to engage with informal polluters.  
Tensions exist also between the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ regulatory boundaries. 
Whether or not a water quality standard is being met is usually monitored at the point 
where industrial effluent is being discharged. This is somewhat related to the way 
fieldwork strategies are designed, focusing mainly on those sites that make up industrial 
effluent disposal networks, such as ‘drains’, ‘effluent outlets’, ‘treatment plants’ and 
‘sewer pipes’ 82. It is at this level that Board members acknowledge having an ‘official’ 
obligation to visit the factory concerned and enforce a standard. However water quality 
can still become impaired even if the load of polluting matter discharged from these 
sites is controlled, because even if certain units monitored closely by the regulatory 
authority are demonstrating compliance with water quality standards, there are also 
those units that are ‘unregistered’ (i.e. do not possess a formal environmental consent to 
operate) and are by default beyond regulatory reach83.   
An added complication arises when polluting matter is transferred through various 
‘informal’ channels that are not at present included in the sites that regulators are used 
to monitoring as part of their fieldwork routines. These include, for instance, direct 
contamination of the drinking water source and risks caused to the food system by the 
use of contaminated irrigation water for cultivating food crops (see also next chapter).  
These are water quality concerns that are recognised ‘unofficially’, but which the Board 
members do not perceive themselves as having a mandatory duty to monitor closely.  
                                                
80 Fieldwork observation supported by interviews with community representatives. 
81 Interview with Mr. Sinha, chairman of the Board, 23 February, 2010. 
82 CPCB, ‘Monitoring protocol in critically polluted areas’, accessed via CPCB website, 20 March 2011.  
83 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, 21th April 2010, under RTI 
Act, 2005. 
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Significantly, the way ‘official’ boundaries are resolved in practice is usually to retreat 
from certain regulatory commitments. An instructive example here is the regulatory 
ambiguity posed by human health. Impacts on health from poor water quality is a 
concern that Board members feel compelled to recognise, but in practice it is 
‘incompatible’ with the monitoring routines adopted for controlling industrial pollution. 
For instance, the fact that the Board enforces standards limiting pollution load is 
perceived to be ‘life centric’84, but this often constitutes a theoretical concern that is not 
followed through in regulatory practices. A Board engineer, anticipating my query 
about the implications of the Board’s monitoring activities for addressing water quality 
impact on health, said ‘we don’t really do health [epidemiological] studies - that is the 
responsibility of the health department’85. Therefore, even though Board members 
support a certain level of recognition of the links between human health and air quality 
for instance (partly because of the public and media attention that air quality has 
received in recent years)86, the same does not hold true for water quality. In general, it is 
assumed that human health is dealt with by other departments or policy areas within the 
Indian bureaucracy, even when it is unclear which departments these are and how their 
mandate might be linked to the Board’s. There are several adverse implications of the 
ambiguity of health impact such as those exemplified by the prolonged exposure of 
poorer citizens residing in Ghaziabad’s urban villages, who are regularly exposed to 
water pollution discharged by industrial units operating in the locality (see also next 
chapter, section 5.3.3).  
4.5.4. The relationship of the Board with civil society 
Board members frequently regard a process of consultation with public stakeholders as 
a positive step towards better water quality management. A review of the Board’s 
written reports suggests consistency in its support of a narrative of ‘spoken’ cooperation 
with civil society and environmental NGO representatives. In the manifesto report of 
the Board on water quality management for instance, it states ‘it is considered desirable 
to involve local administrative bodies at the district, block, municipal and village levels, 
NGOs, and the citizens themselves in conducting at least a crude and rapid overall 
assessment of water quality’ (CPCB, 2002: 4).  The same report further argues that in ‘a 
                                                
84 Interview with Mr. Sinha, Board chairman, 23 February, 2010. 
85 Interview with Mr. Raj Kumar, environmental engineer, PCI division of the Board, 22 December 2009. 
86 Interview with Dr. Rao, senior chemist and additional director, 15 November, 2009. 
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vast country like India’, it may not ever be possible to develop an adequate 
environmental monitoring network based on ‘sophisticated’ instruments and 
methodology alone (ibid: 6). Simpler techniques like bio-monitoring ‘shall render a lot 
of satisfaction to rural and local communities’ (CPCB, 2002: 8). And so a lack of 
technical expertise is presented as an opportunity rather than an obstacle for public 
stakeholders to apply those aspects of water quality management that are not necessarily 
based on ‘complex’ methodologies alone.   
The perceptions of citizens’ and environment groups however suggest an increasingly 
more sceptical and distant public than the Board portrays in its documentation. This is 
partly because of the way the Board allocates specific roles for the involvement of civil 
society. According to Mr. Dunu Roy who leads the Hazards Centre (a small 
environmental group in Delhi), the Board’s approach to water quality operates within a 
narrow framework of science: ‘the bandwidth within which the technical solutions to 
water quality are being created by the Board is extremely narrow’87. This is frequently 
perceived as a structural hindrance to protecting water quality that can erode civil 
society’s willingness to cooperate with Board members. Others perceive that the official 
rhetoric of science-based methodologies underplays the influence ‘commercial’ interests 
are able to exercise over the regulatory process. For civil society to work in closer 
partnership with regulatory authorities some perceive that regulatory standards should 
be set on the basis of ‘natural viability as opposed to commercial viability’88.  
A more critical view of regulatory ‘science’ influences in several ways the kind of 
engagement civil society has with regulators. Members of NGOs conduct their own 
surveys of water quality as a strategy either to challenge official knowledge or to expose 
sources of pollution that are not included in the regulators’ assessments. In the peri-
urban case study, Janhit Foundation, a local environmental NGO with its own team of 
experts, conducted assessments in areas that are not routinely included in the work of 
local regulators. This work exposed the fact that in the poorer villages, concentrations of 
heavy metals are often over the permissible standards (Lewis, 2007). However, NGOs 
have difficulty getting regulators to recognise their sources of information and often 
                                                
87 Interview with Mr. Dunu Roy, director of Hazards Centre based in New Delhi, 22 March 2009. 
88 Interview with Mr. Sunil Mehta, environmental activist and journalist, 17 November 2009. 
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need to go to court as a last resort in order for serious pollution risks to be formally 
recognised.  
In other instances, activists take up the task of tracing information about the practices of 
industries. In the peri-urban case study, Sushil Raghav’s lack of trust in the capacity of 
industry to conform to environmental norms has meant that he regularly exercises his 
right to access ‘official’ information (under the Right to Information Act, 2005) in order 
to obtain information from regulatory authorities. This can be viewed as a strategy to 
expose industrial malpractice through obtaining evidence pertaining to a non-
conforming industry, with a view to further using this evidence for directly challenging 
the performance of regulators. These examples demonstrate that, despite the rhetoric of 
cooperation being reproduced by the Board, NGOs and civil society representatives in 
many instances have to use unorthodox routes for obtaining information.  
The situation of the Board’s engagement with civil society, however, may be more 
complex than it appears at the surface. In the two-day symposium held in Delhi on 
‘Science, Environment and Media: Discussing Experiences in South Asia’89, some 
scientists asserted the view that fostering greater engagement with the public is in fact 
an exercise that can critically undermine their ‘professional’ credibility. Lalit Rao, a 
climate scientist from IIT Delhi who was present at the symposium, provided some 
explanations for this. In his view, ‘if scientists were to respond to all the criticisms then 
they would lose their credibility amongst other scientists’. Instead, again in his view, the 
general mood within the scientific community in India is that scientists prefer to ‘stick 
to their own peer reviewed journals’90. Although such views were not expressed openly 
during my discussion with Board members, they suggest that in the Indian context 
environmental decision-making has over the years become much more politicised, 
which is why it is in the interest of scientists to limit their involvement with the public 
realm as a strategy to protect their credibility. This partly explains why the relationship 
between Board scientists and civil society actors appear to have become much more 
unstable.  
                                                
89 This is a two-day event that was organised by Panos South Asia. It took place at the IIT New Delhi 
during the 15th-16th November 2009. The aim was to bring together academics, scientists, journalists, 
lawyers, activists and policymakers in order to foster a dialogue amongst science and technology 
professionals, and representatives from the popular media in India.   
90 Interview with Mr. Lalit Rao, senior climate scientist from IIT New Delhi, 15th November 2009.  
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4.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted a number of issues regarding the involvement of experts in 
decision-making processes relevant to water quality management. It has highlighted a 
variety of discursive mechanisms that are used by experts to classify different industrial 
operators, their own interpretations of environmental law and the way different 
arguments are presented to effectively ‘micro-manage’ their interaction with 
environmental pressure groups and concerned citizens. Furthermore, insights from this 
case study highlight that failures in policy implementation are often not solely the result 
of an ineffective administration, or constraints on resources, but are partly an outcome 
of how the interests of key actors in the policy process are effectively negotiated in the 
regulatory sphere. These range from the interests of Board members themselves, and 
those of the other departments in the bureaucracy, to the interests of industry. One issue 
that emerged quite clearly was the strong influence that industry can have in shaping 
regulatory decisions, despite significant policy and regulatory reforms that have taken 
place in India over the past 20 years.   
The insights derived from this case study are therefore of particular relevance to the 
peri-urban context. Firstly, it has helped illustrate deeper conceptual problems in how 
water quality management is defined within the regulatory sphere. For instance, an 
overarching emphasis on the DBU classification promoted a tendency to undermine 
uncertainties associated with water quality protection, and excluded from regulatory 
control pollution effects that tend to have the most current impact on peri-urban 
environments. It revealed problems associated with the way the notion of participation 
has been socially constructed by Board members. That is to say, participation is largely 
dependent on communicating with regulators in a ‘technical language’ and a 
background in expert science disciplines is regarded as a prerequisite for effective 
participation. This is why NGOs and citizens exposed to deteriorating water quality, and 
who rely less on technical accounts of water quality, tend to have fewer opportunities to 
influence policy and regulatory outcomes than in-house experts working from within 
the Board.   
This chapter has focused more on how policy agendas are articulated by key policy 
actors at the national level, and to some extent by city level actors as well (particularly 
environmental activists, retired officials, and scientists working for universities in 
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Delhi). The next chapter will explore in much more depth how water quality is 
negotiated at the local level, in the trans-Hindon, Ghaziabad, thus shifting analytical 
attention from the processes of policy ‘framing’ to those of policy implementation.
  
130 
Chapter 5 Policy translations in peri-urban Delhi 
The previous chapter demonstrated that even though the Board scientists operate in 
Delhi they constitute an important group of actors influencing policy priorities in peri-
urban areas. It also provided an entry point for looking critically at the science of water 
quality and its limitations, in order to provide a more nuanced account of the official 
practices that underlie expert knowledge systems.  
The previous chapter illustrated that the Board is perceived to be close to policy makers 
in its role as a provider of scientific expertise, while state pollution control boards are 
envisaged as implementing bodies, carrying out and executing the environmental 
policies formulated by the Board in their respective states and districts. However, the 
fieldwork observations used to inform this chapter show that policies formulated at the 
top are rarely executed in the straightforward manner commonly set out by Board 
scientists. While scientists view water quality solely in technical terms, it has different 
meanings for people in peri-urban areas, particularly in the villages and slum 
settlements. Secondly, water quality in peri-urban areas is subject to different types of 
interventions by official actors and institutions that extend beyond the pollution control 
authorities. There are also noticeable contradictions in how policies are framed and how 
they are translated into action. These contradictions are manifest both between national 
actors (i.e. the Board scientists and their expectations around water quality monitoring) 
and local implementing authorities (i.e. the regional pollution control office), as well as 
between local authorities operating in the district itself. The incongruities contribute to 
large gaps in implementation marked by the heavy pollution of the Hindon river, the 
depletion of the groundwater and the prolonged exposure of local communities to toxic 
pollutants in the water.   
The chapter contends that in the trans-Hindon area of Ghaziabad district situated close 
to the eastern border of Delhi, water quality is part of a ‘negotiated order’ (Barrett, 
2004:253) involving diverse stakeholders and the parallel operation of contrasting styles 
of expertise (Keeley and Scoones, 1999). It further suggests that powerful actors have a 
role to play not only at the policy level (i.e. understood by the role of Board scientists in 
shaping policies), but also at the district level through the informal ties between local 
level institutions and powerful elite groups (e.g. industrial lobbies, politicians etc.).  
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However the role of the ‘official world’ that exists at the bottom end of policy processes 
is either taken for granted or has been omitted from intellectual scrutiny. Later it is 
demonstrated that this is quite significant for understanding why deteriorating water 
quality is still a serious concern in peri-urban areas. Therefore in conjunction with the 
previous account of scientific expertise (using the case of the Board) it further aims to 
provide a more complete portrayal of formal policy responses to peri-urban areas, 
employing both a bottom-up and a top-down approach.  
Section 5.1 introduces the area of study. In section 5.2 an account of the official system 
for addressing water quality is given, highlighting the institutional priorities of pollution 
control authorities, the urban authorities and the water departments. Insights of middle 
level and senior officials perceived as ‘frontline functionaries’ (Coelho, 2004:140) help 
to illustrate some of the background assumptions that influence the ways in which 
district officials exclude the poor from routine engagement with water quality. Section 
5.3 draws largely from interviews with residents of the villages and slum settlements to 
bring into the foreground the contradictions that arise between the dominant narratives 
of experts and district officials and how water quality is experienced on the ground by 
diverse publics. 
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5.1. The study area: Ghaziabad District, Uttar Pradesh  
Ghaziabad district, initially part of the larger region of Meerut, was formed in 1976.  
The town, also known as the ‘hot city’, was named after the Muslim king ‘Gayajuddin’. 
It acquired Class 1 status in 1971, marking Ghaziabad’s status as a new large town 
created from previously rural settlements. As well as the growing population, in terms 
of industry Ghaziabad is also the second largest town in the state of Uttar Pradesh (after 
Kanpur) with approximately 13,000 industrial units registered with government 
records91. The growth potential of Ghaziabad has been harnessed by the state 
government of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), expanding particularly after the 1990s with the 
onset of India’s neoliberal economic reforms and the emergence of India’s middle class.   
Ghaziabad’s growth was facilitated by several factors. Firstly, it is located very close to 
Delhi, the national capital (about 30 kilometers away). A map is shown in Figure 4. 
Secondly, the state government of Uttar Pradesh has undertaken various policy 
initiatives to encourage industries to come to Ghaziabad. The industrialisation of 
Ghaziabad has a long history. It starts in the 1960s with the acquisition of land under the 
direction of the U.P. administration and has continued in consecutive years through 
numerous government notifications for the acquisition of agricultural land from the 
villages. To date, nearly 1500 acres of agricultural land have been acquired from 
roughly 50 villages for the industrial development of the region92. This land is now 
under the auspices of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) 
and includes large industrial estates such as Sahibabad, Loni and Meerut Road. The 
legal basis for the acquisition of this land rests with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, 
the reason given at the time of the acquisition being that the land was required for 
‘public purpose’93. But the haste with which the land acquisition took place has brought 
major transformations to the peripheral villages, and has created widespread 
dissatisfaction amongst the villagers and farmers, many of whom are still taking legal 
action to claim the financial compensation promised by the U.P government for the land 
that was acquired.   
                                                
91 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, 28th April, 2010, under the 
RTI Act, 2005. 
92 Information provided by Government of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), under the RTI Act, 2005. 
93Statement as seen in official documents, under RTI Act 2005.  
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Thirdly, Delhi’s urban restructuring in the climate of neo-liberalisation has further 
fueled Ghaziabad’s growth. The Ghaziabad Master Plan 2021 bears many resemblances 
to the Delhi Master Plan for 2021, both in terms of its overall vision as well as the type 
of uses defined under the plan for further development. It is highly focused on ‘regional 
integration’ and the development of commercial centres, multiplexes, and ‘planned’ 
residential localities similar to those found in the capital. Increases in land prices in 
Delhi have meant that many of the elite of Delhi’s workforce prefer to live in 
Ghaziabad. Middle and senior level government employees, journalists, private sector 
employees and owners of small/medium enterprises maintain a more ‘middle class’ 
lifestyle, and have their own private transport. In addition, because the level of affluence 
is increasing in Delhi, poorer rural migrants are also coming to Ghaziabad94 in order to 
find cheaper rented accommodation while commuting to the capital to work as low-
wage labourers. An important characteristic of this process is that the visual landscape 
of Ghaziabad has been drastically transformed. Modern high rise buildings (residential 
as well as commercial) now co-exist with industrial and village settlement areas. An 
increasing number of these settlements have deteriorated to such an extent because of 
Ghaziabad’s urbanisation that villages have in reality become slums95 (see also 
Figure 5).  These processes are indicative of the polarisation that exists between social 
groups in the district of Ghaziabad, and how this polarisation is interlinked with the 
societal and economic changes taking place in the capital.  
                                                
94 An observation well established in the peri-urban literature is that rural out-migrants do not generally 
go directly to large cities. Instead, a series of moves is involved, called step migration, wherein rural 
migrants move first to villages or small towns and then successively to more urban environments. See 
also (Narain, 2009).  
95 The municipal corporation has declared 23 rural areas as slums.  Most of these urbanised rural areas 
lack basic facilities.  This is due to the haphazard nature of the developments and lack of funds. 
Population densities in these villages are alarmingly high and the family sizes are also larger than 
average. 
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Figure 4: Location of Ghaziabad district in relation to New Delhi 
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Figure 5: Types of land use in the trans-Hindon region
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Ghaziabad’s peri-urban transformation has undoubtedly left its mark on the water 
quality of the region, which is observed to be deteriorating rapidly. The river Hindon96, 
historically known as ‘Harnandi’, is the main water body flowing through Ghaziabad 
district. It is heavily polluted by industrial as well as domestic sources, including 
sources in other districts and industrial towns located upstream from Ghaziabad, such as 
Muzaffarnagar, Meerut and Baghpat. In addition, water pollution has increased because 
of new pressures from pollution sources found within the district of Ghaziabad. 
Residents attribute water (and environmental) pollution in the district to the increasing 
number of ‘hazardous waste disposal’ businesses97 operating illegally. Illegal factories 
tend to operate without functioning Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs) and often no 
underground sewage disposal system, meaning that a lot of industrial waste is dumped 
directly into the river Hindon.  
Environmental degradation in the district is certainly not a new phenomenon since 
Ghaziabad has hosted polluting industries as far back as the 1950s, which is when the 
U.P Government initiated the land acquisition process for industrial development in the 
region. However, the number of illegal industrial units operating in the district has 
increased as a result of Delhi’s beautification policies and because many industries that 
have been pushed out of Delhi have ‘resettled’ (without planning permission) in the 
established industrial sites located in the district. This is reflected in the official records 
of the regional Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB), which attribute the 
increase in pollution levels to a list of 140 units that are currently operating in the 
district without an operating license98. These industries have been established primarily 
through channels of informal negotiation with the state industrial corporation, the 
UPSIDC, the government authority responsible for the lease of land for industrial 
purposes. Given the relatively large plots of land at the disposal of the UPSIDC it has 
been entirely possible for illegal businesses to settle, either in vacant plots or by ‘sub-
contracting’ land on a temporary basis from the owners of units already there.  
                                                
96  The Hindon river flows through six districts and it stretches over 260kms. It originates in the lower 
Himalayas at Parka Tanka village and reaches its final confluence with the Yamuna river in Gautambudh 
Nagar, downstream of Delhi. It has two main tributaries, the Krishni river which joins the Hindon at 
Barnawa village and the Kali river, which joins the Hindon at Pithlokar.  
97 Such industries operating in Ghaziabad include for example, electroplating industries, chemical 
manufacturing units (including pharmaceuticals), dye and dying industries, petrochemical products, 
leathers and textiles.   
98 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, under the RTI Act, 2005. 
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Figure 6 is a map of the trans-Hindon area99 where the majority of interviews and 
fieldwork observations took place. It demonstrates that in Sahibabad industrial estate the 
area of land that is ‘officially’ not used for industrial purposes is quite significant. 
However, what the official records do not show is that this is the same area where the 
majority of the illegal industries are now located. As section 5.3.3 will explore, the 
establishment of illegal industries in Sahibabad industrial area has contributed in several 
ways to the deterioration of water quality. Industrial pollution further constitutes an 
important public health concern for the village residents who, since their land was 
acquired by the UPSIDC, have been forced to reside in very close proximity to these 
factories.  
Within the region, perceptions around problems of deteriorating water quality tend to 
vary significantly between different actor groups, and depending on whether a particular 
group resides in an elite residential colony, a migrant settlement, or an urbanising 
village. Furthermore, there are differences to note in terms of how the state decides to 
intervene in the water problems affecting different localities within Ghaziabad. Often 
discrimination, legitimised by state policy, can be clearly observed, resulting in poorer 
and socio-politically less powerful groups being more severely affected by water 
pollution, while the middle class citizens residing in gated communities, perceived as 
far more ‘deserving’ (i.e. in terms of access to water and wastewater infrastructure), are 
relatively insulated from the risks of water pollution.   
Particularly, in the trans-Hindon area, the inherent ‘messiness’ of policy implementation 
and the fact that policies related to water quality management can be influenced by 
unequal power relations are clearly visible. For the better off middle-class colonies of 
Vasundhara and Vaishali, access to water and the disposal of sewage is no longer 
something which is even thought about, as these colonies have grown accustomed to 
being connected to the municipally managed water and sanitation infrastructure. The 
Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) procures water directly from the Ganges in 
                                                
99 The urbanised part of the district, the Ghaziabad Development Authority is split into what is commonly 
cited as east of Hindon (or cis-Hindon) containing roughly 2/3rd of the population, and the trans-Hindon 
with 1/3rd of the population. The trans-Hindon is the urban agglomeration which is closer to the 
immediate vicinity of the city of Delhi 
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the upper Himalayan region100. The water is then treated at the Pratab Vihar water 
treatment plant (WTP) before being delivered to Vasundhara, Vaishali and emerging 
middle class colonies in the adjoining district of NOIDA. None of the residents depend 
on or need to use any other source of water for fulfilling their basic water requirements, 
and this largely insulates them from local water pollution risks such as the degradation 
of the groundwater from industrial pollution. Officials see no problem with this 
arrangement; as a GDA official said in an interview ‘groundwater in the district is 
polluted, that is why we provide piped water from the Ganga Water Project to 
Vasundhara and Vaishali’101. Ironically, however, residents of these colonies are made 
to pay only a negligible fee for their water supply and rarely perceive their residencies 
as being at risk from the pollution of the river and the groundwater in the district.  
Sewage disposal is another matter which is ‘taken for granted’ in these colonies. 
Vasundhara has a vast and effective underground network for sewage disposal, and 
during this research no form of waterlogging or wastewater accumulation could be 
identified within the residential areas. Furthermore, all sewage is treated in the sewage 
treatment plant (STP) at Indira Puram, situated close to the colonies. Of course not all 
wastewater gets treated at the Indira Puram STP, and an increasing quantity of domestic 
wastewater is also discharged directly into the river Hindon. However, none of the 
residents seem to either know or be concerned about where and how the wastewater gets 
disposed of, after it is flushed out of their houses. Pollution is understood by residents to 
be increasing because of the heavy industrialisation taking place in the district, but risks 
from pollution, for now at least, are perceived to exist ‘outside the premises’ of their 
colonies. The official bodies in the district have diligently planned the provision of 
infrastructure so that this can be realised in practice. The UPPCB regional office also 
operates at a safe distance from where the pollution takes place. It is situated within the 
boundaries of Vasundhara as opposed to being based in the industrial estates where it 
could presumably monitor pollution with much greater effect, see also Figure 6.  
                                                
100 Similar is the case for the middle class colonies of Delhi. The local water source, the Yamuna river, as 
well as the groundwater, is considered to be too heavily polluted for human consumption. Therefore the 
Delhi Jal Board (Delhi’s water authority) has decided to resolve this problem by procuring water directly 
from the Himalayan region. The downside of this process is that the ecological sustainability of the 
Ganges is becoming greatly impaired from over-abstraction, while communities residing in the 
Himalayan region witness their local sources of water, used both for irrigation and consumption, being 
diminishing rapidly (Maria, 2006).  
101 Interview with Mr. Anand, chief town planner, Ghaziabad Development Authority, 16th January 2010. 
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In comparison to the ‘pollution-free’ colonies of Vasundhara and Vaishali, urbanising 
villages located in the trans-Hindon area, such as Arthala, Maharjpur and KarKar 
Model, experience problems in a different way. This is partly linked to their social 
status in the district. These villages are conglomerations of small localities housing 
primarily poor people who work in the informal sector in occupations such as home-
based artisans, street hawkers and vendors, casual labourers, security guards, carpenters, 
petty shop owners, and other ‘blue-collar jobs’. With major industrial areas either 
surrounding the villages or located in close proximity to them, it is clear that many of 
the residents are also representative of a ‘labour-class’ who work for the industries and 
reside near their work places.  
The relatively ‘better-off’ residents of these localities are those that consider themselves 
to be part of the ‘actual’ village, that is the village prior to when the urbanisation of 
these localities began to take place. Some residents therefore claim to be the earlier 
settlers in this area, and are perceived as the ‘native’ population comprising mainly old 
castes such as Rajputs (upper caste land owners), Jats (farmers), Gujjars and Tyagis. It 
is these social groups that are more openly ‘anti-state’ as these are the same villagers 
that saw their farmlands forcefully acquired by the state of U.P., a process which has 
clearly led to the progressive disempowerment of villagers in terms of their right to land 
in the district. However, it is generally the ‘newcomers’ such as migrant populations 
that work in factories or commute to Delhi to work as informal labourers and who 
generally have no landholdings that are the most disadvantaged in this region. The 
migrant populations generally receive little recognition from the state and are often 
looked down upon by other village residents. From a class perspective, there is a clear 
dividing line between the ‘poor’ of the district that have come to reside in the villages 
and the ‘elite’ residents of colonies such as Vasundhara and Vaishali.  
In these parts of the trans-Hindon area the water quality risks presented are more acute 
and widely dispersed. Insufficiency of ‘modern’ municipal water supplies has forced 
villages to withdraw groundwater. However, pressures on the groundwater from 
industrial pollution and over-extraction mean that water quality is often impaired, 
exhibiting high levels of salinity and heavy metal toxicity (due to industrial pollutants). 
Lack of access to underground sewage disposal facilities means that in the villages 
wastewater floods the open drains and alleys, accumulating in scattered cesspools 
within the localities. The problem of water pollution is accentuated by the fact that 
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villages are located within the industrial estates. In the parts of the villages that have 
been transformed into slums, such as the Ambedkar Nagar slum adjacent to Arthala 
village, the GDA has made no provision for basic services. Here the risks are further 
accentuated due to the fact that slum residents (mainly migrant populations) have little 
disposable income to purchase bottled water and therefore depend entirely on water 
accessed illegally from the pipelines used to deliver water to the middle class residential 
colonies. As a result, the quality of water is rarely guaranteed, leading to adverse impact 
on health and the loss of lives from the consumption of contaminated water.  
Ultimately, some of the underlying causes of the inequalities observed can be traced to 
the gentrification of the peri-urban space under a state led planning framework which is 
designed to appeal to the elite of the region whilst intentionally leaving the poorer 
groups out of the development process. For instance, the statement made by Mr. Ajay 
Kadam, the Municipal Commissioner of Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam, encapsulates quite 
vividly the type of development vision shared by state officials in the district102. When 
he felt he had to justify why the poorer groups in the district have to live in 
unacceptable environmental conditions, he said: ‘we are planning and trying to 
implement the best of the schemes possible, and available within existing the 
resources…the results however will be better in the future and one needs to have 
patience’, hoping to convey that in time ‘even the poor’ will be able to benefit from the 
recent development of Ghaziabad. But for now at least, the poor are rarely perceived as 
a priority and this is reflected in the official discourse, while a particular ‘anti-poor’ bias 
that officials bring into their practice in part becomes responsible for widening the gap 
between the poor and affluent peri-urban residents.  
                                                
102 Interview with Mr. Ajay Kadam, the municipal commissioner of Ghaziabad, 16th January 2010. 
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  Ambedkar Nagar Slum                                                                    Industrial Area Perimeter 
               Village Area                                                                     Large Scale Industrial Plots 
‘Posh’ Residential Colony                                                                  Small Scale Industrial Plots 
 
Figure 6: Map of the trans-Hindon area and field-visit locations 
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5.2.  Water quality and the ‘official world’ 
In this overall context of transition, water quality lends itself to a host of formal policy 
interventions and official actors. Figure 7 demonstrates that the institutional structure of 
the Board and State Boards is influential. The regional office of the Uttar Pradesh 
Pollution Control Board (UPPCB), being the main pollution enforcement agency in the 
district with a mandate for addressing water quality, is placed in the centre. However, 
water quality management is also shaped indirectly by multiple agencies (i.e. beyond 
the scope of the Boards) whose roles are less clearly defined. As the following sections 
demonstrate, even though they have an important role in water quality management, a 
significant limitation of this institutional set up is that the relationship between them 
tends to be highly fragmented. Furthermore, not all actors are situated within 
Ghaziabad. The UPPCB for example operates at the state level and is based in 
Lucknow. The CPCB (referred to as the Board in Chapter 4) and the Central 
Groundwater Board (CGWB) operate at the national level and are based in Delhi.  
 
Figure 7: Overview of official actors influencing water quality management 
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5.2.1. The role of the regional office UPPCB 
From the official perspective, water quality in the sense of a district concern is 
frequently linked to the regional office of the UPPCB, the implementing organ of the 
State Board of Uttar Pradesh, which is based in Lucknow. Like the Board itself 
(previous chapter), the regional office was established in 1995 and has a similar 
organisational structure. A key difference between the Board and the regional office 
UPPCB is that the regional office does not conduct technical studies or research. Given 
the considerable presence of industries in the district, its main area of activity is 
checking for industrial compliance with pollution abatement norms. Water quality is 
therefore monitored within the industrial estates, but also periodically at designated 
points along rivers and in groundwater, lakes and ponds.  
But unlike the Board, which has a set allocation of funds and resources for the 
monitoring of water bodies, the regional office works with very limited resources and 
manpower. Given also the volume of industrial units operating in the district, pollution 
enforcement officials tend to prioritise monitoring efforts much more around the 
enforcement of standards related to industrial pollution. This is the first important aspect 
of how policies are translated in peri-urban areas. The Board has incorporated into its 
mandate the environmental implications of deteriorating water quality (for instance 
much of the emphasis of its own monitoring programmes is on river pollution) but in 
practice the ‘environmental’ implications are not adopted very well at the peri-urban 
scale. This is exemplified by the serious deterioration of the local river Hindon due to 
industrial and domestic wastewater discharge. Moreover, monitoring water pollution is 
narrowed down to a regime of merely checking compliance of industrial units, 
providing few possibilities for pollution enforcement agents to take notice of other types 
of risks arising from impaired water quality. This becomes evident in section 5.3.2, 
which discusses the citizens’ exposure to pollution but also in section 5.3.3, which gives 
examples of less recognised sources and impacts of pollution.  
Monitoring industrial compliance with environmental norms is conducted for the 17 
categories of polluting industries in the district. The list includes paper mills, sugar 
mills, alcohol distilleries, tanneries, slaughter houses and more recently established 
processing industries including dye and dyeing industries, electroplating, metal 
processing and electronics. Monitoring is carried out through taking water samples at 
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the point of discharge, i.e. from the wastewater outlets of factories. Water samples are 
analysed for compliance with permissible limits according to a range of core parameters 
that are industry and location specific. The Board formulates the core parameters at the 
national level, under the Minimal National Standards scheme for industrial pollution 
abatement (MINAS).   
Despite the fact that the design of the monitoring process has largely been expert driven 
and actively promoted by scientists, in practice pollution control at a district level 
functions largely autonomously from national regulators. At one level, the limited 
presence of the Board in the district can be inferred from the ways in which pollution 
enforcement officials in peri-urban areas perceive the relationship with the Board. On 
the one hand interviews with pollution control officials suggest that there is little 
incentive for them to engage with Board members. The director of the regional office 
perceived the relationship with the Board as such, saying, ‘we collaborate with them 
[the Board] on some projects but fundamentally we report to Lucknow’103. And then on 
the other hand, although Board standards are referred to in order to demonstrate the 
scientific legitimacy of the regulatory process (‘we follow the water standards of the 
Board’104), it rarely goes beyond casual reference to the national regulatory guidelines.  
Partly as a consequence of the Board’s limited involvement in peri-urban areas, officials 
in the district attribute importance to problems and pollution impacts that are normally 
underplayed in the Board members’ discourse. While Board members view industrial 
pollution caused by small scale industry as being diligently monitored (see section 
4.5.3), officials in the district often perceive small factories to be the most serious 
offenders. As described by Mr. Vivek Nain, an assistant engineer for the regional office 
UPPCB: ‘the dye and dyeing industry is the toughest to monitor despite the fact that 
they are smaller than the paper mills and other heavy industries in the district’105. The 
fact that some polluters can avoid regulatory action in turn reveals some of the 
complexities of translating the regulatory norms designed by the Board into action in 
peri-urban areas. As we heard during meetings with officials, many polluting businesses 
operating in the district are constantly shifting locations. It is common therefore for 
                                                
103 Interview with Mr. Jadav, director of the UPPCB regional office, 12th February. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Minutes from the STEPS peri-urban project meeting with Ghaziabad officials in New Delhi, 
November 30th 2009. 
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many industrial units to operate on rented sites, which means that the owners can move 
at short notice to another site and avoid the threat of regulatory action106.  
Another area of contradiction between the Board rhetoric and the operation of the 
regional office is the way executive power is shared between local pollution control 
bodies and other formal institutions. Board members identify strongly with industrial 
pollution concerns not only in terms of their scientific engagement but also as regulators 
with important executive powers to close industrial units and impose penalties. But 
pollution enforcement officials note a number of difficulties in closing down a polluting 
factory even when it fails on several counts to comply with pollution norms.  
In theory, if the rules are being breached then the regional office UPPCB sends a notice 
to the particular business and informs the administrative Head Office in Lucknow. If the 
owner does not reply within a given time frame despite repeated notices, then the 
regional office UPPCB can proceed with a closure order. In practice, however, this 
entire process can take up to 4-5 months and within this time frame the owner can move 
on to a new place. An added complication is that, even at the time of closure, the 
regional office UPPCB cannot operate alone, since closing down a business requires the 
presence of the police and the consent of the district administrative office107. These 
administrative hurdles prolong even further the time lapse between serving a notice and 
closing down a factory, whilst reducing the capacity of enforcement officials to operate 
independently and effectively when action is required.  
Part of the reason given by enforcement officials for the weak influence of the regional 
office UPPCB over regulatory procedures is that decisions are often centralised, and in 
reality administrative power rests at the level of the state of Uttar Pradesh and not the 
district. Reasons for this curious distribution of power are partly historical, linked to 
Ghaziabad’s industrial development that started in the 1960s and the subsequent 
unprecedented growth of ‘industrial estates’ (see previous section 5.1). These estates 
were initially planned to operate as designated zones where industrial development was 
less restricted but this has also meant that regulatory bodies have less influence in these 
areas.  
                                                
106 Minutes from the STEPS peri-urban project meeting with Ghaziabad officials in New Delhi, 
November 30th 2009. 
107 ibid.  
  
145 
Enforcement officials explained:     
‘We are completely dependent on the administration. Those who drafted the Act 
did not want the engineers to have the authority to go and seal these big factories. 
At that point, pollution was not the main priority. It was the social benefits being 
derived from industry. So they devised this elaborate procedure of 2-3 months that 
has to be done before someone can be prosecuted108.’ 
The majority of the industries found in the trans-Hindon are situated within ‘notified’ 
industrial estates. In these areas the UPSIDC is responsible for granting consents of 
operation to industrial operators Nonetheless, industrial development has, in recent 
years, become haphazard and unplanned, easily taken over by the vested interests of 
industrial elites. It is worth noting that, because of a curious legislative inscription in the 
EIA guidelines, hazardous waste businesses can be established without either a public 
hearing or consultation with the affected communities109 (Menon and Kohli, 2008), not 
even the villages that are often situated within industrial estates.   
Another major point of contention is the fact that, although industrial land was 
originally allocated for the ‘public purpose’, at present this land is being appropriated 
for the establishment of large shopping complexes and industrial activities whereby 
plots are subdivided informally into smaller plots to accommodate more industrial units.  
Local enforcement officials perceive that they have little real influence in shaping 
regulatory decisions in these areas because the executive power of the UPSIDC, in 
conjunction with state level bureaucrats, supersedes their own regulatory authority.  
This was eloquently described in an interview with the regional office director, who said 
‘I am doing my job but there is a lot of pressure from above’110 (referring to the state 
capital Lucknow), highlighting that a type of ‘economics first’ politics appears to 
pervade state level decisions as well.  
As I was told informally during interviews with an official from the UPSIDC, state 
politicians based in Lucknow would have much to lose from creating a more effective 
                                                
108 Minutes from the STEPS peri-urban project meeting with Ghaziabad officials in New Delhi, 
November 30th 2009. 
109 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, Ghaziabad, 28th April, 
2010, under the RTI Act. 
110 Interview with Mr. Jadav, director UPPCB regional office, 12th February, 2010. 
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pollution enforcement mechanism in Ghaziabad, because that would counteract the 
‘special incentives’ industrial policy that the U.P government has drafted for the region. 
Such incentives include exemptions from income tax, transport subsidies and other 
measures put in place to encourage industrialists to set up units of operation within 
Ghaziabad district. The state government fears therefore that striking a better balance 
between environmental protection and industrial development could be a risky course, 
and could potentially encourage industries to relocate from the Ghaziabad to other 
regions. This in turn would lead to a sizable decrease in state revenues because of the 
lost taxation and rental incomes.  
In addition, as I was told by an official source, that many of the industrial operations in 
Ghaziabad are tied to a much more powerful industrial lobby based in Lucknow. 
According to another anonymous source from the UPSIDC, industrialists have set up 
operations in Ghaziabad because of the district’s proximity to Delhi. This is a strategic 
location for industry because it gives access to transport infrastructure (i.e. airports, 
railway networks etc.), a growing urban market and telecommunication services that are 
much harder to access in other parts of U.P. It is possible therefore that industrialists 
based in Lucknow are in a better position to influence political decisions and put 
pressure on the political elite of Uttar Pradesh in order to discourage the implementation 
of stricter pollution enforcement rules for the region. In section 5.3.3, it is shown that 
the process of siting industries has in turn encouraged the deterioration of water quality 
in important ways that are often excluded from the view of regulatory control, despite 
serious impacts on the local populations residing within these estates.  
5.2.2. Influential actors beyond the PCBs 
Officially, the regional office UPPCB has the mandate for water quality. However, 
‘unofficially’, it is an area of concern that overlaps with other institutions. These areas 
of overlap are not formally recognised either by national level actors or the pollution 
control officials in the district. More importantly, the dominant view expressed by 
scientists at the Board is that water quality is related only to pollution control 
institutions, when, in reality, there are synergies and contestations between policy 
responses in the areas of industrial pollution control, river pollution and drinking water.  
  
147 
The Uttar Pradesh Water Board (in Hindi, Jal Nigam) operates within the district but its 
operations are entirely driven by the state. Through its district division it undertakes 
large scale infrastructure projects to do with water supply and pollution abatement. 
These projects mainly include the installation and maintenance of sewage treatment 
plants (STPs) and water treatment plants (WTPs). These infrastructure projects are 
managed by specialist engineers and chemists who are posted to Ghaziabad from the 
Water Board’s head office in Lucknow on short-term placements, or are sub-contracted 
through agreements between the government and private engineering firms from Delhi.  
The engineers are often neither part of the district official system nor residents of 
Ghaziabad. Their interest in water quality is therefore limited to the technology, and is 
defined solely by reference to proposals for future projects (mainly STPs and WTPs) 
and dissemination of information about the existing technological installations.   
On meeting an engineer, Mr. Surya Joshi, who works in the pollution abatement and 
water supply planning unit of the Water Board, one senses that he is well informed 
about the Water Board’s projects, and is also very keen to share his information. But his 
interests are firmly centred on the technologies. For him, the prospect of tackling poor 
water quality in the region appears promising because of the two main STPs, one in 
Indirapuram and one in Dundahera, which have a total treatment capacity of 130 million 
litres per day111. Anticipating my queries on the efficacy of these measures, he adds that 
under the Yamuna Action Plan (YAP) III, there are proposals for another four STPs to 
be installed in the district by the year 2025, using funds from the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC)112. A critical insight regarding the aforementioned 
discourse is that it grossly undermines the politics of access to water and wastewater 
treatment technologies. As mentioned in section 5.1 none of the residents of the poorer 
localities, particularly the village settlements, appear to benefit from existing 
installations, and this is largely because of the way urban authorities have prioritised 
elite middle class colonies in their existing and future plans for ensuring water quality 
protection.  
It is further evident that western models of sanitary engineering are popularised and 
heavily promoted by Water Board engineers. The ‘utility-based’ technological approach 
                                                
111 Interview with Mr. Surya Joshi, zonal officer of the Water Board (Jal Nigam), Ghaziabad city 15 April 
2010.  
112 Ibid, 15 April 2010. 
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promoted by the Water Board views the supply of quality drinking water and the 
removal of wastewater as part of the same cycle. One of the implications of this logic is 
that the deterioration of water quality from the pollution of the river and groundwater is 
largely perceived as being outside the engineers’ area of influence. As we heard 
repeatedly in a number of interviews with the water authorities, ‘pollution is an area that 
rests with the regional office UPPCB, not the water authorities; we deal with domestic 
water supply and treatment’113, affirming a view of the division of roles that is shared by 
officials in the district. However, in reality, issues of domestic and industrial pollution 
are difficult to separate from concerns around drinking water quality. This is 
demonstrated in section 5.3.2, which describes poorer communities’ own assessments of 
water quality.  
An underlying cause for this mismatch is associated with the way policy priorities for 
the protection of water quality have been institutionalised at higher policy levels. For 
instance, the Board’s DBU classification, explored in section 4.4.1, is typically oriented 
towards protecting ‘organised uses’ of water as a first measure, while placing water 
quality of rivers and water bodies as a second and often lower priority. Thus, although 
water pollution is associated with a single authority, the UPPCB regional office, 
drinking water quality is perceived to be a more serious ‘official’ concern, often better 
monitored by means of various routine checks and safety measures.   
The emphasis on drinking water is reflected in the formal monitoring of the quality of 
water reaching households. Water quality checks are undertaken at the WTP by the 
Water Board before it is supplied to the district. Some tests are done on a daily basis, 
such as pH, turbidity, total hardness, calcium and magnesium. More complicated quality 
tests, including for heavy metals such as iron and arsenic, are done on a weekly basis. 
The water is tested for 13 core parameters derived from international agencies, namely 
the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality (WHO, 2008), and brought into 
legislation nationally by the Bureau of Indian Standards114.  
                                                
113 Interview with Mr. Vivek Ramesh, chief engineer of the Ganga Jal water treatment plant, Ghaziabad, 
16 April 2010. 
114 The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) is the national standards body of India working under the aegis 
of Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution of the Government of India, previously 
known as the Indian Standards Institution. 
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Once the water enters the distribution stage, quality testing is carried out at different 
stages by the Municipal Corporation (in Hindi, Nagar Nigam) including water from 
pipes, drains, water, and sewage pumping stations. The Integrated Disease Surveillance 
Programme (IDSP), a team operating under the district hospital, also carries out 
additional water quality testing. The IDSP keeps a check on the municipal water supply 
and sends health officials to collect water samples from municipal water pipes, as well 
as from the point at which water is received by consumers (i.e. from hand pumps in 
villages and water taps in the residential colonies). An important implication of focusing 
monitoring strategies around potability is that it excludes poorer water users who do not 
fall within the ‘official’ water distribution network and consequently more robust water 
quality monitoring strategies. This is particularly true of village communities that are 
not connected to the formal water supply as described in section 5.3.2.  
The division of formal responsibilities between pollution control authorities and 
drinking water is linked to different styles of expertise. Dr. Shastri is a microbiologist 
from Lucknow who has been posted in Ghaziabad to lead the IDSP programme. In his 
view water quality involves two main types of assessments: ‘detection of coliform 
bacteria’ and the rapid ‘H2S test’, both methods are used to measure faecal 
contamination to prevent water-borne diseases such as dysentery, typhoid fever and 
hepatitis A115. Dr. Shastri is interested in ‘contamination of the piped water supply’ 
caused by the ‘mixing of wastewater with the drinking water’ supplied to the district; 
‘hard contaminants’ (i.e. heavy metals from industries) in the water are not monitored 
by the IDSP116. By contrast, from the perspective of the regional office, UPPCB, the 
emphasis on the formal water quality assessment is rather different. Mrs. Roy, a 
scientific officer at the regional office, UPPCB, stated during an interview that 
monitoring is focused on ‘physico-chemical parameters’117, and that routine checks 
centred mostly on industrial pollution.   
What was inferred from many discussions with officials and from fieldwork 
observations is that those engaged in water quality monitoring do not share their 
assessments between their individual departments. This puts up a considerable barrier in 
the development of integrated responses to water quality. The IDSP reports to the Water 
                                                
115 Interview with Dr. Shastri, coordinator of the IDSP Ghaziabad District Hospital, 21st March 2010. 
116 Ibid, 25th March 2010. 
117 Interview with Mrs. Roy, 30th November 2009. 
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Board, the regional office UPPCB to the UPPCB head office in Lucknow, but there is 
often little communication between those different strands of expertise. Some degree of 
formal stakeholder coordination is envisaged through the district’s environmental 
committee118, but since participation in the committee is strongly biased by the 
inclusion of senior bureaucrats, members have little direct involvement with the 
monitoring process. Representatives include the district magistrate, the chief medical 
officer, the district agricultural officer, the district forest officer and the regional office 
UPPCB director. This is a missed opportunity because, although there are different 
bodies of expertise engaged with the assessment of water quality, the way monitoring 
has become institutionalised prevents flexibility both in the choice of areas for 
monitoring water more closely and also in the way information is used by different 
stakeholders to inform decision makers.   
A number of lessons can be drawn from exploring how water quality protection is 
negotiated amongst actors beyond the regional office of the UPPCB. Firstly, as a 
response to the development that is taking place in the district, the U.P. state authorities 
have initiated a series of programmes (primarily under YAP and GAP) to improve 
sewage and water treatment infrastructure. However, the discourse of engineers and 
officials that work at the sites of sewage and water treatment suggest that decisions are 
highly centralised and are more likely to emanate from Lucknow than from within 
Ghaziabad. This has led to a number of areas of oversight in water quality protection. 
The official system exhibits a preference for securing safe access to water for the elite 
colonies, while neglecting water quality protection for poorer settlements. Furthermore, 
there is little indication that these measures are likely to lead to improved environmental 
protection (e.g. by restoring the ecological sustainability of local water sources, such as 
the river Hindon) since the focus is on ‘end of pipe’ solutions, rather than developing 
strategies for reducing pollution at source. 
Given the fact that colonies such as Vasundhara and Vaishali pay a negligible fee for 
the wastewater treatment and water supply services they receive (see also section 5.1), it 
is likely that demand for water consumption and disposal will only escalate in the 
foreseeable future. These problems are further compounded by the fact that although 
                                                
118 Information received from U.P. Government, Environment Department, 29th April, 1992, under RTI 
Act, 2005.  
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water engineers work for the district, they often live in adjacent areas. Consequently 
they have limited information about how different sources of pollution and risks from 
exposure to pollution are ‘spatially’ distributed in the district. This in turn very much 
limits the extent to which adjustments to technological infrastructure can be made or 
remedial measures put in place so that the benefits of water quality protection can be 
distributed more evenly across the population (i.e. by expanding technological coverage 
beyond the middle class localities).  
Another issue which deserves greater elaboration is that of water quality monitoring. 
Insights from the field highlighted that water quality assessments emerge from different 
agencies of the bureaucracy, beyond the regional office UPPCB. Given the complexity 
of different sources of pollution, and the diversity of settlements found in the district, 
improving the sharing of water quality assessment information between the different 
agencies of the bureaucracy could offer some scope for enriching the knowledge base of 
officials, and serve to highlight areas of oversight in the evaluation of water quality. 
However, bureaucratic politics appear to pose a significant barrier to this end becoming 
realised. For instance, from my discussions with officials of the IDSP I could infer that 
in several instances officials attempted to pass on information to the regional office 
UPPPCB, particularly on issues regarding the contamination of the drinking water 
source (i.e. water from the community tubewell) at villages such as KarKar. Pollution 
control officials tried to ignore this information, or otherwise attempted to pass it on to 
the municipal department. The connections between the regional office UPPCB and the 
industrial and political elite in Lucknow could be one possible reason why this oversight 
was unavoidable.  
Another source of bureaucratic ineffectiveness in the district is the fact that even though 
an environment committee is in place to take up inter-departmental matters, in practice 
it appears to be ‘non-functional’, preventing the IDSP from resorting to a higher official 
authority for environmental protection. Given also that the IDSP is a relatively small 
department of Ghaziabad Hospital, other official departments may have little incentive 
to pay attention to its water quality evaluations. This suggests that apart from the issue 
of divergent sources of ‘official’ knowledge on water quality, within the district there 
are different departments with different degrees of influence, claims to power, and 
channels of accountability. This in turn suggests that complex bureaucratic politics may 
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have an equally important influence over efforts of individual experts to foster greater 
inter-departmental coordination on water quality protection.  
5.2.3. District level officials as ‘frontline functionaries’ 
District level officials play an important role in shaping how water quality priorities are 
negotiated in the district. Unlike the traditional view of policy that assumes that policies 
are executed in a linear fashion by rational agents, interviews with district level officials 
bring to the surface how they employ their individual discretion and agency, operating 
as ‘key frontline functionaries’ (Coelho, 2004:140) influencing how policy visions are 
translated into official practice. In contrast to the Board scientists’ top-down vision, 
whereby water quality is viewed as a subject of mechanical objectivity and science, at 
the district level expert knowledge involves not only science but also social categories, 
labels and stereotypes (ibid), which are perceived to matter just as much as the science 
itself for shaping official practice.  
The first point of separation between the actors operating at the scale of policy making 
(represented by the Board scientists) and the implementation regime in the district is the 
professional training of officials and thus their expertise. Unlike national level policy 
agents such as the Board scientists who are specialised engineers and scientists with 
formal training (often holders of a doctoral degree) in water quality management, 
district level officials are often ‘generalists’. Mr. Vivek Nain has the role of 
‘environmental engineer’ at the regional office UPPCB, but in reality he is trained as a 
civil servant. Like many of the civil servants working in the district, his post is 
temporary, and he has to adapt quickly to different posts within the administration. That 
is why he reflects on his expertise as being a ‘Jack of all trades’119, rather than a water 
quality specialist.   
As described in the context of the Board, even at the district and state levels the causes 
of deteriorating water quality are frequently seen as synonymous with a dominant 
narrative on population growth120. As Mr. Vivek Nain described in an interview, ‘water 
pollution is a result of the unprecedented population growth of the district’121 (linked to 
the district’s immediate proximity to Delhi). Population growth has brought a huge rise 
                                                
119 Interview with Mr. Vivek Nain, assistant engineer of the UPPCB regional office, 18th February 2010.  
120 This argument reflects national regulators views on improving water quality discussed in Chapter 4. 
121 Interview with Mr. Vivek Nain, 18th February 2010. 
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in real estate development, with no plans for the treatment of the domestic wastewater 
coming from new residential areas. This dominant view regarding the district water 
quality problem is frequently reinforced by the modern civil servant’s faith in 
engineering solutions: ‘once new modern STPs are constructed that can match new 
demands, water pollution will be tackled more effectively’122.   
Nevertheless, the shortcomings of technological responses to water quality are much 
more evident at the local level. As was pointed out in a separate interview with an 
engineer from the Water Board, the large amount of land required123, as well as the 
excessive running costs for building new STPs, makes it too expensive for the 
Municipal Corporation and the Water Board to take this option seriously. Furthermore, 
the firm assumption that technology can provide long term solutions to serious pollution 
impacts affecting the district is contested by fieldwork observations that demonstrate 
that large-scale technologies only treat wastewater coming from the middle class 
colonies. As argued by Mr. Neeraj Kumar, one of the Water Board’s engineers, 
proposed plans for STPs in the trans-Hindon area cover Vaishali, Indira Puram, 
Vashambi, and Vasundhara, implying that the villages and informal colonies are not 
within the official boundaries124. The utilisation and control of technology is therefore 
strongly linked to the more systemic propagation of inequality in peri-urban areas.  
Another point of separation between the techno-scientific framing of water quality 
adopted by Board scientists and the official practices of these frontline functionaries is 
that implementation of policies is partly determined by their practical knowledge of the 
district. This is knowledge that is continually refashioned by the officials’ daily 
encounters with ordinary people who are fixed in place with regard to their geography, 
social status, and access to municipal services (Coelho, 2004). Essentially, in the 
officials’ view, the district is divided between those that are better served and reside in 
middle class residential colonies (clearly demarcated in the municipal plan), and those 
that often lack access to basic municipal services and live in the margins, comprising 
mainly of slum dwellers and the residents of the urbanised villages who are excluded 
from the municipal development plan.  
                                                
122 ibid, 18th February 2010. 
123 An additional factor that impedes the feasibility of STPs is the price of land, which has risen sharply 
due to real estate speculation in the district.  
124 Interview with Mr. Neeraj Kumar, water engineer of the Uttar Pradesh Water Board. 
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In the official world, these two contrasting social categories lend themselves to different 
labels and stereotypes. People residing in Ambedkar Nagar, which is a poor slum125 in 
the trans-Hindon area, are described as ‘dirty’ people, and their settlements are 
classified as ‘illegal’126. The way illegality is discursively reproduced in planning 
documents is not unique to peri-urban areas, as commentators in Delhi have argued that 
social inequalities are often reproduced by presenting poorer settlements as illegal 
(Ramanathan, 2006). In peri-urban areas the terms ‘non-conforming use’ and 
‘unauthorised settlement’ are frequently cited to describe Ambedkar Nagar in the 
Ghaziabad Master Plan 2021 (Ghaziabad Development Authority, 2006). Ambedkar 
Nagar is ‘officially’ perceived to provide shelter to low-income groups such as ‘migrant 
labourers’127, and their settlements are viewed as being temporary in the official 
discourse. Villages located in the industrial zones in the trans-Hindon, such as KarKar 
Model in Sahibabad Industrial Sector 4, are considered ‘unhygienic’ and ‘poorly 
maintained’. By contrast, the newly established residential colonies of Vasundhara and 
Indirapuram are often referred to discursively using terms such as ‘clean’, where the 
population is ‘decent’ or ‘posh’, marking that an elite category of citizens resides there 
(and presumably is more deserving in terms of access to services)128.   
The social labelling employed to chart different populations is further put into motion to 
protect officials from being held accountable for pollution impacts on the poorer 
colonies. Mrs. Roy of the regional office UPPCB, reflecting on the routine exposure of 
Ambedkar colony residents to wastewater overflow and stagnation said ‘they have 
become immune to this water’129, suggesting that water quality problems of poorer 
colonies do not figure at all in the daily routines of pollution enforcement officials. The 
exclusion of the poorer colonies from the official boundaries of the municipality also 
manifests itself in the case of drinking water. Miss Riya, a health officer with the IDSP, 
                                                
125 In the official jargon simply referred to as bustee. 
126 Interview with Mr. Anand, chief town planner of the Ghaziabad Development Authority, 16th January 
2010. 
127 The large majority of migrant labourers living in the area work for the industries while some work in   
    Delhi and reside in Ghaziabad because it is regarded more affordable. 
128 Interview with Mr. Anand, 16th January 2010. 
129 Interview with Mrs. Roy, assistant scientific officer of the UPPCB regional office, 18th February 2010. 
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said ‘If I was to drink the same water as they drink in villages, I would certainly fall 
sick!’130.  
In several instances, it is therefore demonstrated that serious impacts affecting 
vulnerable populations become normalised in the discourse. Middle level officials relate 
to their official practice sometimes with humour, employing aphorisms such as 
‘government work is about circulating documents’131. Senior officials, those who are 
responsible for leading local government departments, are often more protective about 
the public image of their organisations. The director of regional office UPPCB, Mr. 
Jadav, referring to the pollution situation in the trans-Hindon, frequently pointed out 
that ‘Ghaziabad’s industries have nothing to do with water pollution. We are monitoring 
everything’132, using this argument to shift attention away from industrial sources of 
pollution.   
Affected communities and district officials therefore perceive exposure to impaired 
water quality very differently. In a separate interview, medical official Dr. Saraf, head 
of the IDSP, stressed that ‘poor colonies like Arthala are mainly exposed to air pollution 
due to the industries but the water is clean’133. However, during interviews with citizens 
of Arthala village, they would oppose this claim, linking the acidic taste of the 
groundwater with the proximity of their colony to industries (see section 5.3.2).  
Moreover, from the perspective of local communities, the fact that pollution concerns of 
poorer colonies are systematically not recognised at senior levels is closely linked to the 
secrecy with which formal organisations operate on the ground, where ‘secrecy 
becomes the norm (in the functioning of local bodies), and ‘access the exception’134.  
The fact that some groups are excluded from the official boundaries is also because the 
poor are frequently viewed as victims of their own marginality. From the official 
perspective, drinking water quality is associated with clear jurisdictional boundaries, 
even if communities residing in the district perceive this differently. Miss Riya from the 
IDSP said ‘we receive a lot of complaints because they think that we are responsible for 
poor quality water, when in fact it is the responsibility of the Municipal Corporation to 
                                                
130 Interview with Miss Riya, IDSP project officer at the Ghaziabad district hospital, 25th March 2010. 
131 ibid, 25th March 2010. 
132 Interview with Mr. Jadav, 12th February, 2010. 
133 Interview with Dr. Saraf, chief medical officer of the Ghaziabad Hospital 24th March, 2010. 
134 Interview with Sushil Raghav, 23rd February 2010. 
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resolve these complaints’135. Another perceived barrier in serving poorer communities is 
the bypassing of district officials in favour of those that are considered to have greater 
political power. For instance, communities frequently prefer to address their complaints 
regarding polluting industries directly to the district magistrate’s office rather than the 
pollution control authority. This is something that is perceived to obstruct the job of 
officials. This view was supported in an interview with Mrs. Roy of the regional office 
UPPCB, who said ‘the poor go to the district magistrate because they think he has all 
the power’136, undermining the authority of pollution inspectors. In another interview 
with Mr. Vivek Nain, he said, ‘if a plan for a new colony would come to us, we would 
not give permission if the sewage system is not adequately placed, but then if they go to 
the district magistrate, he would allow it despite not having a deep understanding of the 
problem’137. It was not possible to interview the district magistrate during the course of 
the fieldwork; it became apparent, though, from interviews with officials that the district 
magistrate indirectly influenced many important decisions.   
The role of the district magistrate exemplifies two problems with regard to the way 
water quality is framed at the policy level. First, that although water quality is 
commonly portrayed by national experts as existing outside the realm of ‘politics’, in 
peri-urban areas, the responsiveness of officials with regard to particular sources of 
pollutants (namely, in the peri-urban case, industrial sources) is largely seen to be 
dependent upon the ‘political’ and ‘administrative power’ of the district magistrate. In 
the second place, another observation drawn from the peri-urban case study, which 
further complicates a narrow technical view of water quality, is the way poorer 
settlements are positioned in the official discourse. Interviews with officials support the 
contention that the main problems in servicing poorer populations more often tend to be 
played out in the political as well as social realm. At present, however, conventional 
interpretations of deteriorating water quality both at the level of agenda setting as well 
as in procedures of implementation appear to miss out entirely this dynamic interplay 
between the technical and the political.   
                                                
135 Interview with Miss Riya, 25th March 2010. 
136 Interview with Mrs. Roy, 30th November 2009. 
137 Interview with Mr. Vivek Nain, 30th November 2009. 
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The fact that water quality risks of the poor are downplayed or ignored by officials is 
further linked to the wider politics of citizens’ representation under the paradigm of 
neoliberal urbanisation, also discussed in section 1.1. As the middle class mostly live in 
formally planned colonies, they have access to services that district officials feel legally 
obliged to provide. This explains, for instance, the discourse of ‘purity’ and 
‘cleanliness’, which from the point of view of officials appears to be almost 
synonymous with a ‘middle-class’ social and residential status. This elite-driven bias 
can be partly explained by the fact that in these colonies the middle class have achieved 
greater political representation, and are in a better position than the poorer social groups 
to mobilise the State so that it takes that ‘extra care’ which is needed for their well-
being and protection from water quality risks. I was told, for instance, by residents in 
Vashundhara that the municipal corporation regularly shared important information 
with residents regarding the timing of sewerage infrastructure maintenance work, 
including annual canal clean up and repairs in the sewerage drainage system. This 
information was made available in advance through notifications carried in the local 
newspapers. In addition, middle class colonies were in a position to liaise directly with 
the municipality through their own Resident Welfare Association (RWA) regarding any 
complaints related to drinking water quality and sewage disposal.  
In the case of the poorer colonies, government agents only responded to specific 
outbreaks of communicable disease such as cholera or typhoid by implementing control 
measures, and only after there had been extensive media reporting of incidents of water 
contamination taking place. In certain poorer colonies, such as Ambedkar Bastee, 
citizens were able to achieve some degree of political representation by mobilising their 
local elected corporation member (Sabha Sad) who helped in putting forward 
community complaints to the district magistrate office. The Sabha Sad could help gain 
some degree of political representation for the poorer citizens, such as through 
negotiating the purchase of a submersible pump, or negotiating access to municipal 
funds for the repair of a pipeline. However, for meeting priorities for water quality 
protection that required long term planning, funding and implementation of effective 
maintenance and monitoring systems the level of political representation attained by 
poorer citizens was much lower, and certainly in comparison to that which middle class 
colonies have acquired. This coalition of the state with middle class interests has been 
discussed also in the context of sanitation and water supply delivery in large urban 
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agglomerations such as Mumbai and Chennai (Coelho, 2004, Chaplin, 2011). However 
from the official discourses presented in Ghaziabad district it can be inferred that 
political representation is an equally important factor in peri-urban contexts as well, 
since it can determine how state officials perceive different social groups and 
furthermore influences key decisions regarding what services and facilities the state 
should be able to provide.  
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5.3. Contradictions between official practice and local realities   
Previous sections demonstrated that policy responses to water quality are perceived by 
district officials to be logically organised between separate departments. However the 
way formal responsibilities are currently divided in the official world tend to disguise 
the underlying politics of why certain populations are favoured in formal decision-
making processes, while it further underplays a range of policy and regulatory decisions 
that may be unproductive for ensuring water quality protection. The more apparent ones 
include for instance the deterioration of the local river Hindon. The emphasis of the 
following sections is to draw lessons from those water quality problems that tend to be 
less obvious to officials and policy makers. Furthermore, interviews with peri-urban 
villagers draw attention to a citizen-driven discourse which, even though it is at its core 
‘non-technical’, is valuable because it addresses the politics of water quality in more 
detail and draws attention to problems that tend to be overlooked by officials.  
5.3.1. The informal depletion of the groundwater 
Water quality in the district is often subjected to different expert assessments. The 
‘official’ separation however between institutions that deal with water pollution (the 
pollution control authorities) and drinking water (the Water Board, municipality and 
public health authorities) creates areas of oversight in formal planning and policy. One 
good example is the declining quality of the groundwater in the trans-Hindon. 
Groundwater being used by villages that do not have access to municipal water supply 
for drinking and domestic use is a widespread phenomenon. Alarmingly, industries 
located in the same area are frequently reported discharging their wastes illegally into 
the underground aquifer and extracting high volumes of water for manufacturing 
purposes.  
The officials interviewed for this study recognised the deteriorating status of the 
groundwater in the trans-Hindon area, but were reluctant to report this concern within 
their professional authority. In principle the Central Groundwater Board (CGWB) and 
the UPPCB share responsibilities and powers for monitoring groundwater pollution 
according to the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. In reality, however, the allocation 
of responsibilities between the two authorities is fraught with contradictions. For the 
regional office UPPCB director, Mr. Jadav, the power of his office ends at the matter of 
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‘industrial’ discharge138. Once water pollution enters the groundwater, the regional 
office is absolved of any regulatory responsibility. Groundwater pollution and 
extraction, he further explains, rest with the CGWB139. The CGWB perceives its powers 
very differently. Historically, as Mr. Sen, the senior engineer of the CGWB, explained 
in an interview, the main focus is monitoring the ‘quantity’ of groundwater extracted as 
opposed to its ‘quality’140. This is supported by the written responses of the CGWB that 
state that, regarding the pollution of the groundwater in Ghaziabad, the CGWB ‘has not 
shared any responsibility’ with the pollution control Boards141. This is surprising 
because the CGWB has classified the region as a ‘critical’ area where the groundwater 
is considered overexploited and therefore extraction of groundwater for industrial uses 
is prohibited142.   
Primarily as a result of the wider political economy driving change in peri-urban 
Ghaziabad, the problem of groundwater depletion curiously enjoys both a level of 
recognition and a certain degree of obscurity. State officials, scientists and citizens 
converge in their assessment that groundwater levels have consistently been falling. 
However this has not precluded the even greater efforts of citizens and the state alike to 
bore deeper wells in order to obtain fresh supplies of water. This is true of villages, 
affluent communities, businesses involved in the water trade and industries involved in 
the large-scale extraction of groundwater for industrial purposes. More importantly, as a 
result of the unprecedented growth in the district in terms of both commercial and 
residential uses, new pressures are being placed on an already constrained water source. 
Given that for many of the recently established middle-class colonies water is being 
sourced directly from the upper part of the river Ganga (see also section 5.1), in reality 
this is a problem that is affecting more severely the poorer communities that are not 
connected to the official water supply grid. 
                                                
138 Interview with Mr. Jadav, director of the UPPCB regional office, Ghaziabad, 12 February 2010. 
139 Interview with Mr. Jadav, 12 February 2010. 
140 Interview with Mr. Sen, senior engineer of the CGWB. 
141 Information received from the Central Groundwater Board, 20th September, 2010, under the RTI Act. 
142 ibid, 22th September, 2010, under the RTI Act. 
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According to residents of KarKar Model village the problem started when the 
residential apartments and housing complexes started to grow in number but there was 
no matching expansion of water supplies by the municipal authority, the GNN, either in 
terms of treatment or provision capacity143. This has led to the rise of privately operated 
water plants for making bottled water. Those running these private plants see 
themselves as fulfilling an existing demand and at a rate that is much lower than the 
more famous brands of bottled water in the industry. Village residents therefore often 
buy bottled water in order to cover basic water needs. However, it is evident that the 
safety of bottled water cannot always be guaranteed, especially given the competing 
pressures on groundwater from industrial and other uses.   
The case of groundwater deterioration is therefore to some extent distinct from other 
water quality concerns facing citizens in the area. Unlike the case of the river Hindon, 
where formal boundaries of responsibility are more clearly assigned (even if that makes 
little difference to the environmental conditions of the river), in the case of 
groundwater, formal boundaries are extremely blurred. Those in charge of water supply, 
such as the Uttar Pradesh Water Board, take water a certain distance, after which the 
municipal corporation takes over. However the municipal corporation sees its role as 
limited to ensuring the quality of water when it leaves the WTPs. The regional office 
UPPCB may have a role in groundwater protection, but as mentioned previously, 
whether responsibility is assigned to the CGWB or the pollution control authority still 
remains obscure, despite the fact that the deterioration of the groundwater has been 
ongoing for several years. Given that a significant proportion of the poorest peri-urban 
citizens are reliant on (increasingly polluted) groundwater, the inability of the 
bureaucracy to effectively manage this resource has become associated with a series of 
adverse environmental and human health consequences.  
5.3.2. Citizen knowledge on water quality 
The fact that groundwater quality remains an unaddressed concern is a starting point for 
peri-urban villagers to develop their own views of the causes and implications of 
worsening levels of water quality in the district. Unlike district officials and scientists 
who perceive water quality only in scientific terms, for citizens, water quality is a 
                                                
143 Interview with KarKar Model village resident, Sahibabad Industrial Area,12 March 2010. 
  
162 
concern deeply ingrained in their everyday lives. In many of the poorer settlements of 
the trans-Hindon, poor quality water is something that people have lived with for many 
years and its adverse impacts are felt in diverse ways. The ‘invisibility’ of poorer village 
settlements to the municipal water supply grid means that water tends to be accessed 
informally and from various sources (e.g. use of private tubewells is a dominant water 
access strategy in the villages visited); but the fact that these water access strategies take 
place in the absence of water safety measures means that the quality of these sources 
cannot be guaranteed.  
Greater emphasis on citizen evaluations of water quality has an important place in 
moving beyond formalised risk assessment procedures that focus on narrow 
assessments of risk, towards assessments that recognise experiential sources of 
knowledge and their possible long term value in developing water quality protection 
policies (see also previous section 2.5 on responding to risk). Citizen accounts of water 
quality can also prove valuable for reconceptualising formal boundaries to deal with 
water quality (i.e. the boundary between drinking water quality and water pollution), 
and for adopting a different notion of scale that may possibly draw on both local sources 
(groundwater quality) and regional sources (river quality), and linking these to local 
practices.  
Ambedkar Nagar, a slum settlement in the trans-Hindon, is an ideal case study of some 
of the long-term adverse consequences of ignoring the pollution of water sources near at 
hand, while relying on obtaining water from ever more distant sources. This informal 
residential locality is situated behind the Anand Industrial Area, and on the front side of 
the colony are situated the affluent colonies of Vasundhara and Vaishali144. The 
population of Ambedkar Nagar consists mostly of informal labourers, industrial workers 
and other citizens in subsistence occupations including artisans, craftsmen and street 
hawkers. This settlement had grown up in the mid-1970s when the Anand Industrial 
area began to take shape. Over time however industrial activities have increased within 
the estate, and alternative options for accessing clean water from nearby sources have 
diminished due to competition for water with the new residential complexes that have 
mushroomed in close proximity. Consequently, Ambedkar Nagar’s residents have no 
                                                
144 The map of the trans-Hindon, in Figure 6, shows the relative proximity of Ambedkar Nagar to the 
middle class colonies. 
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other option than to resort to the use of groundwater; the fact that the groundwater in 
this locality is normally of inferior quality has created immense difficulties for the 
residents and as a result problems of deteriorating water quality come across quite 
forcefully in the citizen discourse.   
Water quality in this locality is judged more frequently on the basis of citizens’ own 
criteria, such as aesthetic considerations, colour and appearance, and far less on the 
basis of formally prescribed physico-chemical parameters. Interviews with residents of 
Ambedkar Nagar, which is a slum settlement, start with reference to its taste and colour 
and are overwhelmingly negative. In the popular discourse, water drawn from the 
groundwater becomes ‘yellow’ when left to stand for a few minutes, and its taste is 
‘acidic’. Because of this, the fact that water is not fit for human use is widely agreed and 
often caricatured using popular turns of phrase; ‘For us water is a problem, even the 
utensils and jewellery are of no use to us!’145 (referring to the damage caused to utensils 
from contaminants in the water). More senior community members that are familiar 
with the land transformations of the trans-Hindon region often talk about water quality 
in relative terms. In an interview from the same colony one member said ‘before recent 
years, clean water was received from 30ft below, when at present submersibles need to 
be bored as deep as 120ft!’146. Reference to past memories illustrates the overwhelming 
impact industry has left on people’s lives, quoting ‘the river water was clean and 
potable. It was also used to cook food for marriage ceremonies, but during the last 20 
years, the water quality has greatly deteriorated due to the polluting industries’147. The 
river Hindon was previously a source of fresh water linked to the agrarian fertility of the 
wider region, but is now widely referred to by the majority of social groups residing in 
the area as a ‘sewer’ for the urban towns, carrying an excessive load of industrial 
pollutants and pesticides released from the agricultural run-off of farms.  
Shifting attention from a slum settlement such as that of Ambedkar Nagar to some of 
the village settlements located in the trans-Hindon suggests that the assessments of 
water quality are ultimately tied to how water is used for different purposes. In KarKar 
Model village, which is situated within the Sahibabad Industrial Area (see map of trans-
Hindon, Figure 6), drinking water, among those who have the means to access a better 
                                                
145 Interview with older woman in Ambedkar Nagar, 15 March, 2010. 
146 Interview with old man in Ambedkar Nagar, 15 March 2010. 
147 Interview with old man in Ambedkar Nagar, 16 March 2010. 
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quality of it, is always used separately from groundwater, which is deemed ‘acceptable’ 
only for bathing and washing utensils and clothes. Groundwater is used for irrigation 
too and the use of pumps is reportedly very high. However, as one village farmer 
declared, ‘the government does not recognise this as an agricultural zone any more, and 
therefore there are no official supplies of water for irrigation’148. Similarly, because the 
municipal grid does not reach village households, clean drinking water can only be 
purchased from private water suppliers. Figure 8 illustrates some of the different options 
available to village households for accessing water.  
Given the relative ineffectiveness of district authorities in securing water access for the 
village settlements, the above division of uses that village residents have developed over 
time has to some extent helped them meet some of their basic water needs. However, it 
is evident from the citizen discourse that this largely informal system of water access 
has also introduced different sources of risk from impaired water quality. Residents 
from KarKar Model village, particularly women who are more regularly involved in 
household activities, complained that the direct use of groundwater for cleaning, 
cooking and other household activities has caused widespread problems for the 
residents, especially ailments like skin rashes, and hair falling out, stiffening and 
browning. Because there are no official supplies for irrigation, farmers have to resort to 
the use of water from the Hindon river. Given that the Hindon is highly polluted, the 
largely informal system of irrigation presents a number of water quality risks both to 
farmers and consumers of food crops due to the presence of toxins in the irrigation 
water (see also section 5.3.3). Bottled water, although perceived as a ‘necessity’ for 
those village citizens that can afford to buy it, also entails water quality risks because 
even though it is treated, it is obtained by private vendors from the same groundwater 
source that village residents have grown accustomed to using for their domestic needs. 
As with other instances of water quality knowledge, in the case of bottled water quality, 
sensation counts and the altered taste of water after it has been treated stands as a 
guarantee of superior quality. However, villagers are at the same time acutely aware that 
there is a difference between that water, which appears ‘visibly’ clean and ‘good’ to 
taste, and water which is effectively cleansed of its pollutants. 
                                                
148 Interview with farmer and resident of KarKar Model village, 7 March 2010 
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This brings the discussion to an important point of distinction between the ‘citizen’ 
driven assessments of water quality and the professionalised assessments emanating 
from the municipal authorities and pollution control officials. In citizens assessments 
the planning and policy driven distinction between the categories of ‘drinking water’ 
and ‘water pollution’ become blurred, water pollution and drinking water being part of 
the same discourse. In the surveyed localities of KarKar Model, Arthala and Maharajpur 
people told us in large numbers that despite their long-pending request and 
representations at various levels, the government has never provided their localities with 
any kind of underground sewage disposal system. In the localities surveyed, there is an 
open drainage system carrying waste, both liquid as well as solid. However, this 
network of small drains does not connect to any larger systematic network of waste 
disposal (as is the case of the middle class colonies), but instead empties into large 
cesspools of accumulated filth and dirt ‘behind’ or ‘inside’ the village boundaries. 
Consequently, when asked about water quality, people would respond in sweeping 
terms, and would say, ‘Our village is surrounded by this water (implying wastewater); 
the village is a sick community since the water has turned poisonous’149 to highlight that 
water and waste have become inseparable in the way water quality is perceived. 
                                                
149 Interview with Arthala village resident, 9 March 2010 
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                     Figure 8: Modes of accessing water in the trans-Hindon 
In Maharajpur village, deteriorating water quality is seen as part of a much more general 
exclusion from civic amenities: ‘We are bound to live in filth and bad odour while our 
water is poisonous; in Vasundhara, the rich have clean houses and get treated water 
from the Ganga’. By contrast, the dominant presence of unregulated industrial 
wastewater is often a more serious concern. In Arthala village, situated close to Arthala 
Industrial Area (a more recent industrial estate under the control of the UPSIDC), 
industrial wastewater flooded the catchment area, leaving the groundwater completely 
exposed to toxic chemicals that have entered the shallow underground aquifer 
contaminating the village’s only water source. As an outsider, I was frequently 
summoned to observe the yellow colour of the water coming from the hand pumps or 
invited for a walk around settlements to take a look at the large cesspools of excess 
wastewater. Ironically, some of the cesspits have been ‘developed’ by the municipal 
corporation and the Ghaziabad development authority, to build ‘lakes’ for recreation. 
Hence, a rather paradoxical situation has emerged where ‘picnic spots’ and ‘boat ride’ 
activities are available in the same areas that wastewater is being disposed of. 
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From the point of view of the citizens, the dominant presence of industries in their 
locality is yet another source of ‘proof’ that the drinking water source is polluted. This 
has led to a feeling of mistrust towards expert-technical judgments on the relative scale 
of pollution that is taking place in the district. Importantly, it has led to the belief that 
even though a formal mechanism for pollution control is in place, in reality this has 
made little difference to the communities. This was eloquently described in an interview 
with a human rights advocate: ‘The same bureaucrats and engineers whom we suspect 
of giving sanction to the industries that pollute our water are in the so-called “expert 
committees”. It is like giving the key to the thief’150. According to some residents, the 
fact that pollution is judged solely on the basis of standards serves as a political strategy 
for absolving regulatory authorities from any form of accountability. Sushil Raghav’s 
impression, working as an environment and human rights activist, is that ‘water quality 
doesn’t necessarily need a scientist to understand it; you don’t need the [pollution] 
Board to tell you the water is polluted’151. This citizen-led ‘framing’ of the regulatory 
mechanism reflects a broader citizen frustration with the dominance of standard based 
evaluations of pollution, and also confirms some of the problems with standard based 
evaluations that this study has explored in the context of the Board (see also section 
4.4.2).  
Citizen-led narratives on the failure of pollution control quickly move into discussions 
of the impact of water quality on people’s health. Impact is inferred from general rashes 
on the skin, stomach disorders and skin lesions. On other occasions poor quality water 
is associated with more serious diseases such as respiratory and reproductive disorders, 
cancer, and even death. However, because of the invisibility of the relatively poorer 
residential colonies to official view (particularly the villages and slum settlements that 
are within industrial colonies), health effects are rarely validated through formal water 
quality assessments and are almost entirely based on people’s experiences. In some 
cases, the impact of water quality on health is inferred from the death of animals such as 
cows and buffalo forced to drink the polluted river water. For some village residents it is 
a much more personal matter. For example, people frequently mentioned that 
deteriorating water quality had caused the loss of a family member from a severe 
                                                
150 Interview with Mr. Venkataraman, senior advocate, Indirapuram, Ghaziabad, 14March 2010. 
151 Interview with Sushil Ragav, environment and human rights activist, 19 March, 2010. 
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illness. On several other occasions, deteriorating water quality was linked to large 
financial expenditure incurred by families for medicines and hospital treatment to treat 
water-related illnesses.  
5.3.3. Impact of industrial pollutants on water quality  
The adverse impact of industry in the trans-Hindon is central to communities’ 
assessments of water quality. In particular, interviews with villagers and slum dwellers 
suggest water quality is deteriorating for several reasons, industrial pollution being one 
of the more important ones. However, during interviews with government officials and 
pollution enforcement officials, this concern is usually played down. For instance, it is 
more common for the regional office UPPCB to associate impaired water quality with 
domestic sources of pollution (e.g. as a result of shortages in STP capacity) or distant 
sources of pollution entering the district (e.g. untreated sewage transferred from cities 
upstream), where regulatory accountability is weaker. Novel science and technology 
methods introduced in the sector are intended to lead the non-expert to believe that 
complete regulatory control of industrial sources of pollution will lead to zero discharge 
of toxic wastes. These solutions are also expressed at the national level, by the Board. 
The Board assumes the norm is for industrial pollution to be tackled effectively by 
pollution enforcement officials, a regulatory practice perceived to rest entirely with the 
State Boards and the regional offices immediately below them.  
At one level, empirical insights from peri-urban areas contradict the official rhetoric 
about the scale of pollution problems in local contexts. In Sahibabad industrial area 
alone, the largest industrial estate in the district, there are 304 industrial units presently 
registered with the regional office152. But a large number of units are frequently reported 
to operate without the necessary environmental clearance (termed No Objection 
Certificate153), discharging effluents with minimal or no treatment directly into the 
drains and the river. The regional office UPPCB recognises only 15 units operating 
                                                
152 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, Ghaziabad, under the RTI 
Act, 2005. 
153 The regional office monitors which industries are conforming to the pollution control norms by means 
of issuing a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC). This is a written consent provided by the regulatory 
authority to the industry and proves compliance with environmental norms. The NOC’s need to be 
reviewed by the regional office on an annual basis to check that industries are continuing to maintain their 
pollution levels below permissible limits. Industries that are running illegally or do not hold a NOC are 
assumed not to be complying with environmental norms.  
153 Interview with Mr. Jadav, director of the UPPCB regional office, 20 March, 2010.  
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without environmental clearance, although the real number operating without consent is 
understood to be much higher: closer to 140154. Some villagers claim that the real 
numbers are underestimated because pollution control officials can be easily bribed. A 
resident of Maharajpur village, for instance, found it suspicious that ‘all officials 
working for the regional office UPPCB have a car’, attributing the fact that pollution 
control officials are relatively better off to ‘honour gifts’ received from the business 
owners155. Moreover, the UPSIDC (the official body in charge of industrial areas) is 
considered to blame for ‘knowingly’ extending permission of operation to the worst 
polluting industrial units found in the district. (This is an argument that pollution 
inspectors would also frequently mention in their defence).  
                                                
154 Information provided by the regional office, U.P. Pollution Control Board, Ghaziabad, under the RTI 
Act, 2005. 
155 Interview with resident of Maharajpur village, Sahibabad Industrial Area, 22 March 2010. 
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                  Karkar Model village                               Maharajpur village primary school 
Figure 9: Urbanised villages within industrial zones 
Villagers are perhaps the segment of the population most frustrated with the lack of 
enforcement of regulations. Many of these factories are operating both adjacent to, but 
also increasingly inside, the villages, see Figure 9. The latter include particularly dye 
and dyeing factories, electroplating and chemical factories that have been pushed out of 
Delhi as part of a larger initiative by Delhi’s urban authorities to remove polluting 
industries from the capital (linked to the beautification of the capital). As a 
consequence, even though the pollution enforcement structures in Delhi and Ghaziabad 
(in terms of laws, prosecution procedures and so on) are similar, the implementation of 
rules and guidelines is, in practice, much more lax in comparison with Delhi. Partly 
because these operate on a temporary tenure, owners are not motivated to take long term 
pollution mitigation measures (see Figure 10). The lack of a robust mechanism for 
implementing regulatory norms in turn encourages a system whereby polluting 
industrial units can operate informally and with little adherence to environmental norms. 
It is also less understood that dye and dyeing factories, although smaller in scale than 
the sugar and paper mills, can be equally or sometimes even more harmful. They are 
extremely water-intensive in terms of their production processes and their effluents 
contain toxic chemical residues that can be harmful even in very low concentrations. 
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       Untreated wastewater entering drains                          Extraction of groundwater  
Figure 10: Polluting activities of industries, Sahibabad industrial area 
Water harvesting is sometimes discussed as an alternative policy measure that could be 
used by these industries to reduce the depletion of the groundwater and reduce water 
usage. However the risk of pollutants finding their way into water collected using water 
harvesting techniques is considered simply too high for regional office UPPCB officials 
to trust industries156 to use these techniques. As explained in a meeting with officials, 
‘there was a case 17-18 years back when a 1 mm drop of a red colour chemical seeped 
in the ground water. The chemical was potent enough to turn a large volume of the 
ground water into a red colour; if industry owners are not aware enough of these risks, 
how could we possibly trust them with these techniques?’157. Because of the difficulties 
in introducing pollution abatement measures to some of the industries posing the 
greatest threats to water quality, pollution inspectors prefer to remove them entirely 
from their routine monitoring practices, on the basis that, ultimately, such industries can 
never conform to environmental standards.  
What is therefore shared across the board (citizens and officials) is the perception that 
industry has much to lose from strengthening its pollution abatement measures. Owners 
of small industrial enterprises feel that they have been ‘forcibly’ relocated from Delhi, 
so in their view responsibility for environmental protection rests primarily with the 
state, partly because of its failure to provide them with an alternative site to continue 
their operations. Some of the arguments that industry owners elaborated upon during 
                                                
156 Officials would refer primarily to the dye and dyeing industry when discussing pollution risks 
associated with the use of water harvesting techniques. 
157 Discussion minutes from the STEPS peri-urban project meeting with Ghaziabad government officials. 
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informal interviews included, for instance, the failure of the state to provide any form of 
underground waste disposal system, and the lack of monetary incentives to industry for 
the use of ‘eco-friendly’ waste management techniques. Another argument mobilised by 
industry was regarding the miserable electricity situation of the region, as a 
consequence of which the factory owners felt unable to use technologies like ETPs in an 
efficient manner.   
As a result, an extremely high pollution load on the water resources largely passes 
unnoticed by officials. It is common knowledge amongst villagers for instance that a 
large number of dye and dyeing factories pump polluted water directly into the ground 
via pipes, a practice used to conceal from pollution control authorities the true scale of 
waste produced from industrial processes. The main contaminants identified within the 
effluents of these industries include high levels of organic pollutants as well as high 
concentrations of heavy metals (i.e. from dye and dyeing industries). Quite often the 
levels of these contaminants in the river and groundwater are way beyond the 
permissible limits designated by the Board, as well as those designated by international 
organisations such as the WHO. For example, the level the heavy metal chromium in 
the Hindon river is 12 mg/l, 123 times higher than the Board’s permissible limit of 0.05 
mg/l (Lewis, 2007: 16).  
Similarly high values are observed for metals found in the groundwater used for 
drinking purposes in poorer colonies in the trans-Hindon. In Arthala colony, lead is 
found in the groundwater in concentrations more than three times the permissible limits 
of the WHO (ibid). High levels of heavy metals are known to be highly persistent in the 
water column and not easily broken down or destroyed. They are extremely toxic to 
aquatic organisms as well as to humans, where long-term ingestion of water polluted 
with heavy metals can be devastating, leading to the development of a number of 
cancers, neurological disorders, and even death. Such health impacts are picked out by 
community respondents, environmental activists and the local media but rarely enter the 
official discourse. For instance, there are regular news clippings reporting the death of 
animals such as cows or goats that have consumed chemically -polluted water, but also 
stories reporting incidents where people’s health has been adversely affected by 
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impaired water quality158. Despite several incidents being reported in the district, there 
are very few comprehensive studies evaluating the presence and extent of toxic 
pollutants in the surface and groundwater sources in the trans-Hindon, apart from a 
select few studies conducted by community-based organisations and locally-based 
environment NGOs (such as Janhit Foundation, based in Meerut district, Uttar Pradesh). 
Despite the opportunities presented for the use of this information in regulatory 
decision-making, environmental NGOs tend to operate antagonistically with regulators 
(this has also been explained in section 4.5.4). 
                                                
158 Source: selected media clippings on pollution in Ghaziabad district that have been translated from 
Hindi to English.   
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         Wastewater irrigation, Karhera Village                Vegetable market, Sahibabad area 
Figure 11: Water quality and the food system 
In the trans-Hindon, the unregulated discharge of industrial wastes is also seen to pose 
significant risks to the food system. Not all villages have abandoned agricultural 
practices, but the scarcity of freshwater has led many farmers towards the irrigation of 
food crops such as cereals and vegetables with wastewater. Karhera is one of the oldest 
villages in the trans-Hindon, where agriculture still remains an important source of 
livelihood, but where farmers have become increasingly dependent on wastewater to 
irrigate their crops. Water from the Hindon, mainly consisting of domestic and 
industrial wastewater, is distributed to individual fields on a rotational basis. For the 
farmers, the use of wastewater is recognised as an opportunity to grow more crops faster 
since the high concentration of organic content in the wastewater is thought to act in a 
similar manner to chemically produced fertilisers. It is also more cost effective because 
it reduces farmers’ dependency on chemical fertilisers159, see also Figure 11.  
However, it presents a number of risks to farmers and consumers of food crops since 
toxic factory wastes found in the wastewater bio-accumulate in the soil and crops160. 
This indirect health impact and livelihood dimension linked to water quality in the 
district is something officials are rarely interested in taking seriously. For pollution 
control authorities, both at the district and national level, wastewater re-use for 
agriculture is perceived more in terms of an ‘environmental hazard’ than as a source of 
livelihood and opportunity to promote environmental sustainability in the trans-Hindon. 
                                                
159 From the point of view of environmental sustainability, previous studies have demonstrated the 
benefits of safeguarding (i.e. through policy and institutional arrangements) the informal use of 
wastewater for agriculture, see also (Scott, 2004). 
160 Studies have shown that levels of heavy metals such as Cadmium much beyond WHO and CPCB 
permissible limits in food crops irrigated with wastewater (cf. Marshall, F. et.al, 2005).  
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Therefore it continues to be treated largely as ‘informal’ and lacks the types of 
monitoring provisions that are already in place for rivers, streams and the groundwater. 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an in depth account of the ways in which water quality 
interventions are negotiated at the receiving end of formal policy. The trans-Hindon 
region in particular highlights the types of challenges associated with policy 
implementation in urban/rural contexts in times of rapid social, land and environmental 
transition. Unlike Board scientists who assume that water quality mandates are part of 
the ‘unbroken’ communication of policy objectives from the national through to the 
state and district level, water quality in the trans-Hindon is subject to different official 
practices and competing priorities for science and technology, monitoring and 
regulation.   
Despite various arrangements to ensure the protection of water quality (both planned 
and already implemented), the official system fails to take an integrated view that 
balances a sustainability and livelihood agenda. From one side the urban authority and 
water department narrowly focus on a ‘piped water’ supply that caters mainly for the 
more affluent middle-class colonies (a focus officially endorsed through the installation 
of expensive WTPs and STPs), while on the other side, pollution control authorities 
focus firmly on industrial concerns (i.e. monitoring compliance of industries with 
environment norms). As a result, ‘unorganised uses’ of water may fail to enter the 
official domain, contributing to the depletion of the groundwater, the transformation of 
the river Hindon into a sewer, and the prolonged exposure of local populations to toxic 
pollutants that are harmful for human health.  
This chapter has also brought to the foreground the contradictions between expert-led 
framing (and policy expectations) around the enforcement of water quality (namely 
those produced by pollution control authorities) and how water quality problems are 
experienced in peri-urban contexts. The dominant expert discourse on the causes of 
deteriorating water quality revolves around population growth and domestic sources, 
but in the discourse of villagers and slum dwellers it is a much more deeply rooted 
concern. The risks posed by industrial water pollution also exposed some of the 
difficulties put forward by pollution control authorities, which have inadequate 
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enforcement capacity and little executive power to close down the more blatantly 
polluting industries. Drawing upon the case study findings, the next chapter will discuss 
the mismatch between policy formulation and policy practice in more detail.  
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Chapter 6 Towards an integrated view of water quality 
management: a synthesis the two case studies 
One of the arguments made earlier on in this thesis was that, in general, formal policy 
interventions to address water quality have failed to keep up with emerging complex 
challenges relating to the management of water quality in peri-urban areas. These 
failures are indeed evident from previous research on peri-urban environments, as well 
as from observations that have been brought together in this study, of the expert 
knowledge of scientists working inside government and of the implementation of 
policies in peri-urban areas. The main purpose of the following discussion is to 
elaborate on some of the underlying causes of this discord in the light of the thesis’ 
findings.   
The research emphasis on the Board in Chapter 4 explored in depth the role of expert 
advisors working from the point of view of environmental regulation. Specifically, the 
case of the Board demonstrated that a narrow emphasis on the ‘technical’ dimensions of 
water quality can be limiting in terms of integrating the complexities of impaired water 
quality in peri-urban situations. There is, for instance, little understanding of important 
pollutants or the way water quality risks are distributed unevenly, and particularly how 
they affect poorer citizens more adversely. The inability of the Board to take up a more 
integrated view of water quality is partly linked to the tensions involved in the framing 
of the Board’s own policy advisory and regulatory roles. Section 6.1 of this chapter 
explores these tensions and further argues that because these are, on the whole, ignored 
by the policy and scientific community working for the Board and State Boards, it is 
difficult for policy agenda-setting procedures to take into account the emerging water 
quality challenges which are presented in peri-urban areas.  
The thesis has also attempted to challenge the assumption that policy implementation is 
essentially ‘top-down’ and ‘linear’, by providing a more complicated picture of the 
relationship between the Board and various implementing agencies operating in peri-
urban areas. The insights of this study contest conventional policy wisdom, which 
asserts that water quality management can be carried out effectively by implementing 
sector driven responses alone. At the local level, policy responses to water quality are 
tied to a host of institutions, but because areas where responsibilities could be shared 
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remain unclear, spaces of ‘regulatory oversight’ are created in the implementation of 
formal plans and programmes. The lessons learned from taking a closer look at 
procedures of implementation are explored in some detail in Section 6.2.  
Drawing from a discussion of the problems and opportunities inherent in policy 
processes linked to water quality, section 6.3 contributes to a larger debate which is 
ongoing in India about the more recent measures proposed to improve environmental 
regulatory institutions. It argues that although ‘administrative’ reform can have a 
positive impact on regulatory performance in India, existing debates need to recognise 
the underlying causes of regulatory failure in relation to the functioning of expert 
advisory systems, as well as the value of incorporating ‘non-technical’ actors in the 
appraisal of different policy options.   
Building on the various themes, section 6.4 concludes by outlining a series of features 
for an alternative approach to policy engagement with emerging water quality 
challenges. Attention is paid to the interaction between policy framing and procedures 
of implementation and suggests ways in which this could be strengthened to support 
more sustainable water quality management practices that can better target poorer social 
groups. The discussion concludes by returning to the conceptual framework in section 
6.5, and elaborating on how this thesis has contributed to fostering a better dialogue 
between science studies and policy studies on the basis of the insights obtained from the 
two case studies.  
6.1. The functioning of expert advisory groups 
Turning first to the experts themselves, the interest of this study has been to clarify the 
precise cognitive and discursive mechanisms expert advisors draw upon to set water 
quality priorities. In particular, the research has focused on two areas of conflict in the 
Board’s routine engagement with water quality where these mechanisms play a crucial 
role. The first relates to the way Board members contribute to the ‘framing’ of the 
Board’s regulatory and policy advisory roles and the wider implications of this framing 
exercise (in section 6.1.1). The second relates to how the use of ‘technical’ arguments is 
implicated in the Board’s efforts to present a certain type of knowledge that appears to 
be ‘robust’ and ‘objective’ but at the same time critically understates uncertainties 
surrounding a range of water quality problems (in section 6.1.2).   
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6.1.1. Framing assumptions influencing policy and regulatory practice 
Examining the issue of framing first, the Board’s regulatory and policy advisory roles 
are exemplified by two types of interrelated processes, the assessment of water quality 
that is linked to the Board’s water quality monitoring programme and the management 
of water quality directly through the powers of regulatory action conferred to the Board 
by the Water Act. The ‘official’ mandate for the assessment and management streams is 
well documented and widely disseminated through the organisation’s website and 
various policy reports. However, Chapter 4 provided insights into how scientists 
working from inside the organisation engaged with these different sets of activities. 
More importantly it followed the use of linguistic terms such as ‘monitoring’ and 
‘regulation’ to demonstrate that these function as ‘boundary defining’ terms (Jasanoff, 
1987) that tie the work of the Board with specific priorities and consolidate a particular 
allocation of power between the scientists, policy making and implementation bodies, 
and civil society groups.  
In the case of monitoring, interviews with Board members confirmed that monitoring 
practices were often tied to the assessment of water quality at the river basin scale. This 
was presented as limiting significantly how complex water quality concerns indicative 
of peri-urban areas are able to feed into policy-making. Part of the reason for this 
mismatch was attributed to the scale the Board’s national water quality monitoring 
programme was designed to address. Monitoring reports, for instance, made references 
to trends operating at the scale of the ‘state’ or the ‘union territory’ but engaged very 
little with identifying interactions across these scales. Official reports typically included 
‘approximate’ estimates of domestic wastewater discharge in each of the cities a river 
passes through, but excluded more detailed accounts of different sources of pollution 
and direct effects on local contexts and specific regions. A distinguishing feature of the 
peri-urban realm is that impaired water quality has ‘local effects’, but also involves risks 
that are ‘transferable’ through movement of pollution, contamination of foodstuffs that 
are later sold in markets, and the interdependencies between local water contamination 
and regional water resources.  
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The framing of the monitoring strategy was further seen to influence in important ways 
how Board scientists created ‘boundaries’161 between their own assessment procedures 
and those pursued by other policy stakeholders. One area where the creation of 
boundaries played an important role was in separating the water quality assessments of 
Board scientists from alternative assessments emerging from civil society and 
environmental NGOs. This boundary separation rested on the assumption that regulators 
are perceived as those having the technical skills and specialised knowledge to 
‘evaluate’ water quality, while civil society groups were envisaged as promoters of 
‘awareness’ and citizen engagement. As a result, there were few entry points for civil 
society to gain any influence over the Board’s water quality evaluation process. In peri-
urban Ghaziabad, for instance, Janhit Foundation (a local environmental NGO) was 
instrumental in exposing the contamination of drinking water sources by heavy metals 
reaching the groundwater from industrial wastes. It was unlikely, however, that this 
information would be fed into the Board’s decision-making procedures (see also 5.3.3).  
Another boundary that emerged from the Board’s framing of the monitoring strategy 
was in separating the ‘biophysical’ from the ‘human health’ effects of impaired water 
quality. Two problems emerged from this separation. The first was that there were few 
criteria (i.e. apart from total coliform which indicates faecal contamination of water) to 
measure ‘direct effects’ of water pollution on human health as opposed to the 
measurement of biophysical criteria that are a measurement of environmental pollution 
(such as BOD, pH and temperature). This limited from the outset the extent to which 
links between water quality and people’s health can be drawn upon to influence policy 
decisions. For instance, in the peri-urban case study impaired water quality had serious 
implications for poorer citizens’ health but often appeared to be left outside the official 
boundaries of district officials and pollution regulators. The second problem was that a 
separation between biophysical and human health priorities failed to recognise that, in 
practice, these two are interlinked. In the peri-urban case study, when the quality of the 
groundwater was not guaranteed, there were direct implications for the ‘potability’ of 
drinking water and consequently, for the health and well-being of those who depend on 
the groundwater. However, the links between the environmental quality of the natural 
                                                
161 Boundary work linked to scientists working in government technical organisations and regulatory 
bodies has come to be seen by many as the activity of demarcating science from ‘non-science’ (Jasanoff, 
1987). The term is used here to explain how such boundaries were drawn between Board members and 
outside actors specifically in relation to water quality. 
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resource and the lives of the poorest groups were undermined in the regulatory framing 
of the Board because its mandate prioritised the biophysical aspects of water pollution, 
excluding from policy view the more critical social and human health dimensions.   
In section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4, the thesis has also tried to demonstrate that the underlying 
reasons for the way such boundaries are drawn were not entirely based on the scientists. 
On the contrary, the framing of the monitoring strategy was also subject to external 
policy influences, regarding for instance the selection of sites that are allocated more 
robust monitoring. The convergence of urban environmentalism with concerns around 
river water quality meant that Delhi was at the forefront of the Board’s activities (this 
was exemplified by the centrality of Delhi in monitoring activities, in transferring 
polluting industries to the peripheries and other measures explained in section 4.4.4). 
However, the restoration of water quality in the broader region of Delhi, which includes 
peri-urban areas, did not figure prominently in wider policy initiatives. More broadly, 
water quality restoration programmes were observed to reflect ‘utilitarian’ as well as 
‘political’ motives; utilitarian because some water resources (particular the Ganges river 
basin or the Yamuna) mattered more as ‘water reservoirs’ for large cities and towns, but 
also political since judicial and civil society activism often played an important role in 
influencing the direction of water quality restoration programmes.  
The framing of ‘regulation’ was driven by a different set of expert commitments. In 
particular, an important trade-off emerges between those sets of issues where the Board 
appears to have clear ‘regulatory’ responsibilities and those where regulatory 
responsibilities fall elsewhere or remain ambiguous. On the one hand, industrial water 
pollution was clearly perceived to fall within the Board’s remit. On the other hand, the 
Board preferred to claim no authority over pollution impacts that went beyond the point 
of industrial wastewater discharge, or where policy interventions to address impaired 
water quality were viewed as more politicised or contested. A direct consequence was 
the omission of pollution cases affecting poorer settlements. Issues of wastewater 
stagnation and overflow, or contamination of the drinking water supply, emerged as 
major water quality concerns for poorer peri-urban residents, but nonetheless figured 
less prominently within national level discourses.  
  
182 
Another implication inferred from the Board’s framing of regulation was that, in 
practice, responses to industrial water pollution were highly selective. Large-scale 
industrial units were prioritised in national environmental surveillance strategies while 
small-scale industrial units were underplayed. In particular, solutions to pollution 
caused by small-scale units were perceived to be simpler and often synonymous with a 
‘regional redistribution’ (relocation from the city to the periphery) paradigm. This 
separation typically understated risks that were attached to less understood sources of 
pollution. Firstly, in peri-urban areas, dye and dyeing industries were seen to contribute 
significantly to the deterioration of water quality. And secondly, the way industrial 
pollution was framed suggested that Board members assumed the existence of a fairly 
robust regulatory structure operating at the local level, when in practice, regulatory 
norms were seldom met. 
It is important to consider some of the political underpinnings of this framing exercise. 
At one level, the framing of water quality is the result of the Board’s own attempts to 
maintain the ‘status quo’ of their organisation. However, what further complicates the 
framing of water quality are the politics that pull and push the Board’s agenda. For 
instance, discussions with Board members illustrated that a particular framing of 
industrial regulation was not purely the result of science, but also partly of how 
industries were in a position to influence regulation. Similarly, complex bureaucratic 
politics often underpinned the particular way in which funds for monitoring were 
allocated between the Board, the MoEF, private enterprises, and municipalities. It was 
these bureaucratic politics that created a complex situation where ‘blame’ for obvious 
omissions in water quality protection was shifted between different agencies. Similarly, 
strong vested interests were involved (in national and city level contexts) in the 
selection of particular locations for strengthening measures for environmental 
protection. This partly explains why the problems of the periphery were consistently 
underemphasised in favour of Delhi based environmental issues. It is important, 
therefore, to note that the particular framing strategies which were observed are not 
solely linked to the fact that Board members wanted to strengthen the status quo of the 
organisation. These framings are further linked to how political pressure can be exerted 
from other parts of the bureaucracy, and the particular influence of various powerful 
groups in the decision-making process. The issue of framing is also addressed later on 
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in section 6.4.1, discussing measures for improving the effectiveness of the Board in its 
regulatory and policy-making roles.  
6.1.2. Expert advisory processes and technical language    
The empirical findings further support the view that an overreliance on ‘technical’ 
language to communicate water quality priorities became a limiting factor for problems 
affecting the peri-urban interface to gain sufficient traction in expert advisory appraisal 
methods. Two important issues emerged from this study with respect to the use of 
technical language. Firstly, that technical language was seen to avoid the inherent 
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding a range of water quality problems and how these 
are experienced at the local level. Secondly, the multiple and sometimes competing 
discourses attached to water quality imply that ‘technical language’ has to be interpreted 
for the powerful barriers which it presents for non-technical knowledge linked to 
citizens’ perspectives to be appropriately integrated into mainstream appraisal 
methodologies. The issue of technical language therefore needs to be considered in the 
light of the discussion presented in the theory section 2.5 on risk, uncertainty and 
ignorance, particularly in relation to the problems of expert risk assessments, to 
recognise uncertainty, sources of incomplete knowledge in the appraisal of risk, and the 
value of including alternative perspectives, such as those derived from the citizens 
themselves.  
Turning first to the issue of uncertainty, a significant part of chapter 4 was dedicated to 
demonstrating that technical language (as reproduced in official texts and during 
interviews) is strongly linked to power precisely because it selects and enlarges 
particular framings, problematisations and policy priorities. From a discourse 
perspective, various themes were explored to demonstrate how this takes place in the 
Board. At one level, the disclosure of uncertainty was facilitated at a very early stage 
through the development of the DBU classification (see section 4.4.1) which created a 
picture of ‘misplaced concreteness’ (Stirling, 2011: 84) around what can be ‘defined’ 
and accurately ‘bounded’ within the Board’s water quality evaluation framework.  
Specifically, even though the DBU approach, as presented in official reports, suggested 
that water quality restoration was organised on the basis of achieving desired human 
uses, the range of uses recognised under the DBU were often ‘misplaced’ because they 
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suppressed the true diversity of water uses (and users) that are currently emerging fairly 
rapidly in peri-urban areas. Even in the case of clearly articulated policy arenas such as 
‘drinking water’, quality is supposed to be guaranteed by prior treatment based on 
conventional technologies. But this definition was not realistic because it did not 
address the underlying difficulties in ensuring the quality of water when it is accessed 
without treatment or treated locally by informal methods and practices (private water 
suppliers and use of different treatment technologies are common in peri-urban areas). 
A powerful expert-driven assumption was therefore to reinforce aggregate 
categorisations of water quality (i.e. drinking water supply, irrigation, protection of 
wildlife and fisheries and so on) while removing the possibility of more diverse water 
quality evaluation scenarios being accounted for in policy. This in turn imposed crucial 
limitations on poorer groups, as their particular water quality needs were not sufficiently 
understood by Board members.  
Exploring critically the use of technical language further confirms that the evaluation of 
‘risk’ from impaired water quality was linked to exhaustive parameterisation exercises. 
However, the inherent indeterminate nature of parameterisation itself was often 
suppressed at the discursive level. Importantly, several contradictions emerged between 
the selection of parameters (and pollution load targets) and how these materialise in 
peri-urban situations. Frequently, desired targets are not met in the peri-urban context 
simply because they are too ambitious or because, in many instances, responsibilities for 
meeting such targets at the local level are blurred. This was demonstrated, for instance, 
in the implementation of the BOD target (an important measure of river pollution), 
where observable values in peri-urban areas were consistently well above the 
recommended limits set by the Board. Part of the reason for this contradiction was that 
standards for water quality are not reviewed systematically enough to be representative 
of local conditions. Of course, another limitation was that the same parameters 
encouraged a skewed emphasis on the evaluation of ‘known’ risks from water quality. 
However, risks characterised by incomplete knowledge and uncertainty, such as the 
health exposure of vulnerable groups to high concentrations of industrial contaminants 
(particularly heavy metals) found in the groundwater and water used for irrigation of 
food crops, were less apparent in the discourse.   
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The institutional imperative for objectivity reproduced through technical language was 
frequently at odds with the experience based discourse of citizens. Most prominently, 
the formal separations between different uses of water as the Board prescribes them had 
little direct relevance to how problems were perceived on the ground. Firstly, meanings 
attached to water quality by citizens are subjective and context driven. For instance, 
wastewater stagnation and overflow in the villages and informal colonies figured more 
prominently than water pollution at the river basin scale, and concerns around the 
potability of water were in turn rarely separated from the problem of wastewater 
surrounding settlements. Furthermore, sense perceptions such as taste, colour and 
appearance played a far more central role in the citizens’ discourse than other 
technically derived physico-chemical criteria. For instance contamination of the 
drinking water source was affirmed on the basis of its colour and whether it turned 
yellow if left overnight. The legitimacy granted to technical knowledge, however, made 
it difficult for these sense perceptions of water quality to be reconciled with 
standardised descriptions of water quality promoted at the national level.  
Moreover, the citizens’ knowledge reflected that a more systemic exposure to 
deteriorating water quality of poorer citizens was strongly linked to their political and 
economic marginality. More affluent residents in peri-urban areas could override the 
contamination of local water sources by installing expensive household water filtration 
technologies. But the cost of treated water was prohibitive for poorer groups, and so 
they were directly reliant on polluted water sources for household uses. Also, as the 
peri-urban case study further demonstrated, their location in the district also exacerbated 
their marginality as poorer groups were often forced to reside in the immediate 
proximity of industrial sites. For these reasons, risk was felt unequally within the 
district. Closing the gap between agenda setting and implementation needs to address 
the fact that unequal power relationships can cause unequal exposure to polluted water, 
recognising that the underlying influence of power in turn suggests balancing 
‘technical’ representations of water with the ‘political’, ‘aesthetic’ and ‘experiential’ 
representations. A further consequence of unequal power is that there are likely to be 
translations, interpretations and diverse modalities for action that are negotiated on a 
context specific basis. Policies are therefore not linearly adapted to the context 
(particularly a context that is under rapid transition such as the peri-urban). They are 
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translated, and power has an important part to play in the translation. It is to these 
translation processes that I will now turn.  
6.2. Policy translations in the peri-urban context 
So far, the discussion has focused on how policies are framed (and communicated) 
amongst the expert community of the Board. But water quality priorities were also 
translated through various local interventions and practices.  Furthermore, these 
translation processes present several contradictions between the expectations of national 
regulators and the realities of their implementation. Examining only national level 
priorities and practices would not have been sufficient to demonstrate these translation 
processes, and importantly, how the poor are positioned in procedures of 
implementation. The other important finding is that translation processes involve 
interactions across a wider set of actors and institutions than those envisaged by national 
rules and norms, and that these interactions are in turn intrinsically shaped by relations 
of power. Interestingly, it is the less intuitive representations of power that influence 
quite considerably policy outcomes even though observed actors rarely articulated them 
in an explicit way.  
An empirical observation that was of particular interest for understanding policy 
translation processes was that, even though the Board was directly involved in the 
reproduction of a broad range of rather ambitious regulatory targets, the enforcement of 
these regulations in peri-urban areas was usually far from impressive. This ‘enforcement 
gap’ has caught the attention of commentators in other transitional economies as well. 
In China, for instance, much has been written about the shortcomings of regulatory 
enforcement emphasizing that there are no simple answers. Observers of pollution 
enforcement in China argue that enforcement gaps are in reality the result of multiple 
and interacting influences including, for instance, fragmented bureaucratic structures, or 
the ‘pro-growth’ orientation of local authorities which is confounded by the ‘pro-
development’ values of the enforcement officials themselves (Sinkule and Ortolano, 
1995, Lo and Chung, 1998, Ross, 1998).  
These observations have similarities with empirical observations from the peri-urban 
case study. However, at the same time the aforementioned commentators in China fail 
to consider adequately how power may be involved in the sustenance of such 
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enforcement failures. For instance, polluting industrial units that were deeply unpopular 
with local residents were able to maintain their operation and avoid prosecution except 
in relatively rare cases. The ineffective policing of industrial units in turn presented 
noticeable obstacles for water quality protection as it contributed to the deterioration of 
the groundwater from contamination and over abstraction for industrial uses. In 
addition, industrial pollution contributed to less ‘visible’ impacts, such as the 
contamination of irrigation water for food crops, and the environmental degradation of 
the local Hindon river. Another omission in the same literature is that ‘enforcement 
gaps’ are assumed to have an equal impact upon all populations, whereas the peri-urban 
case study clearly demonstrated that this is normally not the case as the impacts of weak 
enforcement tend to fall disproportionately on the poorest. Village residents and 
informal settlements situated within or adjacent to the industrial ‘estates’ found in 
Ghaziabad district systematically suffered disproportionately higher risks from water 
pollution than the more affluent colonies in the district. 
The ability of industrial operators to exercise their powers in order to circumvent 
regulatory norms contradicted in many instances the rhetoric of effective industrial 
monitoring reproduced by Board members. It further highlighted several layers of 
complexity involved in the implementation of industrial norms and guidelines. 
Importantly, the rule of the ‘state’ (of Uttar Pradesh) over the ‘district’ meant that state-
driven economic and industrial development imperatives often preceded a local 
environmental protection agenda. In the first place, industrial units with the support of 
the UPSIDC (the state industrial corporation that sanctions licences to industries) could 
operate in industrial estates where enforcement of pollution norms was less stringent. 
Secondly, the executive power of the regional office UPPCB to close down an industry 
that is not meeting regulatory norms became limited in these industrial estates. As it 
turns out, the way power was distributed between the state and the district facilitated a 
process whereby responsibility for decisions was passed back and forth between the 
‘state’ and the ‘district’, thus removing accountability from the State for the most 
serious pollution impacts in peri-urban areas.   
The demarcation between the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ realms of the district was further 
observed to reproduce unequal power relations. Particularly the way official boundaries 
were demarcated implied that there were fewer water quality checks in the poorer peri-
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urban settlements. The Municipal Corporation (with the support of the water authority 
and the health department) carried out water quality tests at the point of water outlet (the 
water treatment plant) and at different stages of its distribution. These assessments were 
motivated by a clear policy goal to ensure the safety of the drinking water source, but as 
water quality assessments did not include water allocation practices that fall outside the 
formal water distribution network (water accessed using submersible pumps, water 
tankers, bottled water etc.) poorer social groups became even more exposed to risks of 
water contamination.  
The propagation of unequal power relations was further linked to particular styles of 
official practice. The peri-urban case study demonstrated that, while water authorities, 
pollution control bodies and the municipality made extensive use of professional 
engineers, scientists, and trained administrative officers for performing complex tasks, 
decision makers in these lower ranks had a different way of prioritising the allocation of 
their services compared to experts working at higher policy levels. Board members, for 
instance, saw little disparity between social groups and regions in the way water quality 
monitoring strategies are carried out. But for professionals operating in peri-urban areas 
monitoring was strongly linked to their practical knowledge of the district (i.e. social 
status of different residents, types of settlements, geography, and access to municipal 
services) and was further shaped by moral codes and values.  
Professionalism and expertise at the lower levels of the policy process therefore need to 
be understood in terms of the barriers and opportunities that they present for issues of 
procedural as well as distributive justice in the peri-urban. As was demonstrated in 
section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5, the labelling strategies employed to chart different 
populations within the district influenced in important ways how officials carried out 
their services. Because poorer settlements such as villages and slums were labelled as 
‘illegal’ or ‘non-conforming’162, it was implied that the ‘official’ duty to respond to the 
particular needs of these poorer settlements was diminished. The director of the regional 
office UPPCB, Mr. Yadav, said in an interview, ‘pollution exists in small pockets, not 
in the whole district’163,164. An important policy implication attached to this discourse 
                                                
162 Labelling terms that were also reproduced in the district’s future development Master Plan (Ghaziabad 
Development Authority, 2006). 
163 Interview with Mr. Jadav, director of the UPPCB regional office, 12th February 2010. 
164 Referring to the industrial estates, but not recognising the villages situated in the estates. 
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was that higher pollution burdens observed in the poorer settlements were perceived 
narrowly as a direct outcome of polluting practices of the residents rather than as a 
failure of the State to reach out to the poorer groups.  
It cannot be contested that the planning agendas pursued under Delhi’s urban 
‘modernisation’ paradigm have also helped shape in important ways the direction of 
development in the adjoining peripheries. In particular, as Pushpa Arabindoo explains, 
the ‘metropolitisation’ of cities of the Global South has clearly created a condition of 
inter-relativity between the core and its periphery (Arabindoo, 2005: 54). This is well 
revealed by the transformation that has affected the peripheral neighbourhoods of Delhi, 
which has marked a shift in the evolution of ‘posh’ neighbourhoods from inside the city 
boundaries, to peripheral neighbourhoods located in the immediate proximity of Delhi 
(ibid). The evolution of the elite residential locality of Vasundhara, in Ghaziabad also 
illustrates this, since it signifies where powerful actors of the city prefer to relocate. 
What is also evident is the growing need to keep the regulatory mechanism in the 
peripheries relatively powerless in order to support wealth accumulation within the city 
boundaries. This is evident from the changes happening within industrial zones such as 
that of Sahibabad, where an escalation of industrial activities (mainly informal in 
nature) have emerged at around the same period that Delhi authorities initiated policies 
to relocate industries from the adjoining capital. The fact that the state is unable to 
negotiate, or take a middle stance, in the conflict of interests ensuing from the growth of 
industries and the invasion of a more powerful urban middle class elite, means that 
environmental risks facing the previous older settlements are largely ignored. What this 
alludes to is that policy implementation failure in the peri-urban context has to be 
understood as being not only the result of policy negotiations taking place within peri-
urban areas, but also related to how a much larger politics of ‘exclusion’ has come to 
shape urban development processes in India today (Fernandes, 2004).
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6.3. Re-thinking ‘failure’ of regulatory institutions 
Previous sections have highlighted some of the reasons why policy processes (and their 
reliance on expert knowledge) continue to fail to respond to complex environments and 
particularly to the needs of poorer groups. The empirical findings also reflect poorly on 
the ineffectiveness of environmental regulatory institutions (namely the Board and State 
Boards) in another way. In India, much of the debate on addressing existing regulatory 
failures has been summed up by a widely held view of implementation failure. The core 
of this argument is that, to ensure sustainable development (water quality being an 
integral part of this mandate), policy makers have to address the poor implementation 
and enforcement of environmental rules by the prevailing regulatory institutions.   
There are two important, yet to some extent separate, voices in this debate. The first is 
tied to expert committees set up by government over time to review the functioning and 
performance of the Board and State Boards with a view to providing recommendations 
for their more effective functioning. In these reports, including the 1984 Bhattacharya 
Committee report, the focus has been on fairly mundane aspects of regulatory 
performance, such as measures for improving the structural organisation and day-to-day 
function of the Boards, the creation of technical, scientific and legal service divisions in 
the Boards, and the generating of new funds to strengthen regulatory performance 
(CAG, 1992).   
More recently, a renewed emphasis on the Boards can be noted with the publication of 
the report of the 2008 Parliamentary Committee on Science & Technology, 
Environment & Forests. In this report, the recommendations challenge much more 
directly the overall capacity of the Boards to tackle pollution effectively. Problems of 
lax monitoring and non-compliance of polluting units in the different states are noted, as 
well as the declining institutional authority of the Board as a leading pollution 
enforcement institution (Parliament of India, 2008). A common feature of these reports, 
and others that have not been mentioned, is their recurring emphasis on the weakening 
power of the Board and State Boards to enforce regulatory norms and stipulated 
guidelines. 
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The second more critical voice of regulatory failure comes from civil society 
organisations that have, at different times, been fairly critical of the role of the State in 
tackling pollution. In civil society critiques as well, the need to improve regulatory 
capacity (by recruitment and training of technical staff) is recognised, but often 
superseded by deeper concerns about malpractices and lack of overall transparency in 
the functioning of the Boards (CSE, 2009). In the recent study of the Board and State 
Boards conducted by the public interest research group Centre for Science and 
Environment , poor performance is attributed to issues such as ‘lack of staff’, 
‘corruption’, and ‘poor regulations’ as well as a general lack of willingness on behalf of 
regulators to disclose and disseminate information (CSE, 2009). It is also much more 
evident from these criticisms that by and large, public perception of regulatory 
performance is negative, and there is increasing public distrust of the present 
functioning of regulatory institutions.  
The way causes for regulatory failure are commonly gauged both by civil society and 
government-led expert committees takes for granted in the first place issues around the 
design of regulatory approaches and the fact that these remain, at their core, very 
technical. The thesis’ findings have demonstrated that, because of the nature of the 
Board’s monitoring practices and definitions used to address water quality, local effects 
are excluded from more focused policy attention. With the policy emphasis being 
skewed towards the ‘science’ of regulation, decisions and choices that are not always 
based on science alone are not recognised. This was demonstrated for instance in 
section 6.1.1 of this chapter, which examined the framing assumptions influencing 
Board scientists’ regulatory and policy advisory roles.  
The second area of oversight in this debate is that opportunities for extending the 
participation of different stakeholder groups in regulatory procedures remains rather 
limited. The debate recognises the value of increasing the participation of community 
organisations and civil society representatives (Parliament of India, 2008), but it does 
not recognise that the knowledge of these stakeholders is likely to be considered less 
powerful than the prevailing technical knowledge. In section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4 for 
instance, it was demonstrated that the ability of different stakeholders to liaise with 
regulators is at least partly influenced by their capacity to ‘speak the language’ of the 
regulators. Industrialists invest in resources and consultants to perform complex water 
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quality tests, but those groups exposed to pollution who articulate their concerns in 
more subjective ways pass by, on the whole, unnoticed by the regulatory institutions.  
On a different level, the peri-urban case study demonstrated that there is a need for 
ongoing debates on regulatory reform to look beyond the role of the Board and State 
Boards. These regulatory institutions do not operate in isolation but in fact are part of a 
broader chain of actors and institutions. This involves a complex interplay between the 
routine operations of regulatory bodies and other official agencies, and as a web of 
activities and practices taking place informally at the local level. Taking these inter-
relationships seriously means that improving regulatory performance is likely to depend 
on more than just ‘administrative’ reforms, but also to a much greater extent on 
developing much clearer definitions of the roles of multiple actors involved in 
regulatory processes.  
More recently, the same debate appears to have taken another turn with a proposal by 
the MoEF for establishing a new National Environment Protection Authority (NEPA) 
(MoEF, 2009). Within a broader set of reforms aimed at restructuring environmental 
governance in India, NEPA is anticipated to supersede the role of the Board at the 
centre, becoming the leading authority for pollution control and enforcement, while 
State Boards continue to perform the same roles at the state level (MoEF, 2009). 
Although much is still being discussed about the precise roles and functioning that 
NEPA may adopt in the future, it appears that many of the core problems identified as 
part of this discussion on the effectiveness of the Board and State Boards will be 
replicated with the inception of NEPA. In particular, the fact that the appointment of 
NEPA members is still largely based on science, and the fact that local interests remain 
largely unaddressed, are critical issues that are not sufficiently challenged in mainstream 
policy thinking. For these reasons observers of recent developments have argued that 
there is an obvious danger with the inception of NEPA in reproducing yet another 
technocratic model that fails at its core to be receptive to the deeper changes that are 
needed for improving regulatory performance (Lele et al., 2010). 
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6.4. An alternative approach to water quality management 
As discussed in the previous section, the causes of regulatory failure are several and this 
thesis has outlined at least some of the important discursive and institutional factors 
underpinning regulatory failure. By recognising the limitations of current approaches 
for addressing worsening levels of water quality in peri-urban areas, it is possible at this 
point to suggest features of an alternative approach to water quality management. The 
thesis has demonstrated that two processes drives existing limitations. The first is the 
framing of the policies at the national level, and the implications of these framings for 
policy practice, which is empirically grounded in the functioning of the Board. The 
second is the translation of policies in peri-urban areas and the influence of local actors 
and institutions in procedures of implementation. Of course, these are interlinked, and 
existing failures are encouraged by how the interaction between policy framing and 
implementation has taken shape. An alternative approach that is more effective and 
allows for greater preparedness in facing complex water quality challenges is therefore 
based on increasing the effectiveness of both these processes.   
6.4.1. Increasing effectiveness of the Board 
On the functioning of the Board a number of suggestions can be made as to how the 
involvement of expert advisors at the national level can become more constructive. The 
first area of improvement relates to the type of water quality problems that are normally 
covered in the Board’s own assessments. At the moment, there is too much emphasis on 
pollution having an impact on river basins at a national level, where there is little space 
for alternative water quality priorities to feed into the decision-making process. This 
study however has demonstrated that water quality in peri-urban areas encompasses 
several dimensions, and that there are ‘direct’ local effects on the environment as well 
as adverse impacts on human health, particularly affecting the poorest communities. On 
the other hand, impaired water quality has ‘indirect’ effects as well when risks are 
transferred through the soil, the food chain, and the movement of water pollution to 
other locations.
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Diversifying water quality assessment procedures to include these different dimensions 
can be resolved partly by accommodating different styles of expertise. However, the 
fact that at present the appointment of Board members is biased towards sourcing 
experts with engineering or physical sciences backgrounds makes the inclusion of 
alternative sources of expertise neither possible nor desirable for the organisation. One 
solution to this problem would be to review the schedule of appointment of Board 
members (as prescribed in the Water Act of 1974) so that the inclusion of experts from 
different disciplinary fields is made mandatory. For instance, at the moment, there is 
very little space for social scientists to be appointed in regulatory positions even though 
this would make it far easier to integrate into regulatory decision-making the concerns 
of individuals and especially local communities that are more adversely affected by 
pollution.  
A further limitation which is partly linked to the way the Board sources its expertise is 
that, despite the links between drinking water quality, health and the environmental 
quality of the natural resource (i.e. water bodies such as rivers and groundwater), much 
of the water quality assessment process is currently designed to capture pollution 
impacts at the point of discharge of pollutants, leading to an over-simplified 
representation of risk. An assessment mechanism that encompasses cross-sectoral 
linkages could be developed through a more plural engagement of regulatory 
institutions with science. This means that pollution assessments are not only based on 
engineering knowledge but also on in-house expertise in other science based disciplines, 
including for instance environmental health specialists, ecologists and environmental 
scientists and those with practical experience in conservation.  Furthermore, the 
appointment of a broader range of specialisations should not be confined to the Board 
only. For a more holistic approach to addressing water quality, these appointment 
principles need to be cascaded down to the State Boards and from there to regional and 
district pollution enforcement agencies that at present are structured on the basis of 
replicating the Board member recruitment model.  
Another area where there is significant scope for improvement is in the way the Board 
manages its own boundaries with respect to its policy and regulatory mandates. The fact 
that the Board has accumulated powers in the areas of policy advice as well as 
regulation has put scientists working from inside the organisation in a curious position 
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where they have to fulfill both a technical and a political role. The capacity of the Board 
to function as a regulator is likely to be more complicated in the future if plans for the 
inception of NEPA go ahead as planned, and there is considerable uncertainty about 
how powers will be divided between the two agencies. If the Board is to maintain joint 
powers of regulation and expert advice their engagement with water quality issues will 
need to be much more transparent and accountable to the different stakeholders.  
One of the prerequisites for increasing transparency is for Board members to recognise 
that unequal power relations and issues of procedural and distributional justice influence 
the implementation of regulatory rules and norms in important ways. The fact that 
industrial pollution in peri-urban areas is weakly enforced is not solely an outcome of 
administrative inefficiency. There are power relationships that prevent closure of 
extremely polluting units and prevent the formal system from being held accountable 
for the risks from pollution that are affecting the poorest citizens. The dominant 
narrative of expanding wastewater technologies and increasing administrative capacity, 
currently viewed as the only possible policy intervention for removing existing 
regulatory failures, is therefore insufficient and suppresses the true underlying 
complexities involved in resolving regulatory problems in local situations.  
Greater transparency also needs to be matched with a more pro-active engagement with 
regulatory institutions operating at the local level. As it stands, monitoring water quality 
standards is left entirely to the State Boards and their subsidiary bodies (i.e. regional, 
district and city offices). This was supported by the discourse of regional pollution 
officials in the peri-urban case study, who regularly pointed out that any practical 
influence of the Board in the district was narrowed down to the remark that officials 
were following (at least in principle) the Board’s water quality standards framework 
(see also section 5.2.1). It was therefore hardly surprising that a gap was noted in this 
study between the setting of a pollution standard and its enforcement in peri-urban 
areas. If the Board is to strengthen its leadership roles in pollution control it is therefore 
important that more opportunities arise for dialogue and interaction with local level 
officials and departments. Part of the reason why policy responses to the peri-urban 
repeatedly fail is that this interaction does not exist, resulting in the development of 
pollution abatement targets that are not realistic, and that reinforce an official logic of 
pseudo-adherence to universally applied norms and stipulated guidelines. 
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The research has also confirmed that, at present, there are few opportunities for civil 
society organisations and citizens to intervene in the regulatory process in a meaningful 
way. The main route available to citizens for influencing regulatory outcomes is through 
the formal complaint procedure. This mechanism presents a number of barriers. On the 
one hand resolving a citizen complaint can take a very long time because responsibility 
for action is shifted back and forth between the Board and State Boards. And 
furthermore, it does not provide sufficient scope for non-technical descriptions of 
pollution impacts to have the same level of legitimacy as those that are produced using 
the Board’s standard methodologies. Similarly, at the moment there are a considerable 
number of environmental groups and NGOs working in India that are not well 
represented in the Board’s decision-making process. This is particularly because Board 
members view NGOs in terms of fulfilling the role of ‘watchdogs’ of pollution and less 
for their scientific input. Thus, for raising the profile of ‘unaddressed’ sources of 
pollution the relationship between civil society groups and regulators remains largely 
antagonistic (see also section 4.5.4). The Board’s capacity to reach out to more 
vulnerable populations and areas could be significantly improved by creating entry 
points for civil society groups to be more involved and actively participate at different 
stages of the decision-making.  
6.4.2. Features of an integrated approach to policy implementation 
The case of Ghaziabad district presented a complex scenario of policy implementation 
whereby water quality priorities are fed into a diverse host of institutions that includes 
the pollution control boards, but also extends beyond them. The relationship between 
the various institutions was largely fragmented and the implementation of policies dealt 
ineffectively with the complexities of peri-urban areas (associated with the formal 
oversight of a number of risks from impaired water quality). Given that there are these 
fundamental problems with the current water quality management approach, it is 
important to reflect upon some of the alternative options for making procedures of 
implementation more integrated and responsive to future sustainability challenges and 
the needs of marginalised groups.   
Interestingly the peri-urban case study demonstrated that worsening levels of water 
quality are sustained not simply because of a shortage of formal interventions but more 
importantly perhaps because of the wide separation that exists between the different 
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interventions already in place. Ensuring drinking water quality was at odds with 
protecting water quality from pollution even though the two are interconnected in 
important ways. Similarly, the groundwater authorities took no direct responsibility for 
the pollution of the groundwater. This responsibility was assumed to lie with the 
pollution control authorities even though pollution enforcement officials saw no 
obvious responsibility for the depletion of the groundwater. The apparent 
disconnectedness between formal institutions was seen to undermine the sustainability 
of the region. Part of the reason for this distortion was because the integrated nature of 
contemporary water quality problems has simply not yet caught up with the role of 
officials who have accumulated powers to execute policies.  
This problem relates back to the way policies are administered by central and state 
government through to specific areas. Policies are administered for specific sector 
driven concerns such as wastewater management, industrial pollution, and water supply. 
From the official point of view however as long as progress on specific sectors’ projects 
is being met, the incentive to foster linkages with other sectors is almost made 
redundant. This was demonstrated, for example, by the case of the Uttar Pradesh Water 
Board engineer who was in charge of a wastewater treatment plant yet saw little 
connection between his work and that of the pollution control boards (see also section 
5.2.2). In order for policy implementation to be more effective these interconnections 
and competing logics need to be made much more explicit. Otherwise the fact that there 
is a plurality of formal arrangements can work negatively because formal stakeholders 
do not properly understand the synergies and contestations between them.  
So in one sense the peri-urban case study supports that there is a strong case in favour of 
fostering knowledge integration amongst formal actors involved in procedures of 
implementation. However, knowledge integration has to be balanced with a deeper 
understanding of the power asymmetries influencing policy implementation. One 
important structural change in the way decisions are executed at the local level in order 
to redress this tendency is to include those spaces and settlements where the poorest 
sections of society live and work in the implementation of formal plans and 
programmes. Rather than viewing the spaces where the poor live as illegal (as per an 
official discourse that excludes the poor quite early on from the implementation of 
policies), a revised approach towards implementation needs to recognise the 
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complementarities that exist between the quality of life of the poorest groups and the 
sustainability of the local region, and that populations in both formal and informal 
settlements live in parallel.   
At the moment much of the focus on service delivery in terms of water and 
environmental services is on the more affluent settlements. In these areas drinking water 
quality is ensured by the official piped water supply; wastewater stagnation and 
overflow is prevented by the installation of a sewerage network and wastewater 
treatment technologies, and industrial water pollution poses a less serious threat since 
industrial activity takes place a fair distance from the affluent colonies. Such basic 
provisions need to be ensured for the poorer colonies too, but it must be recognised that 
the approaches needed are likely to differ significantly. Reducing exposure of the poorer 
groups to impaired water quality means that the reach of regulatory regimes needs to be 
extended towards these areas where polluting activities are more concentrated. 
Similarly, locating factories should be carried out with greater involvement of affected 
communities, instead of the current approach where new factories are introduced 
without consulting those citizens that are likely to be more exposed to environmental 
hazards. Another misunderstood dimension of course is that infrastructure development 
will not be the same as in the case of the affluent colonies. Affluent colonies in peri-
urban areas are usually modernised, with wastewater treatment technologies fitted in 
advance of construction. In the case of poorer village settlements, installation of these 
technologies is constrained by a number of factors, including availability of space and 
the high costs associated with their installation and maintenance, as well as the fact that 
many of the houses within these settlements are ‘unconnected’ to the sewer lines and 
water supply pipes. Therefore in order for infrastructure development (aiming to address 
impaired water quality) in these sites to be effective, innovative technological solutions 
have to be considered in conjunction with informal technical interventions that are 
already in place.  
Informal water access practices are, at the moment, consistently undermined in routine 
water quality checks. This has an impact upon basic survival strategies of the poor such 
as in the case of accessing drinking water, but also on water that is used to generate 
livelihoods, such as in the case of wastewater re-use in agriculture. As a result there is 
very little information in the public domain and amongst officials on how risks from 
  
199 
impaired water quality are having an impact specifically on poorer groups and how 
these risks may differ from those of populations that reside in the better-regulated 
colonies. This is a gap that is filled periodically by civil society groups through their 
own water quality studies, but it is not a sufficient measure for capturing the range of 
problems in all their complexity. There is a need, therefore, to foster greater 
transparency within existing regulatory institutions around how water quality 
monitoring takes place in practice, and how the vested interests of various policy actors 
can influence which locations receive greater recognition and tend to be better 
represented within formal policy mechanisms.   
6.5. Bringing together STS and Policy Studies: insights from the case 
studies 
One distinguishing feature of this study is the way that it has drawn upon both Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) and policy studies to derive its main insights. This is 
important for several reasons. The first point relates to the context in which research 
following these two analytical traditions has largely taken place. That is primarily in 
Northern settings, whereas as this study has demonstrated, a more critical analysis of 
policy processes and the role of science and technology can be of potentially enormous 
value in developing countries as well. It is important to note that some studies that have 
applied these traditions in developing countries have examined issues such as soil 
degradation and the governance of water resources (cf.Scoones, 1999, Mollinga, 2008). 
However, there is relatively less written on pollution and the influence of governance 
and policy contexts in shaping patterns of pollution, exposure and distribution. This is a 
gap that this study has attempted to fill by examining policy processes specifically tied 
to the escalating problem of water pollution in peri-urban India.  
The second point relates to the type of synergies and interactions that can be fostered by 
combining these two analytical traditions. The theoretical discussion, in Chapter 2, 
presented a number of key themes that tend to preoccupy theorists of each tradition. 
STS scholars have demonstrated that expert knowledge systems are not ‘static’ systems; 
rather such systems tend to be highly dynamic and shaped in important ways by the 
social, political and institutional context in which these systems are embedded (Latour, 
1987, Jasanoff, 1990). This dynamic view of expert knowledge proved to be particularly 
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valuable for understanding the work that is carried out at the Board. In particular, on the 
basis of an STS frame of inquiry, the thesis developed alternative explanations for why 
policy interventions fail to address peri-urban water quality concerns. In line with the 
conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3, section 3.1, the influence of conceptual 
categorisations such as that of the DBU was highlighted, along with the relationship of 
the Board with other actors (and how these relationships are dependent on how power is 
negotiated between different actors), and the fact that the overriding interest of Board 
scientists to maintain the ‘status quo’ of their organisation may pose a critical barrier to 
peri-urban water quality concerns receiving greater priority within national level policy 
circles. Given that much of the current research on peri-urban environments has adopted 
a ‘place based’ approach to examining the environmental degradation which manifests 
in these spaces, an STS perspective has also been valuable for demonstrating that a 
national level view of such problems also merits analytical attention.  
The policy process ‘frame’ of analysis helped demonstrate that both policy agenda 
setting procedures (where national experts have a more influential role) and procedures 
of implementation (notably those which are manifested in the peri-urban context) are 
important for understanding why expert systems commonly fail to improve water 
quality. In particular, a policy process frame helped trace the particularities of the ‘peri-
urban’ context in the analysis. It helped highlight the specific nature and processes of 
marginalisation that take shape in a local context. Undoubtedly, the current shape of 
urbanisation in India has encouraged an elite driven response to urban service delivery, 
and has also led to the displacement of polluting activities to the peri-urban context. 
This was illustrated by the fact that in Ghaziabad, it was often the middle class groups 
that were better protected by sewage and water treatment infrastructure, while the peri-
urban poor residing in villages and slums were rarely recognised by the authorities. 
Furthermore, the centrality of examining discursive processes of knowledge creation, 
which is so central to the policy process frame, helped illustrate that policy 
implementation is not linear; rather it is influenced by how competing values, interests 
and priorities are negotiated in the policy sphere. 
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Table 3 outlines how elements of both frameworks are combined in this thesis to 
counter the respective weaknesses of the other approach: 
Theme STS Policy Process 
Critical engagement with scientific practice 
& culture 
Strong Weak 
Taking into account micro and macro level 
policy spaces 
Weak Strong 
Comparing policy ‘agenda setting’ with 
‘implementation’  
Weak Strong 
Understanding suitability of technology to 
context 
Strong Weak 
Thinking about power & knowledge Weak Strong 
Table 3: Bringing together the ‘STS’ and ‘policy process’ analytical frameworks 
6.6. Conclusion 
The discussion of the two case studies has proposed several arguments that reveal 
processes through which expert-led policy approaches fail to address impaired water 
quality in peri-urban areas. The various themes that have been touched upon have made 
it clear that specific shortcomings in water quality management should not be viewed 
purely in terms of the resource constraints (i.e. shortfalls in financial, technological and 
human capital) that make policy responses to the peri-urban ineffective. These do matter 
of course, but perhaps behind the critical failures identified in the policy process are 
deeply embedded practices linked to the actors concerned (scientists, peri-urban 
officials, those exposed to impaired water quality and NGOs). These insights relate both 
to how policies are imagined in the first place and the role of expert advisors in shaping 
such dominant approaches, but in equally important ways the working routines of 
implementing institutions (exemplified by the role of officials working in peri-urban 
areas) can indirectly shape policy outcomes too.  
Specifically, in the case of the Board and State Boards, making such regulatory 
institutions more responsive to the concerns and aspirations of poorer people means 
they have to tackle the interactions between power and different forms of knowledge, 
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directly from the level of policy framing through to implementation. At present, the 
dominant discourses that are seen as influential in shaping priorities for water quality 
management inherently de-politicise the problems and leave little space for citizens’ 
concerns to be fed into the mainstream appraisal methodologies and monitoring plans. 
Even at the level of existing debates in India, interpretations of regulatory failure 
explored in section 6.3 remain, to date, too closely aligned with a dominant narrative of 
weak enforcement capacity linked to the Board and State Boards. Strengthening 
enforcement capacity is, however, only part of a possible solution and needs to be 
balanced with deeper structural changes such as the integration of different bodies of 
knowledge and the more direct involvement of regulators with social groups directly 
affected by formal decision-making. These changes can only take place over the long 
term, but are significant for moving towards more sustainable water quality 
management practices.   
These observations conclude the analysis of the findings. The next chapter will address 
the thesis’ concluding remarks. It will attempt to summarise outcomes of the study in 
relation to the overall research questions, outline the thesis’ contributions and provide a 
set of suggestions on how research in the field could be expanded in the future.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
This closing chapter returns to the research questions posed at the start of this thesis and 
attempts to answer them directly, based on the analysis of the two case studies (in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) and the subsequent discussion which looked across the two 
cases in detail in Chapter 6. The structure adopted is as follows: Section 7.1 puts 
forward the overall research questions and summarises the key arguments of the thesis. 
Section 7.2 explains what sets this study apart from previous research engagement with 
water quality, and its contribution to broader theoretical debates. Section 7.3 concludes 
the thesis by pointing towards directions for further research. These emanate from 
recognition of the limitations of this study and imply a forward-looking vision of how 
research can be advanced.   
7.1. Answering the research questions 
In seeking to investigate why expert-led policy processes fail to address the seriousness 
of water quality deterioration in peri-urban areas, the overall research questions that 
have motivated this study have been:  
Why are problems associated with deteriorating water quality in peri-urban areas 
frequently neglected in expert-led policy processes? And what are the implications 
for peri-urban poor communities?  
Despite the empirical findings drawn from this study, answers to these questions still 
remain far from simple. Causes of expert-led policy processes failing to deal effectively 
with complex peri-urban situations and the particular concerns of the poor are several 
and highly interconnected. Indeed, a part of the answer needs to be traced back to 
historical accounts of the policy process in order to ascertain why science has come 
forward as a powerful discourse on the planning and management of natural resources. 
This is not an accidental paradigm as science scholars would argue, but rather it has 
been shaped by mutually reinforcing political, institutional and social factors (some of 
which have been addressed in more detail in Chapter 2). What this study has tried to 
show, however, is that even in mundane and apparently scientific domains of policy 
engagement such as that of water quality, contemporary realities bring about a need for 
a more significant involvement with the sciences, and perhaps, more importantly, stress 
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the urgency for developing a better balance in formal decision-making between 
scientific sources of expertise, alternative perspectives emanating from the citizens 
themselves, and also less well represented specialisations and disciplinary approaches 
(Wynne, 1996).  
But a better appreciation of how science interacts with policy is only one side of the 
argument. A far less obvious dimension of the problem is the process of translation, 
reconfiguration and acceptance of deep-seated scientific framings by a diverse host of 
actors and institutions. When hegemonic frameworks of policy action (informed by 
science) are scaled down to peri-urban areas, positive outcomes across all sections of 
society can never be guaranteed, and certainly not for all the water quality problems that 
affect peri-urban areas. In this case, answers lie in the details of policy implementation 
and how current procedures can, in fact, operate in ways that reinforce social and 
environmental injustices. The thesis has tried to show that the precise mechanisms 
through which a policy approach that is largely expert driven and excludes the interests 
of the poor is shaped by mutually reinforcing cognitive (dominant policy knowledge 
influenced by science) as well as procedural processes (official practice influencing 
policy implementation in peri-urban areas).  
This research has described, in detail, how powerful actor groups have come to shape 
these processes in order to advance particular interests. It has further identified a range 
of political barriers which have come to detract attention from how water pollution 
impacts upon the peri-urban context. To be specific, two kinds of political barriers have 
appeared to play a prominent role in the case studies examined. The first order of 
political barriers relates to the shortcomings of bureaucratic functioning. Different 
bureaucratic agencies pursue different interests with respect to water quality protection. 
However, better integration of a water quality protection mandate ‘across’ the 
bureaucracy was jeopardised by the fact that a high concentration of scientists with 
technical backgrounds still tends to dominate key administrative positions. Furthermore, 
although wider stakeholder participation was recognised by key actors in the policy 
process, in reality this was only at the level of rhetoric. For instance, engagement 
between the Board and stakeholders from the peri-urban case study was limited, and this 
was partly because of the very high level of ‘entrapment’ of regulatory processes by a 
much more powerful political and industrial lobby, which helped provide immunity to 
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industries that had not taken any measures to mitigate their pollution impact. A second 
order of political barriers relates to the fact that the state has an overriding interest in 
developing its periphery in the same way that it has developed its metropolises. A 
narrative of ‘modernisation’, which is in tune with the pursuit of neoliberal planning 
policies, provides therefore little prospect for the recognition of heterogeneity in peri-
urban spaces, or of the fact that not all social groups have the same kind of political 
representation in development processes. As a result, while middle class groups have 
achieved a certain level of protection from environmental hazards, poor people have to 
fend for themselves with little or no protection being provided from state actors. Lastly, 
it is important to note that such kinds of political barriers are not meant to be exclusive, 
but rather the point is that these barriers have played a central role in the case studies 
examined, and occur at different scales of the policy process almost simultaneously. 
Some reflection and clarification is appropriate at this stage on how answers to the 
questions posed were developed, both in the course of the research, as well as in the 
final written version of the thesis. In this study, the two cases that were selected, namely 
(a) the functioning of the Board and the (b) translation of water quality priorities in the 
peri-urban region of Ghaziabad, were central to the ‘multi-sited’ research approach of 
this study which hoped to capture and enlarge on a contemporary phenomenon in its 
real context. Using two case studies can be viewed as a somewhat ambitious way to 
answer the research questions.  
The peculiarities and the difficulties that this thesis encounters in the delineation of 
multiple epistemological paradigms are illustrated in its borrowings from two different 
yet parallel discussions; the first pertaining to STS and the other to the peri-urban 
debate. Neither of these debates is incorporated here in full as this thesis operates on the 
points of intersection and interaction of those discussions. Despite the methodological 
limitation of not offering an in-depth coverage of either debate, the thesis explores the 
breadth that can be covered by simultaneously engaging with both in order to draw 
different conclusions and steer them to different outcomes through the discussion and 
the findings that are presented in the course of the thesis.   
What therefore sets this research apart is that it has attempted to take on together these 
two very different discussions and to show how each context influences the other in 
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important ways. This approach offers a more multifaceted answer to why expert 
advisory processes neglect issues of water quality in peri-urban areas, an answer that 
includes both the operation of scientists and the direct implications of impaired water 
quality in local contexts, in a way that would not have been possible if it had been 
focused only on one of these policy settings.       
The multi-sited approach adopted for studying the policy process demonstrated that 
making expert advisory processes of decision-making more responsive to peri-urban 
areas necessitates the reversal of a set of dominant tendencies. In the case of water 
quality assessment, there is significant scope for ‘branching-out’ assessment 
methodologies and promoting the inclusion of alternative sources of expertise. The fact 
that water quality assessment procedures are informed by a narrow range of expertise 
and perspectives provides limited scope for complex interactions between different 
water user groups and their existing dependencies on natural resources to be properly 
accounted for in policy making. Another tendency that could be reversed is the way 
poorer user groups are currently represented in policy appraisal and implementation 
procedures. A better representation of these poorer user groups affected in more adverse 
ways by polluted water is likely to depend on a better recognition of existing power 
asymmetries in implementation that exclude the concerns of the poor. Also, the 
development of meaningful interventions is strongly dependent on recognising that 
poorer user groups are affected by deteriorating water quality through a combination of 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ processes.    
7.2. Research contributions to knowledge 
The research aimed to contribute to existing debates in several ways. It has sought to 
provide original insights into the organisational and institutional contexts that underpin 
existing policy failures in managing water quality. As the world is rapidly becoming 
more complex, but also more urban, the peri-urban stands out as a representative 
example of this new order of complexity. In this context, worsening levels of water 
quality is a key environmental challenge facing many cities and peri-urban 
environments of the Global South, and is likely to be exacerbated in the near future.  A 
discussion on how policy processes fail address water quality, and indeed how different 
actor groups construct policy is relevant. It is also important to explore some of the 
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critical insights this study has to offer with regards to addressing questions of 
sustainability and social justice in the peri-urban context.  
The originality of this research rests initially with its overall approach. Whilst not being 
entirely ethnographic (since ethnographic research can often span several years of 
fieldwork), it has adopted and expanded upon important features of ethnographic 
research with to better understand different dimensions of the policy process. In 
particular, the research has tried to demonstrate in several instances that discourse is not 
impartial where the sustaining of current failures in resolving complex water quality 
challenges is concerned. Another way of engaging in this debate is by narrowing down 
the analysis to the predominant causes for policy failure and how these are attributed to 
the agency of multiple actor groups.  
Furthermore it has provoked reasons for questioning entrenched commitments and 
practices as a necessary step for addressing peri-urban sustainability. Given that the 
peri-urban literature has generally placed greater emphasis on the relationship between 
land-use change and sustainability (cf.Douglas, 2006, Narain, 2009), this research has 
provided insights on a less explored aspect of sustainability. Land is indeed important, 
as some of the major changes taking place in the peri-urban context are underpinned by 
land related changes. However, shifting analytical attention from the issue of land to 
problems of deteriorating water quality, has brought to the foreground the relationship 
between knowledge, policy and formal decision-making, and has presented this as yet 
another area that merits attention for sustainability.  
Part of the reason why the sustainability of peri-urban areas is often undermined has to 
do with how critical dimensions of the peri-urban context become effectively ignored in 
policy. This omission is in turn linked to the current mode of expert knowledge creation, 
and how legitimacy depends on where the knowledge is coming from. Exploring the 
different framings of water quality risk, which exist amongst citizens and science 
professionals, demonstrated this point.  In the earlier theoretical discussion on risk (i.e. 
section 2.5), it was highlighted that conventional risk assessments focus on risks that are 
easily parameterisable, such as increasing emphasis on river pollution, or the 
technological options considered in order for policy to respond to river pollution, as 
discussed in section 4.4.3.   However, they are poor at dealing with risks that are 
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characterised by ‘incomplete knowledge’(cf.Stirling et al., 2007) such as the long-term 
effects of the biological and chemical contamination of drinking water sources. 
Because of this misplaced focus on risk, peri-urban sustainability became undermined, 
and critical interconnections between water (access) and waste (water) that were central 
for peri-urban actors, were left markedly unrecognised at the national level. Throughout 
negotiations about peri-urban sustainability, policy agents have yet to reconcile their 
approach towards the different forms of knowledge which exist about the peri-urban 
context, as these different knowledges are often likely to represent different priorities 
for sustainability (Leach et al., 2010: 64). A critical point that this study has attempted 
to communicate is that, if policy and decision-making effectively continues to ignore 
the different forms of knowledge which shape the peri-urban context, it becomes very 
difficult to create a more ‘inclusive’ vision of peri-urban sustainability. Such a vision 
would need to include an understanding of how different groups are represented in the 
process of addressing peri-urban sustainability; thus, taking a broader view of 
institutional responses, forms of expertise, and tools needed, for arriving at more 
sustainable peri-urban conditions.  
In relation to the issue of social justice, the research has tried to argue that while 
environmental problems affecting peri-urban areas demand urgent attention, it is 
particularly those problems that are affecting the quality of life of the poorest groups 
that have been strikingly neglected in the policy arena. This is partly because issues of 
social justice have not been considered on a par with environmental sustainability. In 
order for this trend to be reversed, the thesis has identified that the understanding of and 
responses to impaired water quality of those living with or dependent upon 
contaminated water sources should have a more central role in shaping policy outcomes. 
It is equally important to legitimise NGO and civil society based water pollution 
monitoring initiatives that make stronger connections between water contamination and 
health effects on the poorest. A strategy of this kind, intended to benefit a particular 
social group that so far has been neglected in policy and planning of the peri-urban, is 
essentially a ‘political enterprise’ (Allen, 2003:146). Thus developing more socially just 
outcomes relates most obviously to the extent to which the participation of the poor 
themselves in the definition of priorities and decision-making can be achieved. This will 
not be an easy task, as the thesis has demonstrated, since part of the struggle in opening 
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up policy appraisal and implementation to poorer citizens is fundamentally about 
recognising the underlying power relationships that prevent marginalised people from 
having a greater voice and agency in policy. 
Arguably, creating these sorts of connections between sustainability and social justice in 
the peri-urban interface has implications for other contexts where water quality is 
deteriorating as a result of rapid environmental and social change. For example, the 
ongoing pollution of water associated with the rise of oil extracting industries in many 
parts of the Amazon represents equally serious risks to the ecology of the Amazon and 
to human health, especially for the poorest people who use and consume contaminated 
water on an everyday basis (Bebbington, 2009). Currently different actors (oil 
companies, government actors, indigenous organisations working with citizens) struggle 
to obtained reliable information about measured levels of dangerous substances in 
polluted water (ibid). Hence, contests of knowledge are as ‘alive’ in this kind of policy 
process as they are in the peri-urban interface. Ultimately however, realising a broader 
normative notion of sustainability in this kind of context depends critically on the extent 
to which notions of environmental sustainability and social justice can be brought 
together when powerful forces are involved in shaping urban and peri-urban 
development, recognising that there are likely to be trade-offs between different actors’ 
goals and aspirations with regard to sustainability (Leach et al., 2010).   
The strength of this study is the empirical insights drawn from the different cases, and 
not the construction of new theory. However, the empirical insights themselves imply a 
few modest contributions to existing theoretical debates, particularly in bringing 
together the policy studies and STS literature with the view to fostering a better 
dialogue between the two theoretical disciplines. In India, much attention has been 
directed towards ‘experts’ working within the bureaucracy, while their predominance in 
framing environmental policy has often been contested (cf.Williams and Mawdsley, 
2006, Menon and Kohli, 2008). However, there have been fewer studies that have 
attempted to develop a better understanding of the underpinning discursive mechanisms 
and institutional commitments that ensure their predominance in policy. To this end, 
and by following the STS tradition, the thesis has taken a ‘regulator’s view’ of the 
policy process and has highlighted that values, regulatory behaviour and the way 
experts ‘manage’ their relationships with other actors play a key role in their 
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maintaining a position of influence. By contrast, following the policy studies tradition 
enabled this study to broaden the focus and link a discussion on expert practice and 
knowledge to the peri-urban context, highlighting in the process that a two-way 
relationship exists between policy implementation and policy framing. The success of 
bringing together STS and policy studies rests fundamentally in showing that although 
policies are negotiated locally, local negotiations are also influenced by wider discursive 
frames, narratives and problem framings attached to national level actors.   
The dialogue between STS and policy studies has further helped highlight a number of 
key entry points that could counter-balance some of the existing failures identified in 
the policy process. This links particularly to the idea that the functioning of the Board 
and State Boards could become more effective. The appointment of members should 
include other areas of expertise that are currently absent from both pollution 
assessments and the implementation of regulatory guidelines. Furthermore, the practice 
of regulating water quality needs to become more transparent, creating conditions where 
the regulators themselves are more open about the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
regulatory action. In addition, the research has identified specific potential entry points 
in the current structure that would allow the concerns of a wider range of stakeholders 
to be better represented in routine decision-making than at present. There is plenty of 
scope for translating the insights of this research into a summary of recommendations 
that can be used later to inform policy makers and regulators alike how prevailing 
approaches could become more pragmatic and responsive to local conditions. But this 
type of engagement can only take place if regulators are prepared to take up the 
challenge of making deeper changes in the existing regulatory regime.  
Finally, the thesis’ contributions to knowledge can be evaluated in light of previous 
research carried out on the peri-urban context. As discussed in the introductory Chapter 
1, much ink has been spent discussing the particularities and commonalities of the peri-
urban context. In the process valuable insights have been drawn from case study 
research in India and other countries, most prominently countries of the Global South, 
where peri-urbanisation has become more pronounced in recent years. On the basis of 
this research, we are now in a better position to evaluate environmental challenges 
brought forward by a broader process of economic and political change affecting the 
peri-urban interface (cf.Thong, 1995, Arabindoo, 2005), how peri-urban systems are 
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constituted in the first place (Moffat and Finnis, 2005, McGregor et al., 2006), and the 
transformations rural and urban that act upon such systems (Baviskar, 2002, Kundu, 
2008).   
However, it is rather surprising that despite the relative rise in research focusing on peri-
urban systems, this is an issue that still remains fairly marginal in mainstream policy 
and planning decisions. Part of the reason for this, in my view, is that a systematic 
analysis of the diverging ways of perceiving and analysing the peri-urban, in relation to 
specific resource management issues such as the impacts of water pollution, has not 
been granted sufficient attention by peri-urban scholars. Building constructively upon 
existing peri-urban theorisations, the thesis has therefore brought attention to two 
important areas which still remain relatively underrepresented in peri-urban research.   
The first relates to the issue of scale. It still remains a critical challenge to understand 
the type of barriers that exist for ‘mainstreaming’ peri-urban considerations in policy 
and planning, and the different scales at which such barriers are likely to be manifested. 
So far, the peri-urban has been subject mostly to a ‘place-specific’ analysis, however the 
perspective offered in this thesis is essentially based on thinking ‘across scales’. A 
cross-scale approach has helped identify policy spaces that exist ‘outside’ the 
geographical boundaries of the peri-urban yet can make a huge difference in shaping 
decisions around policy and planning on the ground. Notably, here, the role of the 
Board and the policy influence that it has achieved on issues related to water quality 
management over the years is of relevance since, as this study has shown it is a ‘macro’ 
policy space that could have a positive influence over the peri-urban, if for instance the 
particularities of the peri-urban context were fully integrated in the Board’s decisions. 
However, what became clearly evident is that the Board can also be an ‘obstruction’ to 
mainstreaming the peri-urban in policy and planning, if particular biases that influence 
decision-making are not made explicit by involved actors, or are intentionally ignored 
for political reasons.  
The second relates to the issue of knowledge. The approach commonly adopted to 
examine the peri-urban space emphasises the institutions formed in peri-urban areas 
such as, for instance, the range of formal and informal institutions that are usually 
formed for accessing basic water and sanitation services in the peri-urban context 
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(Davilla et al., 1999, Allen et al., 2006). In these accounts, a particular emphasis is 
placed on how institutional arrangements affect the long-term sustainability of peri-
urban areas but also on the linkages between institutional arrangements and the quality 
of life and livelihoods of those citizens that reside in these spaces (Allen et.al, 
2006:147). The insights offered by this study suggest that alternative knowledge based 
understandings of the peri-urban interface can also be of particular relevance, 
particularly when the influence of diverse knowledge systems is considered in the 
context of prevailing institutional arrangements, formal and informal. It provides an 
account of sources of incomplete knowledge in policy and management (i.e. in this case, 
specifically to do with water quality), and ways in which environmental risk and 
uncertainty (two critical issues in relation to the peri-urban environments) become 
embodied in different forms of knowledge production (i.e. ‘expert’ as well as ‘lay’). 
Arguably, the issue of knowledge, and particularly locating knowledge both 
institutionally as well as geographically, is a subject that has received less attention both 
in urban and peri-urban debates, and where there are clear complementarities between 
the two. The thesis provides some prospect for moving towards that direction, while 
Chapter 3 has made explicit the methodological innovations and challenges of making 
knowledge a more central focus in peri-urban research.  
7.3. Implications for future research 
Water quality is traditionally a subject loaded with technicalities. Very little scholarly 
attention has been given to the ways in which water quality problems manifesting in 
transitional regions are, in fact, linked to a complex mix of institutional and knowledge 
factors. With this study having reached a natural close, a range of opportunities are 
presented for further research in this field.   
This study has focused on two case studies in order to develop the key insights. The 
conclusions drawn from the case studies can only explain the overall patterns that 
underpin causes of failure to address water quality. However, at the same time, these 
cases do not allow a precise representation of the processes studied, and indeed there are 
other cases that could be included in the future in order to develop a better 
understanding of the issues. It would be of particular interest to explore the influence of 
international regulatory institutions’ influence on the development of national 
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regulatory norms and guidelines. Global institutions such as the World Bank, the WHO, 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) may not necessarily directly impose regulatory norms for water 
quality on developing countries such as India, but they can indirectly urge the adoption 
of particular principles and ‘best-practices’ that are difficult for national regulatory 
institutions to ignore (Van Zwanenberg et al., 2008: 8). One area of influence arises 
from the adoption of international water quality standards within national regulatory 
frameworks. Another important area could arise from the controlling of funds and 
expertise for project based activities already taking place within India by global 
institutions. River pollution abatement strategies especially have been heavily funded by 
donor agencies that are eager to make radical changes in the way water quality 
(specifically river pollution) is managed at present. Also, further research on global 
institutions and actors could support a better understanding of how the particular 
aspirations, visions and problem framings of actors at the international level could 
reinforce existing policy failures. Alternatively, if approaches developed at the 
international level could offer scope for the more integrated management of water 
quality, what constraints could hinder a process of scaling down these approaches to the 
local level? Both these issues deserve some further reflection since as far as the study 
findings suggest, any practical influence from international frameworks on the peri-
urban was observed to be minimal.  
This thesis has attempted to engage with policy processes influencing water quality 
priorities. It is possible however, that due to the thesis’ emphasis on expert decision-
making, other distinguishing features of the policy process may have been 
underrepresented. Or, put in terms of the theories applied, the attempt to make stronger 
links between policy studies and STS may have caused some of the conceptual elements 
that underpin studies on policy in particular to figure less prominently in the research.  
Leaving this limitation open is helpful since it provides directions for future research. 
Notably, the thesis has turned much of its attention towards the ‘politics’ of knowledge 
(particularly expert knowledge) but there are also political implications associated with 
the policies themselves. It is a very interesting line of inquiry, for instance, to look at 
how the urban middle-class can influence particular values and aspirations for 
strengthening environmental protection in towns and cities. This in turn is linked to 
what type of water quality changes are deemed necessary and important. Scholars in 
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Delhi have pointed out the dangers of middle class environmentalism in constructing an 
overtly sanitised vision of environmental protection that fails to incorporate the 
concerns of poorer groups (Baviskar, 2003). How are such visions co-constructed by 
different actor groups? What might be the role of the media in conjunction with civil 
society and policy makers in reproducing and legitimising such visions? There is also 
plenty of scope for future research on how business interests (and the power of 
industries) can gain undue influence over environmental protection measures. 
Empirically, this line of inquiry could perhaps focus much more on the interface 
between environmental regulators and industries than this study achieved. On a more 
general note, the point to be made is that matters of political economy in relation to 
water quality could be developed further in research terms.  
Finally, a third potentially useful direction for further research to take would be to build 
upon the theoretical and empirical insights of this study in order to pursue an 
investigation of other relevant policy fields. In particular, expert knowledge related to 
air quality is another technical field that deserves much more focused scholarly study.  
Taking into consideration the Board’s approach to water quality management, for 
example, it is possible to foresee overlaps with the design of prevailing air quality 
monitoring arrangements. A wider acceptance of the limitations of prevailing appraisal 
approaches (i.e. regarding the issue of selection of appropriate monitoring scales, 
language, and sources of knowledge,) could, in turn, form the basis for thinking in more 
concrete ways about specific tools that could encourage a more participatory style of 
engagement with impacts of water and air quality on targeted populations. For instance, 
work conducted in Indian towns and cities using spatial data (based on geographic 
information systems) and social surveys has been useful for identifying ‘hotspots’ of 
deprivation within large towns and cities (Baud, 2011). For the most part, such studies 
have been useful for mapping the extent to which anti-poverty programmes are, in fact, 
reaching those areas that they are intended for. It could be possible to imagine how 
similar methodologies could be developed to determine how pollution impacts variably 
upon different populations within urban and peri-urban areas. So from this point of 
view, there is significant scope for further research in terms of testing new types of 
methodologies and identifying specific entry points in the policy process, where these 
could be utilised for incorporating new information about the opportunities and 
limitations presented by the local environment, the social relations of power influencing 
  
215 
the distribution of risk from pollutants, as well as the concerns and aspirations of 
affected communities with regard to those risks.  
To conclude, it can be hoped that the proverbial ‘our power rests with numbers’, a quote 
from one of the Board members, included also in the title of this thesis, ends up being 
challenged as both a rhetoric and professional practice ethic. Instead, as this thesis has 
argued, it is entirely possible that a more broad, varied and therefore socio-culturally 
embedded conception of water quality can become realised. Not only augmenting 
technical and specialised knowledge, but also creating pathways towards social justice 
and environmental sustainability, catered for by research objectives that policy makers 
and scientists alike might cultivate, develop and enforce. 
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Appendix 1: Interviews with Board members, activists 
and scientists in Delhi, case 1 
1. Mr. Sinha, chairman of the Board  
2. Dr. Patel, additional director of the Board      
3. Dr. Joshi, (former) additional director of the Board      
4. Dr. Verma, senior laboratory scientist of the Board       
5. Dr. Rao, senior chemist and additional director of the Board   
1. Dr. Desai, senior scientist and director of PAMS division of the Board    
2. Dr. Bhatt, senior scientist, PAMS division of the Board     
3. Dr. Modi, senior scientist, PAMS division of the Board     
4. Mr. Raj Kumar, environmental engineer, PCI division of the Board   
5. Mr. Manoj Tanti, senior environment engineer, PCI division of the Board   
6. Mr. Ajay Prasad, environmental engineer, working for IIT in New Delhi  
7. Dr. Khamar, retired engineering professor living in New Delhi     
8. Mr. Raghavendra, retired pollution scientist living in New Delhi 
9. Mr. Lalit Rao, senior climate scientist working for IIT New Delhi 
10. Mr. Sunil Mehta, engaged activist and journalist based in Chennai  
11. Mr. Leo Saldanha, environmental activist based in Bangalore* 
12. Mr. Dunu Roy, director of Hazards Centre, an NGO based in New Delhi** 
* Real name used with permission 
** Real name used with permission
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Appendix 2: Interviews with officials, citizens, and 
activists in peri-urban Ghaziabad, case 2    
1. Mr. Jadav, director of the UPPCB regional office     
2. Mrs. Roy, scientific officer at the UPPCB regional office    
3. Mr. Vivek Nain, assistant engineer at the UPPCB regional office  
4. Mr. Surya Joshi, official of the Water Board (Jal Nigam)    
5. Mr. Vivek Ramesh, chief engineer for the Ganga Jal water treatment plant  
6. Mr. Neeraj Kumar, water engineer of the Water Board (Jal Nigam) 
7. Dr. Saraf, chief medical officer of the Ghaziabad Hospital     
8. Dr. Shastri, coordinator of the IDSP, Ghaziabad Hospital                
9. Miss Riya, IDSP officer of Ghaziabad Hospital   
10. Mr. Anand, chief town planner for the Ghaziabad Development Authority  
11. Mr. Ajay Kadam, Municipal Commissioner of Ghaziabad  
12. Mr. Sen, senior engineer for the Central Groundwater Board 
13. Elderly woman resident of Ambedkar Nagar slum settlement 
14. Village elder, resident of Ambedkar Nagar slum settlement 
15. Farmer and resident of KarKar Model urban village 
16. Resident of KarKar Model urbanised village 
17. Resident of Nawada urban village  
18. Resident of Maharajpur urban village, Sahibabad industrial area 
19. Mr. Sushil Raghav, environmental activist based in Ghaziabad* 
20. Mr. Venkataraman, resident of Indirapuram, and New Delhi advocate** 
* Real name used with permission 
**Real name used with permission
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Appendix 3: Example of the interview schedule 
1. Interviews with Board members 
Eliciting respondents’ profile 
Ask for name of interviewee, area of expertise and position in the organisation, number 
of years spent in the organisation, professional roles other than the Board.  
Introductory questions 
How do you see the role of the Board in terms of addressing water pollution? 
What policy guidelines influence how financial and time resources are spent to address 
water quality management?  
To what extent does the structure of the organisation (i.e. in terms of divisions, 
infrastructure, and expertise) influence the projects you work on (for example more 
work on national air, water quality monitoring)? 
What stakeholders do you normally liaise with on the subject of water pollution? 
In recent years have you been working on projects/initiatives (mention examples?) that 
signify a change in organisational thinking over addressing pollution issues? 
Working as a scientist in the Board (regulatory/advisory) you may have to perform 
different sets of activities that are not necessarily related to your expertise….if so can 
you discuss a bit on the nature of these responsibilities? 
Questions specific to water pollution monitoring 
What types of issues are you usually concerned when developing a monitoring strategy 
(i.e. for water pollution)? 
Does that involve fieldwork activities? (Going to poorer communities?) 
How often would you need to go to the field? 
When water samples come from outside agencies, what is the scientific rationale for 
testing the quality of the water? 
When it comes to water pollution, why have you focused primarily on large scale river 
basin studies? 
When it comes to particular problem areas (i.e. Ghaziabad) do you consult local 
regulatory bodies to develop a pollution abatement strategy?  
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What happens when a water quality concern overlaps with the responsibilities of 
another agency (i.e. Groundwater Board, municipality, health departments)? 
How robust are effluent emission standards (as a regulatory ‘tool’) in minimising 
pollution impact, (taking into account connections between pollution, health, ecology, 
sustainability environment)? 
Do you think that incorporation of social science research methodologies and expertise 
can have a positive impact to your work. Is that something that CPCB would consider? 
(Considering that the majority of people working in CPCB are scientists) 
Water pollution regulation 
Can you intervene at the state level when a particular problem area is not addressed 
properly (i.e. industries operating illegally in Ghaziabad)? 
What would be the role of the CPCB in this case?  
Would it result to particular actions being taken? Or does that depend on other 
agencies/authorities co-operation (i.e. District Magistrate, Municipality)? 
Do you feel that your organisation is sufficiently equipped in terms of manpower and 
financial resources to regulate water quality affectively? 
Would it make sense in your opinion to give greater autonomy at the state level for 
developing standards?  
Eliciting Board members’ views on citizen participation in formal decision-making 
Under what circumstances do you seek the consultation of the public or 
citizens/communities affected by impaired water quality? 
How can the public become more informed/and proactive in decision-making? 
What type of institutions do you normally share your data with (policy makers, NGOs, 
universities, other?)?  
While the general public is more aware of the functions and activities of the Board, 
there is little awareness at the ‘state’ and ‘district’ level on the roles of State Boards.  
This often leaves pollution-affected citizens powerless in terms of seeking solutions to 
their immediate concerns. How do you feel the role of the State Boards could be 
improved, as well as the interaction between the State Boards and your own 
organisation?  
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2. Interviews with officials in Ghaziabad district 
Eliciting respondents’ profile 
Ask for name of interviewee, area of expertise, name of the organisation, professional 
responsibilities. State aim of this study is on eliciting the personal views of officials 
working in Ghaziabad district about the problems of water pollution affecting the area.   
Introductory questions 
How long have you worked in this district? 
Have you seen any significant changes taking place in this area over recent years? 
What do you think is contributing to the degrading environmental conditions of this 
region? 
Are there any particular areas (related to local environment) that you find to be of more 
concern than others?  
Questions applicable to all fields of experts/officials 
In your organisation what are the key initiatives (and policy interventions) that you are 
focusing on (is there an obvious link with water quality?)? 
When did the initiatives start? How long have they been running for? 
What sort of social groups do these activities normally target (i.e. residential areas? 
villages?)?  
Water pollution regulation   
What type of pollution issues do you focus upon? 
Do you have a team that conducts field visits? (How often do you visit affected areas?) 
What activities do you need to regulate more closely (i.e. river basins, industries?)? 
Do you have the power to close down an industry that is not conforming?  
Official views on community level water quality concerns  
How is your organisation involved with improving the environment in villages and slum 
settlements?  
Do you (or your teams) make field visits to these areas? How regularly? 
Do you talk to community about the problems, or do you get information from local 
doctors and representatives? 
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Do you have information on pollution problems affecting these areas? 
Is there a dialogue amongst official agencies on pollution issues affecting the villages 
and slums? 
How informed do you think the communities are in terms of government efforts 
(immunisation, water treatment filters, other options?) 
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Appendix 4: Right to Information Act Letter 
 
